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i. an accoMPanying lEttEr 
We are of one mind in recommending for consideration the thoughtful report developed 
by the Presidential Succession Clinic of Fordham University Law School. We were 
pleased to participate in the Fordham Law Review program, a unique academic but highly 
practical undertaking, that preceded the establishment of the Clinic; the program led 
to the publication of an issue of the journal entitled “The Adequacy of the Presidential 
Succession System in the 21st Century: Filling the Gaps and Clarifying the Ambiguities 
in Constitutional and Extraconstitutional Arrangements,” 79 Fordham L. Rev. 775-1157 
(2010). We each also participated in a class with the Clinic, sharing our experiences with  
the students and responding to their questions.
We are each aware from our own public service of the importance of anticipating and 
developing approaches to the handling of contingencies that, if they occurred, could 
endanger our nation. We have been reminded time and again that what may appear at one 
time to be remote does in fact occur. Luckily, we have met past challenges and have taken 
steps to improve our system, but we have not addressed every gap.  
The accompanying Report, entitled “Ensuring the Stability of Presidential Succession in 
the Modern Era: Report of the Fordham University School of Law Clinic on Presidential 
Succession,” is important for many reasons. It provides a thorough history of our nation’s 
three succession statutes, examines the Twenty-Fifth Amendment that has served the 
nation well, and discusses political party rules and procedures for responding to succession 
contingencies in the pre-inaugural period. The three professors and nine students of 
Fordham Law School who have studied the system of presidential succession and developed 
this Report offer recommendations worthy of careful attention regardless of one’s point of 
view on the subject generally or on any particular recommendation. Fordham Law School 
has made valuable contributions in the field of presidential succession and this Report is the 
latest and possibly most immediately constructive.
We thank Fordham Law School, its deans, professors, and students, for inviting us to 
participate in this rich and vital endeavor. We have no doubt that this Report will be of 
enormous benefit to decision makers and citizens more broadly and urge decision makers in 
the federal government as well as our national party leadership to give it their most serious 
consideration.
Birch Bayh Benton Becker Fred F. Fielding
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In April 2010, Fordham University School of Law hosted 
a two-day symposium on the Adequacy of the Presidential 
Succession System in the 21st Century. The symposium 
included as speakers and panelists many of the foremost 
scholars who have addressed issues relating to the law 
and practicalities of transition in the case of temporary 
interruption of leadership by the President of the United 
States or, of far greater potential concern, national tragedy 
resulting in the death or inability of the President or Vice 
President or both.
The symposium was considered by those who attended 
and others in the field who reviewed the transcript to be an 
extraordinarily substantive and informative conference. As 
a result, William Michael Treanor, then Dean of Fordham 
University School of Law, suggested that a clinic be created 
to study and propose solutions for the many and challenging 
issues that remain unaddressed by the Constitution, the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, and current federal and state 
statutes.
A clinical seminar was thus established for the Fall 2010 
and Spring 2011 terms, led by former Dean John D. Feerick, 
who has had a lifelong interest in these issues, has published 
books and articles on them, and worked closely together with 
Senator Birch Bayh and others in Congress on the drafting, 
passage, and ratification of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 
Dean Feerick was joined by Adjunct Professor Dora Galacatos 
of Fordham Law School and Senior Counsel for the Law 
School’s Feerick Center for Social Justice and Adjunct 
Professor Nicole A. Gordon, a former chair of the New York 
State Bar Association Federal Constitution Committee. Nine 
students of different backgrounds were selected to participate 
in the clinic, which required a significant commitment and 
intensive work to master the literature and intricacies of the 
subjects raised by the topic.
Beyond their study, the students shaped this Report after 
determining subjects that it would address. The seminar 
examined the question of what true “gaps” exist in the 
current succession process (i.e., those for which there is no 
clear direction in law), as opposed to possible gaps for which 
a solution does exist but is not ideal. The students ordered 
priorities among the true gaps and decided which are the 
most urgent and practical to address.
A further purpose of the seminar was to make a non-partisan, 
constitutionally sound, and practical contribution that could 
be recognized as worthy and within the immediate reach 
of the political process. There was an interest not simply 
in producing a Report, but in acting on it: presenting it to 
decision makers in Congress, in the executive branch, and 
in the political parties, and arguing the merits of the group’s 
recommendations addressing this complex area to forestall the 
extraordinary challenges that could someday face this country 
if contingencies occur that so far are unaccounted for in the 
succession law.
The Clinic decided not to propose a constitutional amendment, 
understanding the extreme difficulty of instituting change in 
this manner. Instead, the students focused on suggestions for 
statutory change, exercise of executive (and personal) powers, 
amendment of political party and congressional rules, and 
practical plans that can be implemented in the absence of any 
change in the law, but that are consistent with the Constitution 
and existing succession law. 
The Clinic’s recommendations are summarized in the 
Executive Summary and Part VIII of the Report. These 
recommendations represent the consensus of the group and 
should not be attributed to any one person.
We are grateful for the assistance of numerous participants 
in our work who are named in the acknowledgements and 
without whose contributions we would not have understood 
the subject as well, as readily, or as deeply. 
John D. Feerick
Dora Galacatos
Nicole A. Gordon
June 2012
iii. forEword
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iV. ExEcutiVE suMMary
The attempted assassination in January 2011 of United 
States Representative Gabrielle Giffords in Tucson, Arizona, 
highlights the fact that the safety of our political leaders is 
under constant threat. The President of the United States, 
more than any other individual, unites and strengthens the 
nation and serves as a source of stability in crisis situations. 
The gaps and contingencies that exist in the current system 
of presidential succession leave our country vulnerable to 
a vacuum in national leadership. It is easy to conclude that 
the unaddressed contingencies in the current system of 
presidential succession are remote, but the unexpected and 
unforeseen do occur. A catastrophic event can leave both the 
President and Vice President dead or unable at the same time. 
The Presidential Succession Clinic at Fordham University 
School of Law, composed of three professors and nine 
students, undertook in July 2010 the task of analyzing 
the existing framework for succession and advancing 
recommendations to address these gaps and contingencies. 
The Symposium on Presidential Succession, sponsored by 
the Fordham Law Review in April 2010, highlighted these 
weaknesses.i Many of the nation’s foremost public servants in 
past succession crises joined with other experts in academia, 
law, national security, public policy, and politics to discuss 
these issues. They encouraged continued work in this field 
leading to the establishment of the Clinic. 
The work of a law school clinic may be seen by some as a 
largely academic endeavor; however, as former Dean William 
Michael Treanor noted at the symposium, “[g]iven the terrible 
frequency with which Presidents fail to complete their terms 
of office and the frequency with which they are disabled, any 
ambiguities concerning presidential succession and any flaws 
in the rules governing succession have the capacity to lead 
to national disaster.”ii We agree. The unforeseen and remote 
can occur, and advance contingency planning can prevent 
confusion or even chaos at a time of national distress. 
The Clinic began by studying the system of presidential 
i Symposium, The Adequacy of the Presidential Succession System in the 21st 
Century: Filling the Gaps and Clarifying the Ambiguities in Constitutional 
and Extraconstitutional Arrangement, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 775 (2010).
ii Id. at 775-76.
succession as set forth in the text of the Constitution—Article 
II, Section 1, Clause 6, and the Twelfth, Twentieth, and 
Twenty-Fifth Amendments—the Presidential Succession Act 
of 1947, other federal and state statutes, political party rules, 
and documents such as “letter agreements” that provided 
for a transition process in certain circumstances. The Clinic 
examined a broad range of proposals regarding presidential 
succession and interviewed, among others, many of the 
experts who participated in the Fordham symposium. 
In making recommendations for reform, we were guided by 
five values:
•	 Adherence to the Constitution;
•	 Certainty and predictability in the transition of 
leadership;
•	 Legitimacy of a presidential successor in the eyes of the 
public;
•	 Party continuity; and
•	 Depth in qualifications of a possible successor.
The Clinic studied three distinct areas: presidential and vice-
presidential inabilities not provided for by the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment; the line of succession; and the pre-inaugural 
period. 
First, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment does not address certain 
instances of inability of a President or Vice President. These 
include: 
•	 Inability of a President when there is a vacancy in the 
office of Vice President;
•	 Dual inability of a President and Vice President; 
•	 Inability of a Vice President; and
•	 Inability of a statutory successor while acting as President. 
Second, succession to the presidency is possible through a 
line including members of both the legislative and executive 
branches. The gaps and contingencies in this area include: 
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•	 The questionable constitutionality of having legislative 
leaders in the line of succession;
•	 Concerns about the qualifications and presidential 
pedigree of executive officers in the line of succession;
•	 The effects of the “bumping” provision in the current 
succession law, which can result in multiple individuals 
exercising the powers of the President in a short period of 
time; and 
•	 Lack of clarity whether Acting Cabinet Secretaries are in 
the line of succession.
Finally, each segment within the pre-inaugural period, 
running up to the start of the quadrennial presidential term 
on January 20, presents distinct gaps and contingencies. 
We address these with particular attention to democratic 
legitimacy and current political realities. They include:
•	 Party procedures that do not adequately address the 
death or resignation of a presidential or vice-presidential 
candidate prior to Inauguration Day; 
•	 Lack of clarity about the duties of presidential electors 
and Congress with respect to the casting and counting of 
electoral votes in the event of the death or resignation of a 
presidential or vice-presidential nominee, or both; and 
•	 Lack of an institutionalized process for nominating 
Cabinet members during the transition between 
presidential administrations.
•	•	•
The Clinic is aware of the political challenges to reform in this 
area. Although we have certain preferred recommendations, 
we recognize the obstacles to change and have made a range 
of proposals to offer decision makers different options to 
consider. We also note with respect to our recommendations 
for executive action that these will almost all require 
cooperation with the legislative branch and that some of 
the recommendations surely reflect actions already taken by 
recent administrations, but which are not necessarily known 
to the public. 
a. PrEsidEntial and VicE-PrEsidEntial inability
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution 
establishes procedures for both the filling of a vacancy in 
the office of the Vice President and for addressing a case of a 
presidential inability. The Amendment’s availability in 1973 
and 1974, when both the elected President and Vice President 
resigned from their offices, provided essential stability and 
continuity at a time of great national turmoil.
Although the Twenty-Fifth Amendment has dealt 
successfully with challenges encountered since its adoption 
in 1967, neither the Amendment nor the 1947 Act addresses 
several key threats to presidential continuity posed by a 
presidential or vice-presidential inability.
First, the Amendment is predicated on the availability of 
an able Vice President. In the event that the office of Vice 
President is vacant or the Vice President, due to his own 
inability, is unable to act with the Cabinet under Section 4 
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the Amendment does not 
provide an alternative means for making a declaration that 
the President is unable. History has shown that a vacancy or 
inability in the office of the Vice President is a contingency 
that cannot be ignored.
Second, the Amendment does not establish a procedure for 
declaring the inability of the Vice President. In the event that 
a President dies, resigns, or is removed from office, a situation 
may arise in which an unable Vice President would assume the 
presidency. In addition, a President anticipating a temporary 
inability or one who is unable but recognizes his own inability 
will likely be reluctant to transfer his powers even briefly to an 
unable Vice President. Furthermore, an unable Vice President 
may not be in a position to exercise his responsibility pursuant 
to Section 4 to declare a President unable to discharge the 
powers and duties of his office. 
Third, neither the Amendment nor the 1947 Act establishes 
procedures for declaring the inability of an Acting President 
during a vice-presidential vacancy or inability.
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Presidential and Acting Presidential Inability 
Recommendations: 
Statutory Action:
1. Acknowledge that the President or Acting President, 
upon declaration of his own inability, can transfer his 
powers voluntarily to the next in the line of succession in 
instances of vice-presidential inability or vacancy.
2. Authorize the person next in the line of succession 
after the Vice President, together with a majority of the 
Cabinet, to declare the inability of the President or Acting 
President in instances of vice-presidential inability or 
vacancy. 
Executive Contingency Planning:
3. The President or Acting President should prepare a 
prospective executive declaration of inability at the 
beginning of his service, in which he would define the 
situations which in his view would render him unable 
to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency in 
the future and would provide that the declaration of his 
inability goes into effect based upon a review process set 
out by the President or Acting President.
Vice-Presidential Inability Recommendation:
Executive Contingency Planning:
4. The Vice President should prepare a prospective executive 
declaration of inability at the beginning of his service, in 
which he would define the situations which in his view 
would render him unable to discharge the powers and 
duties of the vice presidency in the future and would 
provide that the declaration of his inability goes into 
effect based upon a review process set out by the Vice 
President.
b. linE of succEssion 
Article II of the Constitution names the Vice President 
as the first person on whom the powers and duties of the 
presidency will devolve and authorizes Congress to establish 
a line of succession after the Vice President. The Presidential 
Succession Act of 1947 expands the line to include the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President pro 
tempore of the Senate, and then the Cabinet Secretaries in the 
order in which their departments were created. 
Debate about the constitutionality of including legislative 
leaders in the line of succession has remained a steady 
undercurrent in the legislative history of the Presidential 
Succession Acts of 1792, 1886, and 1947. There are two 
major criticisms of including legislative leaders in the line of 
succession. First, some argue that the Speaker of the House 
and President pro tempore of the Senate are not “Officers” 
within the meaning of Article II. Second, some maintain that 
the inclusion of legislative officers in the line of succession 
compromises the principle of separation of powers between 
the executive and legislative branches. 
In the case of presidential inability, the Speaker and the 
President pro tempore can become Acting President in the 
absence of a Vice President. Including legislators for this 
purpose in the line of succession is especially problematic 
because they are required by statute to resign their roles and 
seats in Congress in order to act as President and cannot 
simply return to their previous positions when the inability 
of the President is removed. Thus, temporarily acting as 
President until an inability is removed could effectively 
end the political career of a legislative leader. This creates a 
disincentive for a legislative leader to act as President at a time 
when stable leadership is most urgent. 
Moreover, the Speaker and the President pro tempore can 
“bump” members of the Cabinet who are acting as President, 
which can result in multiple successors serving as Acting 
President during a short period.
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Line of Succession Recommendations 
Statutory Action:
5. Establish an executive line of succession that runs 
exclusively through the Cabinet after the President 
and Vice President. In the case of removal, death, or 
resignation of the President, the Cabinet member 
assuming the powers and duties of the presidency should 
be required to resign from the Cabinet. In a case of 
inability, the Cabinet member assuming the powers and 
duties of the presidency should not be required to resign.
6. In the event an executive line of succession is not adopted, 
establish a binary line of succession that first runs through 
Congress, and then the Cabinet, in instances of death, 
resignation, and removal. Successors would be required 
to resign in these circumstances. The line of succession 
would run solely through the Cabinet in instances of 
presidential and vice-presidential inability or failure to 
qualify. Under this proposal, when a Cabinet member 
assumes the powers and duties of the presidency, that 
Cabinet member would not be required to resign.
7. Confirm whether Acting Secretaries are included in the 
line of succession, and, if so, either remove them from the 
line, or alternatively, amend the 1947 Act so that Acting 
Secretaries can assume the powers and duties of the 
presidency, in the order of the departments’ creation, but 
only after succession has passed through all of the Cabinet 
Secretaries.
c. PrE-inauguration PEriod
The current system of pre-inauguration presidential 
succession is governed by a legal framework based on 
constitutional provisions, federal and state statutes, and 
political party rules. Contingencies that may occur during 
the period prior to a General Election are governed almost 
exclusively by party rules. The political parties are authorized 
by their rules to fill any vacancies in the nominations for the 
offices of President and Vice President. 
The parties are similarly authorized to fill vacancies that may 
occur on their respective national tickets after the General 
Election, prior to the casting of the Electoral College votes in 
mid-December. 
The Twelfth Amendment governs contingencies that may 
occur between the casting of the Electoral votes in mid-
December and the counting of those votes by Congress on 
January 6. The Amendment is silent as to whether Congress 
can invalidate electoral votes cast for a presidential or vice-
presidential nominee who dies after the meeting of the 
Electoral College and before Congress counts the electoral 
votes.
The Clinic has concluded that Congress is required to count 
these votes and that it must declare the winners even if they 
have both died since the meeting of the Electoral College. 
The Twentieth Amendment addresses the death of either a 
President-elect or Vice President-elect during the fourteen 
days between the congressional count of the electoral votes 
on January 6 and Inauguration Day on January 20. In the case 
of the death or resignation of the President-elect, the Vice 
President-elect becomes President on January 20. In the case 
of the death or resignation of the Vice President-elect, the 
new President is required to nominate a Vice President to be 
approved by a majority of both houses of Congress.
In the event of the double death of the successful presidential 
and vice-presidential candidates, the Speaker would become 
Acting President pursuant to the 1947 Act. Such a scenario 
may, however, result in a change in the party of the presidency 
contrary to the will of the electorate.
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Pre-Inaugural Period Recommendations:
Political Party Rules:
8. In the event of the death or resignation of a presidential 
candidate before the political party conventions, require 
the parties to hold an open meeting to decide which 
replacement candidate(s) will receive the delegates’ votes.
9. In the event of the death or resignation of a presidential 
nominee between the political party conventions and the 
General Election, require the parties to either hold an 
open meeting to select a replacement candidate or recall 
the convention delegates. 
10. During the period between the General Election and 
the meeting of the Electoral College, provide that 
the vice-presidential candidate replaces a deceased or 
resigned presidential candidate of the same ticket and 
that the candidate’s party issue recommendations to the 
presidential electors as to a new candidate for the office of 
Vice President.
Congressional Rules:
11. In the event of the death or resignation of a presidential 
or vice-presidential candidate between the meeting of the 
Electoral College and the counting and declaration of the 
Electoral College votes by Congress, require Congress to 
count votes cast for a candidate if he was alive at the time 
of the Electoral College vote. 
Executive Contingency Planning: 
12. During the period between the counting and declaration 
of Electoral College votes by Congress and Inauguration 
Day, the outgoing President should consider promptly 
nominating any Cabinet nominees the President-
elect submits to him, and Congress should confirm as 
many nominees as possible prior to Inauguration Day, 
consistent with the proper discharge of Congress’s advice 
and consent responsibility. One or more newly confirmed 
Cabinet Secretaries should remain at a secure location 
outside of Washington, D.C. on Inauguration Day. This 
recommendation is particularly important in the case of 
an exclusively executive line of succession, as the Clinic 
recommends. 
d. conclusion
The work of the Constitution’s Framers in creating a system 
for presidential succession has provided stability and 
continuity for the nation during many uncertain moments 
in its history. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment, adopted after 
the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, further 
buttressed the system of presidential succession by providing 
mechanisms for: the seamless succession of the Vice President 
to the presidency in the case of a vacancy in that office; the 
filling of a vacancy in the vice presidency; and addressing 
instances of presidential inability. 
Our recommendations are designed to be consistent with 
the separation of powers and the framework of checks and 
balances, to protect the electorate’s choice of President 
and Vice President and their party for a four-year term, 
and to ensure the stability and continuity of government 
in the modern era. We believe the adoption of the Clinic’s 
recommendations will support these goals.
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V. inability and PrEsidEntial succEssion issuEs
a. introduction
The Framers of the Constitution constructed a succession 
provision that enabled the Vice President to assume the 
powers and duties of the President in the event of the death, 
resignation, removal, or inability of the President.1 The 
succession provision, however, did not cover all possible 
contingencies. The adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
in 1967 filled several important gaps, but it did not provide 
for every instance of presidential inability or address the case 
of a vice-presidential inability.2 These open areas continue to 
present policy challenges, constitutional issues, and questions 
of construction of current statutes. 
b. thE twEnty-fifth aMEndMEnt
1. History of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
The assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963 
renewed Congress’s interest in providing safeguards in 
the event of presidential inability.3  Senator Birch Bayh, as 
chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional 
Amendments, largely led these efforts.4  After conducting 
extensive hearings and debates and considering the opinions 
of the American Bar Association and others on the topic, 
Congress completed work on what would become the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment in July of 1965.5  The Amendment 
was ratified on February 10, 1967.6 
Section 1 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment codifies the 
precedent set by President John Tyler in 1841 when he 
assumed the office of the President rather than the position of 
Acting President upon President William Henry Harrison’s 
death.7 Under Section 1, when the President dies, resigns, or 
is removed from office, the Vice President becomes President, 
rather than Acting President, and is no longer Vice President.8  
This section is intended to ensure that there is never a vacancy 
in the office of President.9  
Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment deals with a vice-
presidential vacancy. When there is a vice-presidential vacancy 
resulting either from the death, resignation, or removal of 
the Vice President or from the Vice President’s succession to 
the presidency upon the death, resignation, or removal of the 
President, the new President must nominate a Vice President, 
who is subject to confirmation by a majority of both houses of 
Congress.10 The term “vacancy” does not cover an inability of 
the President or Vice President.11 
Sections 3 and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment address 
presidential inability.  Section 3 provides a mechanism by 
which the President can declare his own inability in a writing 
to the President pro tempore and the Speaker, which results 
in the Vice President serving as Acting President until the 
President declares that his inability has been removed.12 
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment sets forth the 
process by which the Vice President and a majority of the 
Cabinet, or another body as Congress may provide,i can act 
together to declare the President unable to perform the duties 
of his office when he cannot or will not do so himself.13 The 
Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet must transmit 
to the President pro tempore and the Speaker their written 
declaration that the President is unable to perform the duties 
of his office.14 In both instances, once presidential inability is 
declared, the Vice President becomes Acting President while 
also continuing as Vice President.15
Under Section 4, the President can dispute the determination 
of his inability by declaring in writing to the President 
pro tempore and the Speaker that no inability exists.16  The 
President then resumes his powers and duties at the end of 
a four-day period unless the Vice President and Cabinet 
majority object within four days of the President’s written 
declaration.17 If within that four-day period the Vice 
President and the Cabinet majority transmit to the President 
pro tempore and the Speaker a written declaration that the 
President is unable to discharge the duties of his office, 
the issue is then given to Congress which can, by a vote of 
two-thirds in each house, declare the President unable.18 If 
Congress does not act within twenty-one days, or if either 
House supports the President, the President resumes his 
powers.19 In the interim, the Vice President remains the 
Acting President.20
i Congress has never exercised its power to substitute a body for the Cabinet 
to work with the Vice President under Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment.
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2. Applications of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment 
President Gerald R. Ford was the first and so far only person 
to become President under Section 1 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment.  In 1974, Vice President Ford became President 
when President Richard M. Nixon resigned from office.21 
President Ford was also the first person to become Vice 
President under Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
in 1973.22  After President Nixon’s first Vice President, Spiro 
Agnew, resigned, Nixon nominated then-Representative Ford 
to be the new Vice President, and both houses of Congress 
confirmed him.  Less than a year later, Vice President Ford 
became President upon President Nixon’s resignation from the 
presidency, and President Ford nominated Nelson Rockefeller 
to be his Vice President.  Rockefeller then became Vice 
President under Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
after both houses of Congress confirmed him in 1974.23 
President Ronald Reagan underwent anesthesia in 1985. 
He followed the procedures of Section 3 of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment by submitting a letter to the President 
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, 
although he stated that he was not invoking Section 3 of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment because he did not want to set a 
precedent.24  In his letter, President Reagan explained that he 
did “not believe that the drafters of this Amendment intended 
its application to situations such as the instant one.”25  
President Reagan said he was following a “longstanding 
arrangement” with his Vice President rather than the 
constitutional provision created for inability.ii26 
President George W. Bush was the first President to formally 
invoke Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in 2002 
in anticipation of undergoing sedation.27  In 2007, President 
Bush again invoked Section 3 to transfer presidential powers 
and duties to Vice President Richard Cheney when he 
underwent a second procedure during his term in office.28  In 
both instances, President Bush followed the process set forth 
in Section 3 by transmitting a written declaration of his own 
inability to perform the duties of his office to the President 
ii After he left office, President Reagan acknowledged invoking the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment at this time. See Ronald Reagan, An American Life 500 
(1990). 
pro tempore and the Speaker.29  President Bush reclaimed the 
powers and duties of the presidency by issuing a letter to the 
President pro tempore and the Speaker on the same day in 
both instances.30 
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment has never been 
employed, but it arguably could have been in the wake of the 
attempted assassination of President Reagan on March 30, 
1981.31 Although White House Counsel Fred Fielding had 
prepared draft documents prior to the assassination attempt 
providing for the invocation of either Section 3 or Section 4 
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment under such circumstances, 
no formal transfer of power occurred.32 The misstatement of 
Secretary of State Alexander Haig, who was the top Cabinet 
official in the line of succession, that until Vice President Bush’s 
return to the White House he was in charge because  
“[c]onstitutionally . . . you have the President, the Vice President, 
and the Secretary of State, in that order,” reflected confusion 
about the order of succession.33 Chief of Staff James Baker and 
presidential counselor Edwin Meese III rejected a discussion of a 
transfer of presidential power “until they learned more from the 
doctors.”34 Vice President Bush made clear that he would not act 
as President in the absence of a formal transfer of power.35  
c. contingEnciEs not addrEssEd by thE  
twEnty-fifth aMEndMEnt
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment provides for many—but 
not all—contingencies in the event of presidential inability. 
Currently, there exists no legal mechanism to: declare a 
President unable to discharge the powers and duties of his 
office in the event of either a vice-presidential vacancy or 
inability; declare a Vice President unable to discharge the 
powers and duties of his office; or declare an Acting President 
unable to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. 
That the Twenty-Fifth Amendment does not address these 
contingencies, referred to generally as the “inability gaps,” 
was not an oversight by its drafters.36 At the time of the 
drafting, Representative Richard Poff asked John Feerick, 
then a member of the American Bar Association (“ABA”) 
Conference on Presidential Inability and Succession, to 
suggest language for the Twenty-Fifth Amendment that 
would cover the case of simultaneous inability of the 
President and Vice President.37 Professor Feerick identified 
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the inability gaps referred to above and drafted language that 
would permit succession in the event of dual inability as well 
as in the event of a vice-presidential inability.38 
Professor Feerick proposed, in the case of a vice-presidential 
vacancy or inability, that “the person next in the line of 
succession shall act in lieu of the Vice-President” to determine 
presidential inability.39 He also suggested that “[t]he inability 
of the Vice-President shall be determined in the same manner 
as that of the President except that the Vice-President shall 
have no right to participate in such determination.”40 This 
language and the drafted contingencies were not included in 
the final amendment. 
Furthermore, both an amendment proposed by a bipartisan 
majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1958 and an 
amendment proposed by Senator Birch Bayh in 1963 had 
addressed these inability gaps in a similar manner.41 Herbert 
Brownell, Attorney General under President Eisenhower, 
explained that the proposed 1958 amendment provided 
that “‘if at any time there is no Vice President,’ the functions 
envisaged for the Vice President by the proposed new 
constitutional amendment ‘shall devolve upon the officer 
eligible to act as President next in the line of succession to the 
office of President, as provided by law’.”42 Thus, the next in the 
line of succession was to have the authority to act in concert 
with the Cabinet in determining presidential inability.43 
The ABA’s final proposal similarly contained a provision by 
which the next in the line of succession, if there were no able 
Vice President, could act with a majority of the Cabinet to 
determine presidential inability.iii44  
When Congress did not include language in the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment to address the inability gaps identified, Senator 
Samuel Ervin commented that attempting to fill every 
gap could jeopardize ratification of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment.45  As Professor Feerick points out, “[i]t was 
believed at the time that an amendment providing for every 
possible scenario would be too complex and therefore unlikely 
to survive the difficult congressional and state ratification 
iii The language of Senate Resolution 139 was very similar to Professor 
Feerick’s in his letter to Representative Poff. John D. Feerick, The Twenty-
Fifth Amendment: Its Complete History and Applications 60 (2d ed.1992). 
processes.”46 Nevertheless, the inability gaps that persist are 
serious and must be addressed because mass catastrophe, 
illness, or some other happenstance can occur at any time. 
1. Inability of the President in Certain 
Circumstances
Sections 3 and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which 
permit the declaration of a presidential inability, are premised 
on the availability of an able Vice President.47 Neither section 
comes into play if the office of the Vice President is vacant or 
its occupant is himself unable.48 Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment is unavailable to a President who wishes to transfer 
power temporarily if there is a vice-presidential vacancy because 
there is no Vice President to act as President.49 Furthermore, 
although Section 3 may be available to the President during a 
vice-presidential inability, a President would be hard pressed 
to transfer authority to an unable Vice President. Similarly, 
Section 4 depends on the presence of an able Vice President 
to work with the Cabinet in declaring a presidential inability. 
Section 4 does not provide a substitute for the Vice President 
to make such a declaration if the vice presidency is vacant or the 
Vice President is himself unable and thus incapable of declaring 
a case of presidential inability.50 
2. Inability of the Vice President in Certain 
Circumstances
Currently, no mechanism exists by which a Vice President 
can be declared unable to perform the powers and duties 
of his office.51 As previously discussed in Part V.C.1, this 
gap results in a number of unaddressed issues if the Vice 
President is, in fact, unable. First, if the President dies, resigns, 
or is removed from office, the Vice President automatically 
becomes President under Section 1 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, even in a case of a Vice President’s undeclared 
inability.52 Second, if a President sought to transfer his powers 
temporarily to the Vice President under Section 3 of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, he would be transferring powers 
to a Vice President unable to exercise them. Furthermore, 
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment cannot be invoked 
when the Vice President is unable because the Vice President 
is a necessary actor in the determination of presidential 
inability under Section 4.53
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3. Inability of the Acting President in 
Certain Circumstances
Current succession law provides no mechanism for dealing 
with an inability of an Acting President, whether a Vice 
President or statutory successor.iv
d. rEcoMMEndations
Congress, following President Kennedy’s assassination, 
acted wisely in proposing the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to 
eliminate major gaps in the system of presidential succession. 
We urge the President and Congress to move forward to 
address the remaining inability gaps.
The Clinic believes much can be done to anticipate and 
address these gaps with changes in the law and contingency 
planning. In 1988, participants of the Miller Center 
Commission on Presidential Disability and the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment, including Senator Birch Bayh, Herbert 
Brownell, and Fred Fielding, advanced many helpful 
recommendations for contingency planning. Such planning 
has routinely taken place since at least 1980.54 The exercise is 
of course confidential, and while we identify gaps and suggest 
responses to them, we well understand that others in positions 
of responsibility have already engaged in contingency 
planning and may find our recommendations duplicative of 
work already undertaken. Nonetheless we support continued 
planning, as is surely underway, recalling the wisdom of the 
writers of the Federalist Papers that “a wise nation . . . does not 
rashly preclude itself from any resource which may become 
essential to its safety.”55
iv The situation in which an Acting President is exercising the powers and 
duties of the presidency during a presidential inability and a vice-presidential 
vacancy raises issues beyond the scope of this Report. These include the 
question whether an Acting President can exercise presidential power under 
Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and nominate a new Vice 
President while the President is alive but unable. For further discussion of 
this issue, see generally William F. Baker & Beth A. Fitzpatrick, Presidential 
Succession Scenarios in Popular Culture and History and the Need for 
Reform, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 835 (2010) and Examination of the First 
Implementation of Section Two of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Hearing 
on S.J. Res. 26 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. (1975).
1. Statute
The Clinic supports a statutory approach that mirrors the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment to address the inability gaps. There 
is sufficient basis in the Constitution and law for doing so. 
We recommend that Congress enact legislation facilitating 
the President’s ability to voluntarily transfer his powers to 
the next in the line of succession during a vice-presidential 
vacancy or inability. We also recommend conferring authority 
on the next in line in conjunction with the Cabinet to 
declare a presidential inability in the absence of an able Vice 
President.v 
A mechanism for the voluntary transfer of power by the 
President or Acting President to the next in line in the 
absence of an able Vice President would track the provisions 
in Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, requiring a 
record of the transfer by written declaration to the President 
pro tempore and the Speaker of the House or, if they are not 
available, by a filing in the Office of the Department of State.vi 
For the more difficult case of an obviously unable President or 
Acting President who refuses or is unable to declare his own 
inability, a declaration by the next in line together with the 
Cabinet would assure responsible handling of the matter and 
would promote confidence among the public at large.56
Reliance on the Cabinet members, who are close to the 
President and can evaluate the President’s or Acting 
President’s situation, together with the next immediate 
successor of either party, would minimize the risk of abuse 
of power and facilitate an appropriate transfer. A statutory 
approach could also, like the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 
contain provisions for dealing with a disagreement between 
the unable President or Acting President and the person who 
is next in line acting together with the Cabinet.
Turning to a justification of this approach, we review the 
reach of Congress’s power and the role of the next in line.
v See infra Part V.D.2 
vi The Office of the Department of State is an appropriate repository as an 
alternative to filing with legislative leaders because those leaders might be the 
next in the line of succession, as would be the case under current law. This 
recommendation presents a potential problem, however, if the next in the 
line of succession is the Secretary of State.
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a. Congressional Authority
Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution gives 
Congress the authority to decide who is to act as President in 
the event that both the President and the Vice President are 
unable to perform the duties of their offices, as well as in the 
event that the President is unable when the vice presidency is 
vacant.
Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution states:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of 
his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers 
and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the 
Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the 
Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of 
the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall 
then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, 
until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be 
elected.57 
The 1792, 1886, and 1947 Acts, by which Congress created 
lines of succession beyond the Vice President, rest on this 
authority.58 The statutes reflect the idea that a clear line of 
succession allows the government to continue to function 
in the case of simultaneous vacancies and/or inabilities by 
ensuring that there is always a qualified successor to carry out 
the powers and duties of the presidency. 
However, when there is no able Vice President and the 
President is incapable of declaring his own inability, the 1947 
Act has no mechanism for declaring presidential inability.59  
Thus, although Congress has the constitutional authority to 
create the line of succession, the 1947 Act does not exercise 
that authority to its full extent.
In addition to the language of Article II, Congress appears to 
have authority to address this gap pursuant to the Necessary 
and Proper Clause in Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of the 
Constitution. The Necessary and Proper Clause provides 
that Congress shall have the power “[t]o make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution 
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in 
any Department or Officer thereof.”60 
The Supreme Court interpreted Congress’s power under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause broadly in its 1819 decision 
in McCulloch v. Maryland.61 Holding that Congress had the 
authority to charter a bank, even though the Constitution did 
not explicitly give Congress such power, Chief Justice John 
Marshall wrote: 
[W]e think the sound construction of the constitution 
must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with 
respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to 
be carried into execution, which will enable that body to 
perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most 
beneficial to the people.  Let the end be legitimate, let it be 
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are 
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are 
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution, are constitutional.62
While the Court has given the Clause an expansive reach, it 
has also stated that the Clause “is not the delegation of a new 
and independent power, but simply provision for making 
effective the powers theretofore mentioned.”63  
Experts on presidential succession have suggested that a 
statute providing a mechanism by which the President or 
Acting President could be declared unable to perform the 
duties of his office would be sound under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause because it would be consistent with 
the express power of Congress under the Constitution to 
establish the line of succession.64 One commentator writes 
that such a statute “would not appear to grant a new and 
independent power to Congress, [but] only a measure to 
ensure the legitimate end of providing for a successor beyond 
the Vice President in circumstances where additional process 
is deemed necessary as an effective use of power.”65  Providing 
for the determination of presidential inability is “necessary to 
ensure that the executive power does not fall into abeyance 
. . . [and so this] power is clearly within the scope of the 
[Necessary and Proper Clause].”66 
Even those who oppose a broad reading of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause in terms of presidential succession agree that 
the clause allows for intervention where both the President 
and Vice President are incapacitated. Presidential succession 
scholar Ruth Silva, writing prior to the adoption of the 
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Twenty-Fifth Amendment, noted that the Constitution 
gives Congress the express power to provide for presidential 
succession only “when there is neither a functioning President 
nor a functioning Vice President.”67 She argued that  
“[b]ecause enumeration in the Constitution of certain powers 
denies all others unless incident to an expressed power or 
necessary to its execution,” Congress does not have the 
authority to legislate regarding any scenario but that of a dual 
inability and/or vacancy.68 Herbert Brownell agreed that 
“congressional action under the ‘necessary and proper’ clause 
would seem restricted to the uncommon situation in which 
both the President and Vice President are incapacitated.”69 
b.  The Role of the Next in the Line of Succession in 
Determining Incapacity 
Prior to the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, many 
who wrote on the topic of presidential succession relied on 
the contingent grant of power theory to justify an authority 
in the next in the line of succession to determine presidential 
inability.70 Professor Silva explained that, according to this 
theory, “it is a well-established rule of law that the one to 
whom the power is granted is to decide when the emergency 
has arisen.”71 Silva wrote, 
[T]he Vice President, or the “officer” designated by law to act 
as President, is constituted the judge of a President’s inability 
. . . .  The Constitution provides that the power of acting as 
President belongs to the Vice President or to the “Officer” 
while a President is disabled.  Since the Constitution 
mentions only the successor, he is the judge of the facts.72  
Herbert Brownell agreed that “whenever any official by law . 
. . is designated to perform certain duties on the happening of 
certain contingencies, unless otherwise specified, that person 
who bears the responsibility for performing the duties must 
also determine when the contingency for the exercise of his 
powers arises.”73 Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy issued 
an opinion in 1961 adopting this theory, stating that the 
“Vice President or [an]other ‘officer’ designated by law to act as 
President has the authority under the Constitution to decide 
when inability exists.”74  
Thus, the contingent grant of power theory supports the 
idea that the next in the line of succession should have a role 
in the determination of presidential inability. However, to 
permit the next in the line of succession alone to determine 
presidential inability would grant him more power than 
what is granted to the Vice President under the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, which does not permit the Vice President to 
act alone but requires him to act along with a majority of 
the Cabinet or other congressionally designated body.75 As a 
result, reliance on the theory of a contingent grant of power 
might yield a result that is not consistent with the framework 
set forth in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
c. Summary
Some may argue that only a constitutional amendment 
can expand upon the existing mechanism for declaring a 
presidential inability. The Clinic, however, is persuaded 
that Congress has the power to enact a statute providing a 
mechanism for the determination of presidential inability 
during a vice-presidential inability or vacancy. Based on the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment and a theory of contingent grants 
of power, accepted by scholars familiar with presidential 
succession issues, the Clinic believes Congress has the 
authority to legislate in this area. The Clinic recommends that 
such a statute be enacted on the basis that it is necessary and 
proper to implement Congress’s express power under Article 
II, Section 1, Clause 6 to provide for the line of succession 
and to ensure the continuation of effective government. We 
recommend the adoption of a statute that acknowledges 
that the next in the line of succession has the power to 
determine, with the Cabinet or another body that Congress 
may choose, the existence of an inability of the President or 
Acting President in the absence of an able Vice President. We 
recommend that this statute also confirm that a President 
or Acting President may voluntarily transfer his powers and 
duties to the next in the line of succession during a vice-
presidential inability or vacancy. 
22 Ensuring the Stability of Presidential Succession in the Modern Era:
  
ADVANCE DRAFT- Cite as: 81 Fordham L. Rev. (forthcoming Oct. 2012)
2. Executive Action
The Clinic believes congressional enactment of a statute 
addressing presidential inability gaps, in the absence of a 
constitutional amendment, presents a sound and feasible 
approach. However, the Clinic recognizes that enactment of a 
statute can be a lengthy process and that meanwhile national 
emergencies can occur at any time. In the absence of statutory 
reform, the Clinic is aware that executive branch officials have 
instituted comprehensive practices, procedures, and rules to 
ensure preparedness in the event of gaps in leadership. The Clinic 
endorses such anticipatory contingency planning and suggests 
that prospective executive declarations of inabilityvii provide an 
effective way to address both presidential and vice-presidential 
inability even as congressional action is under consideration.
Article II, Section 1 permits Congress to provide for a line of 
succession only in the event of a dual inability and/or vacancy in 
the presidency and vice presidency.76 An executive declaration of 
prospective inability would permit the President, Vice President, 
or Acting President to describe, in a formal writing, the situations 
in which he would consider himself unable to discharge the 
powers and duties of his office.viii Executive declarations of 
prospective inability allow the President, Acting President, or Vice 
President to provide for future instances of inability and thereby 
permit timely implementation of the current succession law.
An executive declaration of inability permits the line of 
succession to be triggered during a vice-presidential vacancy 
or inability by giving the President or Acting President a way 
in which to declare himself unable to perform the powers and 
duties of his office prospectively, in the event that he becomes 
unable to declare his own inability in the future. An executive 
declaration of prospective inability by the Vice President 
similarly allows the succession law to go into effect as intended.
vii Executive declarations of inability are similar to letter agreements. See 
Appendix B for a compilation of letter agreements and declarations from 
various administrations.
viii The Clinic acknowledges that such a writing will require some person 
or persons to decide whether the conditions set forth in the executive 
declaration of prospective inability are present. The Clinic notes that an 
executive declaration of prospective inability could possibly authorize a 
designated party to resign on behalf of the President or Vice President in 
defined circumstances. See the Eisenhower-Nixon Letter Agreement in 
Appendix B. A sample Executive Declaration of Inability is also included in 
Appendix B.
a.  Historical Support for Executive Declarations of 
Inability
Declarations for future contingencies are consistent with 
Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which allows 
the President to temporarily transfer his powers when 
he “recognizes his inability—or the imminence of his in-
ability.”77 Although the President can transfer his power 
during foreseen periods of inability, he might be able to do 
so “even prospectively for unexpected yet contemplated 
future incidents.”78 Former Attorney General Nicholas B. 
Katzenbach testified that “the President should be able to 
arrange for the Vice President to act . . . in the event of a 
certain contingency . . . which would be a self-executive [sic] 
provision.”79 
Others agree. Noting that President Bush signed a letter 
formally transferring his powers to Vice President Cheney 
prior to undergoing anesthesia, Adam Gustafson argues 
“there is no overwhelming constitutional reason why such 
a letter may not be sent further in advance.”80 Indeed, some 
have suggested that the President and Vice President can 
“outlin[e] procedures for contingent cessions of executive 
power” for “unplanned future inabilities.”81 These procedures 
might extend as well to a statutory successor in contemplation 
of a possible vacancy in the vice presidency or an inability 
of the Vice President. Although prospective declarations 
of inability “would require a broad reading” of Section 3, a 
narrow reading of Section 3 that “discourages the President 
from taking present action for future contingencies . . . may 
undermine the Amendment’s purpose of promoting executive 
branch continuity.”82
This cession of power is not unprecedented in American 
history. Prior to the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, when no mechanism for the declaration 
of presidential inability existed, President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower recognized the urgency of addressing presidential 
succession issues.83 In 1958, he presented to Vice President 
Nixon a “letter agreement,” setting forth certain procedures 
in the event of his future inability as President.84 President 
Eisenhower wrote that he and Vice President Nixon “could 
do much to eliminate all these uncertainties by agreeing, in 
advance, as to the proper steps to be taken at any time when 
[he] might become unable to discharge the powers and 
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duties of the President.”85 President Eisenhower stated that 
“this agreement would not in any way contravene the clear 
intention of the Constitution; on the contrary, it is rather 
a statement of our common intention to act completely 
according to the spirit of . . . the Constitution.”86
Pursuant to the letter agreement, Vice President Nixon was to 
act as President if President Eisenhower determined himself 
to be unable or if Vice President Nixon determined President 
Eisenhower was unable; Eisenhower would resume his 
presidential duties upon his own declaration that the inability 
had ended.87 Later administrations followed the Eisenhower-
Nixon precedent by entering into letter agreements to provide 
for prospective inability, including President Kennedy and 
Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson;88 and President Johnson 
and Speaker of the House John W. McCormack.89 President 
Johnson and Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey apparently 
never entered into a written agreement.90 There appears to 
be evidence that, even after the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, Presidents George H.W. Bush and Clinton 
had executed letter agreements with their Vice Presidents 
indicating their intentions for the transfer of power in case 
of inability.91 One commentator noted that prior to the 
adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, letter agreements 
“did not have the force of law behind them and depended 
entirely on the good will of the incumbent President and Vice 
President.”92
b. Summary
In case a presidential inability arises during a vice-presidential 
vacancy or inability, an executive declaration of prospective 
inability can fill the gap that is not addressed by the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment by allowing the President to define a 
future inability. The declaration of a future inability, although 
not explicitly provided for in Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, is consistent with the purpose of Section 3 (and 
the Article II succession provision) to promote executive 
branch continuity and has historical precedent.
The Clinic believes vice-presidential inability is also best 
addressed through the use of executive declarations of 
prospective inability. An executive declaration of prospective 
inability would permit the Vice President to describe the 
situations that he considers would render him unable. 
Upon the occurrence of one of these situations, if the Vice 
President has made a declaration of prospective inability, the 
next in the line of succession would then be in a position to 
declare the inability of the President or Acting President, as 
circumstances require. 
Although the Vice President does not have the explicit 
authority under the Constitution to declare his own inability, 
the Clinic believes such authority is implicit. A mechanism by 
which vice-presidential inability can be declared is necessary 
for an effective system of presidential succession. Historical 
precedent supports this approach since past and current 
administrations have engaged in contingency planning to 
address issues arising from a vice-presidential inability.93
3. Other Options
a. Vice-Presidential Inability
The Clinic considered various options to deal with vice-
presidential inability and ultimately favored executive 
declarations of prospective inability, as described above. 
Below is a summary of other options we considered.
i. Statute
The Clinic considered congressional enactment of a 
statute providing a mechanism for a determination of vice-
presidential inability. The Vice President plays a vital role 
in succession through his authority, with the Cabinet, to 
determine presidential inability under the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment; thus, a statute providing for a determination 
of the Vice President’s inability could be seen as necessary 
and proper to enable the person next in the line of succession 
to play a vital role in the event of a Vice President’s inability. 
Ultimately, the Clinic did not believe such a statute would 
pass constitutional muster because the Constitution specifies 
that Congress can act in the event of a dual inability; it 
does not provide that Congress can act in the case of a vice-
presidential inability alone.94 Silva and Brownell, as indicated 
above, believed congressional authority was limited to 
circumstances in which both the President and Vice President 
were unable or absent.95 
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ii. Impeachment
Impeachment would be a dubious and problematic route 
to address the problem of vice-presidential inability. The 
wrongdoing contemplated by the Constitution’s requirement 
of “high crimes and misdemeanors” has been somewhat 
broadly construed, but, although impeachable conduct 
need not be criminal, inability still stands far apart from 
bribery, treason, and the other types of “political” crimes 
that constitute a willful abuse of office and that justify 
impeachment and removal.96 Further, partisan considerations 
have frequently played a role in impeachment and removal. 
The impeachment and removal of a President or Vice 
President for inability is both unsupported by the language 
or any reasonable interpretation of the Constitution and 
could set a dangerous precedent for the use or threat of 
impeachment and removal as a partisan political weapon.97 
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a. introduction
Under Article II, Section I, Clause 6 of the Constitution, the 
Vice President is the first successor to the powers and duties of 
the presidency, and Congress is authorized to create a line of 
succession.1 The line of succession beyond the vice presidency 
has taken three different forms over the past 220 years.  The 
Presidential Succession Act of 1792 (“1792 Act”) included 
a line of succession that was strictly legislative in nature, 
running to the President pro tempore of the Senate and then 
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.2  Then, the 
Presidential Succession Act of 1886 (“1886 Act”) changed the 
line of succession to an entirely executive line, running through 
the Cabinet Secretaries.3  The Presidential Succession Act of 
1947, as amended (“1947 Act”), changed the line of succession 
to include both legislators and executive officers, starting with 
the Speaker, followed by the President pro tempore, and then 
Cabinet Secretaries in the order of their departments’ creation: 
the “Secretary of State, Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of 
Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary 
of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, Secretary of Housing 
and Urban Development, Secretary of Transportation, 
Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Education, Secretary of 
Veterans Affairs, and Secretary of Homeland Security.”4 
The 1947 Act, like the 1792 Act, has been subject to criticism 
on constitutional grounds as well as on the basis of policy 
considerations.  There is a serious question regarding both 
the constitutionality of including legislative members in the 
line of succession and the “bumping” provision that permits a 
Cabinet member, acting as President, to be replaced by the 
Speaker or President pro tempore. 
As a matter of policy, the succession of legislative members 
presents numerous concerns, including violation of the 
doctrine of separation of powers, the possibility of a sudden 
and complete shift in party control of the executive branch, 
and conflicts of interest issues in instances of impeachment 
or removal of the President. On the other hand, inclusion 
of executive officers also raises questions about Cabinet 
members’ qualifications to serve as Acting President. The 
Clinic treats each of these issues in the sections that follow 
and advances a recommendation for returning to the 
executive line of succession as provided for in the 1886 
Act. Failing adoption of this recommendation, the Clinic 
recommends an exclusively Cabinet line of succession for 
cases of presidential inability. This reform will facilitate a 
voluntary transfer of presidential power when circumstances 
require it and will reduce disruption in legislative leadership, 
but otherwise will preserve legislative succession. 
b. constitutional concErns 
1. Constitutionality of the Legislative Line 
of Succession
The constitutionality of the 1947 Act and, more generally, 
of the legislative line of succession is questionable. The first 
constitutional question is whether the term “Officer,” as 
understood by the Framers and as it appears in Article II, 
Section 1, Clause 6, includes legislators. Article II, Section 1, 
Clause 6 provides in relevant part: 
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his 
Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and 
Duties of the said Office . . . the Congress may by Law 
. . . declar[e] what Officer shall then act as President, and such 
Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, 
or a President shall be elected.5
Congressional leaders and scholars have interpreted the term 
“Officer” to mean “Officer of the United States,”6 which refers 
only to executive branch officers who are nominated by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate. Thus, some argue that 
legislators are not qualified under the Constitution to act as 
President.7 
It is also argued that, based on the description of the executive 
branch and the use of the term “Officer” elsewhere in the 
Constitution, the Framers did not anticipate legislators 
succeeding to the presidency. For example, in 1864, Senator 
James Bayard of Delaware referred to Article II, Section 1, 
Clause 2, which provides for the election of presidential 
electors, as an instance in which the term “Officer” is placed 
in opposition to those holding legislative positions.8 This 
clause distinguishes between Senators and Representatives, 
on the one hand, and persons “holding an Office of Trust 
or Profit under the United States,”9 on the other. Based on 
this distinction, Senator Bayard concluded that Senators 
and Representatives are not “Officers,” nor do they “hold 
office under the United States;” rather, they hold a position 
Vi. linE of succEssion issuEs
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of “trust,”10 and therefore are not qualified to succeed to the 
presidency under the Constitution. Furthermore, Senator 
Bayard argued that legislators are not “officers of the United 
States” because citizens from individual states or districts elect 
them, rather than citizens from throughout the country.11
Similar arguments arise from the language in Article II, 
Section 1, Clause 1, which states in relevant part that “[the 
President] shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years.”12 
Moreover, Article I, Section 2, Clause 1, states, “[t]he House of 
Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every 
second Year by the People of the several States”13 and Article I, 
Section 3, Clause 1, states, “[t]he Senate of the United States 
shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen 
by the Legislature thereof, for six Years.”14 If the Framers 
intended legislative members to fill “Officer” positions, then 
they presumably would have used the same language in the 
Constitution for both the executive and legislative branches; 
however, the Framers refer to legislators as “chosen” for either two 
or six years, and they omitted the language “hold his Office.”15 
Additionally, the 1947 Act may violate the Incompatibility 
Clause of Article I, Section 6, Clause 2.16 The Constitution 
makes clear that sitting members of Congress cannot hold 
“any civil Office under the Authority of the United States.”17 
Therefore, the clause “civil Office under the Authority of the 
United States”18 must refer exclusively to the members of the 
executive and judicial branches because the Constitution 
does not say any “other” civil office. In language following 
in the same clause, the Constitution provides that “no 
Person holding any Office under the United States, shall 
be a Member of either House during his Continuance 
in Office[,]”19 again suggesting that a legislator is not an 
“Officer.” The language of Article I, Section 6 thus appears to 
exclude legislators from those who are “Officers.”20 
The constitutional provisions governing impeachment also 
raise issues related to the definition of “Officer.” Article II, 
Section 4 provides for the impeachment of the President, 
Vice President, and “all civil Officers of the United States.”21 
Over time, the interpretation of the words “all civil Officers” 
has come to exclude legislators,i and thus supports the 
i See Appendix C for a discussion of this interpretation related to the 
impeachment trial of Senator William Blount. 
argument that legislators are not “Officers” and are not 
eligible to succeed to the presidency. Other provisions of the 
Constitution also support this view. Specifically, Article II, 
Section 3 gives the President the authority to “Commission 
all the Officers of the United States.”22 However, members of 
Congress do not receive commissions to serve in the House of 
Representatives or the Senate, thus supporting the argument 
that legislators are not “Officers of the United States.”23 
On the other hand, some scholars note that the Framers used 
the term “Officers” in Article II, Section 1 instead of the term 
“Officers of the United States.”24 Thus, it is argued that the 
ratifying states may have found the distinction unimportant 
because the Speaker and the President pro tempore are described 
as “Officers” of their houses elsewhere in the Constitution.25 
Yet, even if members of Congress are deemed “Officers” 
and are eligible to act as President, their inclusion in the 
line of succession raises issues about separation of powers. 
As President James Madison noted in 1792, an Acting 
President from the legislative branch would blur the lines of 
separation of powers.26 In addition, the Speaker participates 
in the impeachment process, and the President pro tempore 
votes in removal proceedings, which presents an obvious 
conflict of interest since the 1947 Act places both in the line 
of succession. In fact, this conflict of interest was present in 
the 1868 effort to remove President Andrew Johnson for 
violating the Tenure of Office Act.27 Johnson succeeded to 
the presidency after the assassination of President Abraham 
Lincoln and carried on as President with no Vice President.28 
When then President pro tempore Benjamin F. Wade voted 
in the removal trial of President Johnson, he effectively voted 
for his own succession to the presidency by voting “guilty” 
to remove President Johnson, because, under the 1792 Act, 
the President pro tempore was next in the line of succession 
after the Vice President.29 Ultimately, the effort to remove 
President Johnson failed by one vote, but the incident cast 
light on the issue of potential conflicts of interest in the 
context of a legislative line of succession.30 
Moreover, the historical record reveals the political maneuvering 
that led to the insertion of legislators into the 1792 Act. The 
Federalists and anti-Federalists were engaged in a power 
struggle.31 The Federalists did not want the line of succession 
to run through the Cabinet because Thomas Jefferson, an 
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anti-Federalist, was Secretary of State at the time.32 Alexander 
Hamilton, leader of the Federalist Party, persuaded his fellow 
Federalists in the Senate to overlook the constitutional questions 
about the 1792 Act in order to establish a legislative line of 
succession that would exclude Jefferson.33 
Although the arguments outlined above cast doubt on the 
constitutionality of the legislative line of succession, other 
arguments support its constitutionality. The primary support 
comes from the text of Article I, Sections 2 and 3,34 which 
provides for the House of Representatives and the Senate to 
choose their “other Officers,” in addition to the two legislative 
positions referred to by name in the Constitution: Speaker and 
President pro tempore.35 Thus, if the Speaker and President pro 
tempore are referred to as “Officers” in Article I, Sections 2 and 
3,36 and the word “Officer” in Article II, Section 1 refers to all 
“Officers,”37 members of Congress are, arguably, constitutionally 
eligible to be included in the line of succession.
Furthermore, historical practice supports the constitutionality 
of the legislative line of succession. The Second Congress, 
which passed the 1792 Act placing legislators in the line 
of succession, included six membersii of the Constitutional 
Convention who approved the final language of the 
Constitution38 and thus were uniquely qualified to interpret 
the Framers’ intent. However, four of the six membersiii 
present in the Second Congress voted against the 1792 
Act,39 including President James Madison, who at the time 
was a Representative from Virginia. As noted previously, 
President Madison believed that the inclusion of the 
President pro tempore and the Speaker in the line of succession 
was not constitutional because they were not “Officers” 
in the constitutional sense and that any other reading of 
the Constitution would violate the separation of powers.40 
Additionally, President Madison believed that the forced 
resignation of the President pro tempore or Speaker under 
the 1792 Act would remove any authority those individuals 
might previously have held in order to act as President.41 
ii These members were Abraham Baldwin, Elbridge Gerry, Thomas 
Fitzsimons, Nicholas Gilman, James Madison, and Hugh Williamson. See 3 
Annals of Cong. 417-18 (1791).
iii Those voting against the 1792 Act were Abraham Baldwin, Nicholas 
Gilman, James Madison, and Hugh Williamson. Id. 
2. Presidential Qualifications
Constitutional considerations also arise regarding other kinds 
of qualifications for those in the line of succession. Article II, 
Section 1, Clause 5 provides: 
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen 
of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this 
Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; 
neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall 
not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been 
fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.42 
The 1947 Act confirmed that this provision would apply 
to those in the line of succession with the language, “this 
section shall apply only to such officers as are eligible to the 
office of President under the Constitution.”43 While these 
requirements are clear, the question remains whether an 
individual who may be constitutionally qualified to act as 
President is “qualified” in the eyes of the national electorate. 
For example, notwithstanding that the President pro tempore 
is third in line of succession after the President, that position 
is traditionally filled by the Senator with “the longest record 
of continuous service,”44 rather than by a Senator who is 
being evaluated as a possible successor to the President. If the 
Senate’s only criterion for nominating a President pro tempore 
is the length of a Senator’s service, we respectfully suggest that 
the Senate should change its practice or the position should 
be removed from the line of succession. 
The qualifications of Cabinet members raise other issues. 
A number of departments have generated considerable 
controversy because those departments necessarily engage 
in practice and policy that at any given time may be under 
debate; in addition, Cabinet Secretaries may be unfamiliar 
to the electorate (as may be legislative leaders).iv Therefore, 
iv For example, a survey of 1,000 “likely voters” on April 1-2, 2011, discusses 
whether the American public is knowledgeable of the current Cabinet. For a 
more detailed explanation of the survey, see Locke, Solis Are Least Known of 
Obama Cabinet Members, Rasmussen Reports (Apr. 9, 2011), http://www.
rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/obama_administration/
april_2011/locke_solis_are_least_known_of_obama_cabinet_members. 
Similarly, on March 17-20, 2011, a Pew Research Center survey found 
that only forty-three percent of Americans know that John Boehner is the 
Speaker of the House. See Bruce Drake, What Does John Boehner Do for a 
Living? Less Than Half in Poll Know, Poll Watch Daily (Apr. 1, 2011), 
http://www.pollwatchdaily.com/2011/04/01/what-does-john-boehner-do-
for-a-living-less-than-half-in-poll-know/.
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when considering whether the legislative or executive line of 
succession is appropriate, the issue of qualifications in both 
the constitutional sense and as seen through the eyes of the 
electorate must be considered.
3. “Bumping” Provision
“Bumping” is a term that has come to describe cases in which 
legislators—not the President or Vice President—replace a 
Cabinet member who is an Acting President. Under the 1947 
Act, Cabinet members who have succeeded to the powers and 
duties of the office of President in the absence of a Speaker or 
President pro tempore may be displaced or bumped from the 
presidency once a Speaker or President pro tempore is elected or 
qualifies for office. This provision does not allow for Cabinet 
members to bump one another or for a Speaker to bump the 
President pro tempore or vice versa, but it does create a scenario 
for several officeholders to serve as President in a short time. 
The possibility of multiple successors in a short period appears 
to violate Article II, Section 1, which authorizes Congress 
only to enact a law that would declare what “Officer” would 
act as President until “a President shall be elected,” and not a 
law that would allow others to bump Acting Presidents from 
office.45 Furthermore, Article II, Section 1 states that the 
Acting President “shall act accordingly, until the Disability be 
removed, or a President shall be elected.”46
The rationale behind inclusion of the bumping provision is 
not well documented in the legislative history of the 1947 
Act. The debates on the 1886 Act, however, do include 
references to bumping.47 In 1883, Senator George Edmunds 
of Vermont first proposed having the Secretary of State act 
as President, should no Speaker or President pro tempore be 
available, and then relinquishing the office once a Speaker 
or President pro tempore was available to act as President.48 
Senator George Hoar opposed this, stating that it is not 
within Congress’s power under the Constitution to provide 
for two or three officers in succession to act as President.49 The 
1886 Act did not provide for bumping. 
c.  uncErtainty in tiMEs of PrEsidEntial 
succEssionV 
1. Acting Secretaries in the Line of 
Succession and Structural Issues 
Raisedvi
It is unclear whether the Acting Cabinet Secretaries are in the 
line of succession under the 1947 Act.vii During congressional 
debates leading up to the 1947 Act the topic of their inclusion 
did not come up once.50 Senator Kenneth Wherry, who 
introduced a Senate Bill, S. 564, which was later passed into law 
as the 1947 Act, said, “the bill accomplishes what I want to do, 
and that is to make the Speaker always the man that is to be the 
Acting President.”51 Senator Wherry thought that the Speaker 
was the closest official to the electorate.52 He stated: 
My theory is that as long as they all are elected officers I 
would much rather it would go to the Speaker first; then to 
the President pro tempore as the next closest to the Speaker, 
maybe. But in the event neither one of them is available, 
then go down through the line we have now, and they act as 
President only until either the President, Vice President, the 
Speaker, or the President pro tempore qualifies. In that order 
they can supplant the Secretary of State.53
v It is highly unlikely but not unquestionably clear that the Speaker of the 
House pro tempore and the Acting President pro tempore of the Senate are 
not currently included in the line of succession. See Appendix E. There have 
been two bills introduced by Congressman Brad Sherman since September 
11, 2001 that specifically state that the Speaker of the House pro tempore is 
not considered the Speaker of the House for the purposes of presidential 
succession. Both of these bills are silent with regard to the Acting President 
pro tempore of the Senate. The Clinic, recognizing that this is a point that 
has not previously been discussed in the literature on presidential succession, 
does not find a convincing argument for the inclusion of these legislators in 
the current line of succession. For a discussion of Congressman Sherman’s 
bills see Appendix D. The Clinic, however, recommends that Congress 
explicitly clarify whether Acting Secretaries and substitute congressional 
leadership are included in the line of succession. We think it inappropriate to 
include the latter—interim legislative officials—in the line of succession. 
vi An Acting Secretary is an officer who was not appointed as a Cabinet 
secretary by the President, but who nonetheless now holds the powers of a 
Cabinet secretary. By contrast, a Cabinet secretary is an individual who was 
appointed by the President with advice and consent of the Senate for the 
position of Cabinet Secretary. For a discussion of the bills introduced since 
September 11, 2001 see Appendix D. 
vii “We have spoken to acting secretaries who told us they had been placed in 
the line of succession.” Continuity of Gov’t Comm’n, Preserving 
Our Institutions: The Second Report of the Continuity of 
Government Commission 34 (2009).
Report of the Fordham University School of Law Clinic on Presidential Succession 31
  
ADVANCE DRAFT- Cite as: 81 Fordham L. Rev. (forthcoming Oct. 2012)
Thus, it is unlikely that Senator Wherry intended to include 
Acting Secretaries. They are more removed from the electorate 
than the Speaker, President pro tempore, and Cabinet Secretaries. 
Further, Senator Wherry advocated for succession to run, after 
the Speaker and President pro tempore, “through the line we have 
now,” which under the 1886 Act was only the Cabinet Secretaries 
confirmed as such, thus excluding Acting Secretaries.54 However, 
the language of the 1947 Act itself is ambiguous.
The inclusion of Acting Secretaries in the line of succession 
is supported by comparison of the language of the 1947 Act 
and the 1886 Act.55 The 1886 Act explicitly included only 
Cabinet Secretaries confirmed as such. After enumerating 
the list of Cabinet Secretaries who were included in the line 
of succession, Section 2 of the 1886 Act provided, “[t]hat 
the preceding section shall only be held to describe and apply 
to such officers as shall have been appointed by the advice 
and consent of the Senate to the offices therein named.” 56 In 
contrast, the language of the 1947 Act is less clear. Section 
19(d)(1) of the 1947 Act provides that “the officer of the 
United States who is highest on the following list, and who 
is not under disability to discharge the powers and duties of 
the office of President shall act as President.”57 The list that 
follows is a list of the Cabinet Secretaries. Section 19(e) goes 
on to state, “[s]ubsection (d) of this section shall apply only 
to officers appointed, by and with the advice and consent of 
the Senate.”58  The lack of language in the 1947 Act explicitly 
limiting succession to Cabinet Secretaries, “confirmed as 
such,” raises the question whether the Acting Secretaries are 
in the line of succession. However, the fact that the 1886 Act 
did not include the Acting Secretaries, that Senator Wherry’s 
statement quoted above likely did not contemplate inclusion 
of Acting Secretaries, and that there is a complete absence of 
discussion of Acting Secretaries in the legislative history of the 
1947 Act weigh against any interpretation of the 1947 Act 
that would include Acting Secretaries in the line of succession. 
If Acting Secretaries are in the line of succession, then Section 
19(d)(1) of the 1947 Act means that an Acting Secretary in a 
higher-listed department may become Acting President ahead 
of the lower-listed Cabinet Secretaries.59 Section 19(d)(1) 
states only that, “the officer of the United States who is 
highest on the following list . . . shall act as President.”60  There 
is no distinction made between an Acting Secretary or a 
Cabinet Secretary who was appointed and confirmed as such. 
Thus, under one interpretation, an Acting Secretary of State 
would have a valid claim to become Acting President ahead of 
the Secretary of the Treasury.61 
Whatever Congress’s intent in passing the 1947 Act, the 
Clinic has grappled with the soundness of including the 
Acting Secretaries in the line of succession. Their inclusion 
greatly expands the line of succession, but it raises several 
concerns about the implementation of the line of succession 
and the qualifications of the individuals who could assume 
the powers and duties of the presidency.viii  
d. additional concErns
1. Democratic Pedigree
Commentators most often defend placing members of 
Congress in the line of succession before Cabinet members 
on the basis of democratic pedigree, arguing that members of 
Congress are elected officials and thus, most representative 
of the national electorate after the President and Vice 
President.62 It is argued that Cabinet members, on the 
other hand, are not elected, but are only appointed by the 
President.ix Although they are not chosen by the electorate, 
Cabinet members do represent the electorate’s mandate 
as designees of the President, who is the most politically 
representative figure of the national constituency.x63 
Furthermore, Cabinet members, other than interim 
appointments, are not only appointed by the President but 
also must be confirmed by the Senate, which places them 
in the unique position of having been confirmed by “two 
continental institutions,”64 in contrast to the Speaker of the 
House and the President pro tempore, who are selected only by 
their local constituency and then by their respective houses.65 
viii For further discussion on the effect Acting Secretaries might have on 
implementing the line of succession, as well as the concerns regarding their 
presidential qualifications, see Appendix E.
ix President Truman, in his address to Congress, made the point—as a 
criticism—that with a Cabinet line of succession, the President has the 
ability to nominate the person who would be the “immediate successor 
in the event of [the President’s] own death or inability to act.” H.R. Doc. 
No.79-246, at 1 (1945).
x The President may be elected without a majority or even a plurality of 
the popular vote; however, the electorate of all the states still votes for the 
electors for President and Vice President.
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2. Party Continuity
The current line of succession can effectuate a change of party 
in the White House if the legislative leader who assumes the 
powers and duties of the presidency belongs to the party 
opposite to that of the elected President. Because a party shift 
could occur at any time during a presidential term and the 1947 
Act does not provide for special elections, the party which 
was not elected to the presidency could control the office of 
the President for up to four years (should a dual inability and/
or vacancy occur, for example, on or after Inauguration Day), 
contrary to the electorate’s mandate. Such a shift may be viewed 
as illegitimate in the eyes of the electorate.
3. Historical Precedent
There is historical precedent for a legislative line of succession. 
Scholars such as James E. Fleming argue that if the question of 
the constitutionality of a legislative line of succession were to 
come before the Supreme Court, the burden of proof would 
be on those arguing against the constitutionality of the 1792 
Act and the 1947 Act.66 
E. rEcoMMEndations for futurE action
1. Executive Line of Successionxi
The Clinic recommends an executive line of succession that 
would include all Cabinet Secretaries in the order in which 
their departments were established. Cabinet Secretaries 
xi The Clinic also discussed maintaining the current legislative-Cabinet line 
of succession, but to modify it to maintain party continuity by placing the 
leaders of the President’s party in the House of Representatives and the 
Senate in the line of succession rather than the Speaker and President pro 
tempore regardless of their party affiliation. The Clinic does not support this 
recommendation. First, the question remains unanswered as to whether the 
Speaker and President pro tempore are “Officers” in the constitutional sense. 
The creation of additional offices within the House of Representatives and 
the Senate would create positions that are even less clearly “Officers” because 
these new positions are not specifically enumerated in the Constitution. 
Second, because the proposed positions within Congress are not 
constitutionally mandated—unlike the Speaker and President pro tempore—
they may be revoked based on a simple vote within each House, which 
would add to the uncertainty in the line of succession. For a thoughtful 
discussion and contrary recommendations on this subject see Joel K. 
Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Lessons in Ensuring 
Presidential Continuity, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 959, 1038-39 (2010). 
should be required to resign from their positions if they act 
as President in cases of death, resignation, or removal, not 
because of a separation of powers issue, but so that their 
offices can be filled with a new Secretary and so that there 
will be a full Cabinet. As a matter of constitutional law, an 
executive line of succession cannot be challenged because 
Cabinet Secretaries, unlike legislative leaders, are clearly 
“Officers” under Article II, Section 1, Clause 6. Furthermore, 
Cabinet Secretaries, by virtue of their position in government 
and having day-to-day involvement in the administration of 
the executive branch, are more likely than legislators to run 
the executive branch consistent with the views held by the 
former or unable President. 
Furthermore, an executive line of succession moots the 
bumping provision. If legislators are no longer in the line of 
succession, they cannot bump an executive officer acting as 
President. 
2. Binary Line of Succession
As an alternative to an executive line of succession, the Clinic 
proposes that, in cases of presidential inability and vice-
presidential inability or vacancy, the line of succession should 
temporarily run through the Cabinet Secretaries. Under this 
proposal, Cabinet Secretaries should not be required to resign 
from their positions because no separation of powers issues 
are implicated and Cabinet Secretaries can return to their 
former offices without a second presidential nomination and 
subsequent Senate confirmation. This approach promotes 
party continuity during times of temporary presidential 
inability. In the event of a dual presidential and vice-
presidential vacancy due to death, resignation, or removal 
from office, under this binary approach the line of succession 
would continue as it currently stands under the 1947 Act with 
successors running first to the legislative leaders and then to 
Cabinet Secretaries.xii 
xii See Appendix D for Congressman Brad Sherman’s similar proposal.
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f. rEcoMMEndations for iMMEdiatE action
1. Acting Secretaries
The Clinic recommends that Congress confirm whether 
Acting Secretaries are included in the line of succession, 
and, if so, either remove them from the line, or alternatively, 
amend the 1947 Act so that Acting Secretaries can assume 
the powers and duties of the presidency, in the order of their 
departments’ creation, but only after succession has passed 
through all of the Cabinet Secretaries. Greater clarity is 
needed on the subject of their inclusion. We are aware that 
the Continuity in Government Commission and various 
legislative proposalsxiii suggest that Acting Secretaries be 
excluded altogether, reflecting to some extent a point of 
view as to their qualifications to serve in the highest office. 
However, we do not rush to this conclusion even in the 
face of this impressive authority, believing that a number of 
individuals who serve in these positions are highly qualified 
and have been confirmed by the Senate. Their inclusion in the 
line of succession does have the benefit of deepening the line 
of succession in the event of a catastrophe. Finally, if Acting 
Secretaries are included in the line of succession, then the 
departmental lines of succession need to be more carefully 
studied to determine the qualifications of the individuals 
in those lines of succession for possible presidential service. 
Either explicitly excluding Acting Secretaries from the line 
of succession, or allowing Acting Secretaries to assume the 
powers and duties of the presidency only after all succession 
has run through all of the Cabinet Secretaries, greatly reduces 
potential confusion were statutory succession to be triggered 
in the event of a mass catastrophe and, in particular, the 
succession of an unknown Acting Secretary of questionable 
presidential pedigree. 
xiii For a more complete discussion of the Continuity of Government’s proposal 
and the proposed legislation see Appendix D.
EndnotEs
1 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
2 Presidential Succession Act of 1792, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 239, 240 (repealed 1886).
3 Presidential Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1 (repealed 1947).
4 Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(1) (2006).
5 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
6 Joel K. Goldstein, Taking From the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Lessons in 
Ensuring Presidential Continuity, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 959, 1020 (2010).
7 See Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 35–37 (1863–64).
8 13 Cong. Rec. 128 (1881); see also U.S. Const. art. II, §1, cl. 2 (“Each 
State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, 
a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and 
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no 
Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit 
under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.”).
9 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
10 13 Cong. Rec. 128 (statement of Sen. James A. Bayard).
11 Id. 
12 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
13 Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
14 Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
15 Compare id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1, and id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, with id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
16 U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“No Senator or Representative shall, during 
the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under 
the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the 
Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time; and no 
Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of 
either House during his Continuance in Office.”).
17 Id. 
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 See 13 Cong. Rec. 128 (1881) (statement of Sen. James A. Bayard) 
(arguing that these “Officers” are not included in the line of succession).
21 U.S. Const. art. II, § 4 (stating in full that “The President, Vice President 
and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office 
on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors.”).
22 Id. art. II, § 3 (stating in relevant part that “[The President] shall 
Commission all the Officers of the United States.”).
23 See, e.g., 13 Cong. Rec. 127–28 (1881) (statement of Sen. James A. 
Bayard).
24 Goldstein, supra note 6, at 1020–21. 
25 Id.; see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5.
26 Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Feb. 21, 1792), in 3 
The Founders’ Constitution (Philip Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 
2000), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/
a2_1_6s3.html.
27 See John D. Feerick, From Failing Hands: The Story of 
residential Succession 113–14 (Fordham U. Press, 1965).
28 See id. at 114.
34 Ensuring the Stability of Presidential Succession in the Modern Era:
  
ADVANCE DRAFT- Cite as: 81 Fordham L. Rev. (forthcoming Oct. 2012)
29 See id. 
30 See id.
31 Id. at 60–62.
32 Id. at 60–61. 
33 Id. at 60–62. 
34 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5.
35 Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (stating in relevant part that “The House of 
Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers . . .”); id. art. 
I, § 3, cl. 5 (stating in relevant part that “The Senate shall chuse their other 
Officers, and also a President pro tempore . . .”).
36 Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5.
37 Id. art. II, § 1.
38 Feerick, supra note 27, at 60.
39 3 Annals of Cong. 417 (1791).
40 See Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, supra note 26.
41 See id.
42 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
43 Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 3 U.S.C. § 19(e) (2006).
44 Definition of President Pro Tempore, U.S. Senate, http://www.senate.gov/
reference/glossary_term/president_pro_tempore.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 
2011). In a recent article, Professor Amar also argues that “most Speakers are 
un-presidential.” Akhil Reed Amar, Why Speakers of the House Should Never 
Be President, The New Republic, Jan. 12, 2012 (stating that “Speakers of 
both parties have typically been unfit for the presidency”), http://www.tnr.
com/print/article/politics/99509/presidential-succession-speaker-house.
45 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 6; see also Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram 
David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 Stan. L. 
Rev. 113, 135 (1995) (noting this discrepancy and discussing further the 
problems created by bumping).
46 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
47 See, e.g., 17 Cong. Rec. 676–77 (1886) (statement of Sen. George Everett 
Adams); 17 Cong. Rec. 220 (1885) (debate on Dec. 16, 1885); 14 Cong. 
Rec. 880 (1883) (debate on Jan. 5, 1883).
48 14 Cong. Rec. 880.
49 Id.
50 See Succession to the Presidency: Hearing Before the Comm. on Rules and 
Admin., 80th Cong. (1947) [hereinafter Succession to the Presidency]; To 
Determine Presidential Succession: Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 80th Cong. (1947); Selection of an Acting President in the 
Case of Failure to Qualify of Both President-Elect and Vice-President Elect: 
Hearing Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th 
Cong. (1947); H.R. Rep. No. 80-80 (1947); H.R. Doc. No. 80–89 (1947); 
H.R. Rep. No. 80–817 (1947). 
51 Succession to the Presidency, supra note 50, at 42 (statement of Sen. Kenneth 
S. Wherry).
52 Id. at 43.
53 Id. at 61 (emphasis added). 
54 Presidential Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1, § 1 (repealed 1947).
55 Continuity of Gov’t Comm’n, Preserving Our Institutions: 
The Second Report of the Continuity of Government 
Commission 34 (2009). The Continuity of Government Commission has 
confirmed with some acting secretaries that they were placed in the line of 
succession. Id.
56 Presidential Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1 (emphasis added) 
(repealed 1947).
57 Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(1) (2006).
58 Id. § 19(e).
59 Id. § 19(d)(1).
60 Id.
61 Id. § 19. 
62 See Amar & Amar, supra note 45, at 130 (noting that this argument is often 
made). 
63 See id.; see also Steven G. Calabresi, The Political Question of Presidential 
Succession, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 155, 172–73 (1995).
64 Amar & Amar, supra note 45, at 131.
65 Id. at 130–131.
66 James E. Fleming, Presidential Succession: The Art of the Possible, 79 
Fordham L. Rev. 951, 952–56 (2010).
Report of the Fordham University School of Law Clinic on Presidential Succession 35
  
ADVANCE DRAFT- Cite as: 81 Fordham L. Rev. (forthcoming Oct. 2012)
a. introduction
The peaceful and orderly transfer of executive power, 
beginning with the popular election and culminating with the 
inauguration of the new President, is crucial to the continuity 
of a democratic government that is responsive and accountable 
to the electorate. Lack of clarity in the constitutional provisions, 
federal statutes, state laws, and party rules governing candidate 
succession during the pre-inaugural period threatens orderly 
transfers of presidential power.i The contingencies raised below 
therefore merit attention, are ripe for reform, and are no less 
important than post-inaugural contingencies.  
b. lEgal fraMEwork
Constitutional provisions, federal and state statutes, and 
political party rules govern the modern system of pre-
inaugural presidential succession.ii This section identifies the 
sources of law that are applicable at specific junctures in the 
pre-inaugural period and the relationships among them.
Contingencies that may occur prior to a General Election, 
during which prospective candidates campaign for their 
parties’ nominations in primaries, caucuses, and party 
conventions, are governed almost exclusively by party rules 
and state law. The Rules of the Republican Party, adopted by 
the 2008 Republican National Convention on September 1, 
2008 and amended by the Republican National Committee 
on August 6, 2010, state: 
The Republican National Committee is hereby authorized 
and empowered to fill any and all vacancies which may 
occur by reason of death, declination, or otherwise of the 
Republican candidate for President of the United States or 
the Republican candidate for Vice President of the United 
States, as nominated by the national convention, or the 
Republican National Committee may reconvene the national 
convention for the purpose of filling any such vacancies.1
i This discussion is limited to death or resignation of a candidate or nominee. 
The possible contingencies arising from temporary or permanent inability, 
though worthy of prompt attention and scrutiny, are numerous and largely 
beyond the scope of this inquiry in the pre-inaugural period.
ii See Appendix A for the text of these constitutional provisions, federal 
statutes, and political party rules. See Appendix F, Chart 5 for the text of the 
state statutes.
Similarly, the Democratic National Committee has the 
responsibility of filling vacancies on the party’s national ticket 
that occur prior to the General Election. The Charter & 
the Bylaws of the Democratic Party of the United States, as 
amended by the Democratic National Committee on August 
20, 2010, provide that:
The Democratic National Committee shall have general 
responsibility for the affairs of the Democratic Party between 
National Conventions, subject to the provisions of this Charter 
and to the resolutions or other actions of the National Convention. 
This responsibility shall include . . . (c) filling vacancies in the 
nominations for the office of President and Vice President.2
The Democratic National Committee, in the Call for the 
2012 Democratic National Convention, stipulates:
In the event of death, resignation or disability of a nominee 
of the Party for President or Vice President after the 
adjournment of the National Convention, the National 
Chairperson of the Democratic National Committee shall 
confer with the Democratic leadership of the United States 
Congress and the Democratic Governors Association and 
shall report to the Democratic National Committee, which is 
authorized to fill the vacancy or vacancies.3
The Constitution provides in Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 
that “[t]he Congress may determine the Time of chusing the 
Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which 
Day shall be the same throughout the United States.”4 In 1845, 
Congress established the date for the General Election in a 
presidential year to be the first Tuesday after the first Monday in 
November. The General Election involves the process whereby 
presidential electors are chosen by popular vote in each state.5 
In the event of a mass catastrophe, such as a terrorist attack that 
prevents citizens from going to the polls or the death of a party’s 
nominee in the period prior to the General Election, Congress 
is constitutionally authorized to delay the date of the election.6 
Fortunately, Congress has never had to act on this authority.iii  
iii In contrast, local governments have postponed elections in emergency 
situations. The terrorist attack in New York City on Tuesday, September 11, 
2001, resulted in the postponement of citywide primary elections scheduled 
that day and which were already underway at the time of the attack. A 
New York Supreme Court order canceling the election was followed by an 
executive order by Governor George E. Pataki temporarily suspending the 
election. Jerry H. Goldfeder, Could Terrorists Derail a Presidential Election?, 
32 Fordham Urb. L.J. 523, 525-26 (2005).
Vii. PrE-inauguration succEssion contingEnciEs
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Prior to the General Election, each state is responsible for 
selecting its presidential electors.7 Generally, candidates 
for presidential elector are nominated by the state political 
parties, which are responsible for filing the electors’ names 
with the Secretary of State of their respective states.8 Article 
II, Section 1, Clause 2 provides the manner in which these 
selections are to be made: 
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature 
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the 
whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which 
the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or 
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit 
under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.9
After the General Election, the electors are required to 
meet and are expected to cast their electoral votes for the 
candidates to whom they are pledged. Under current law, 
the presidential electors meet in their respective state capitals 
and in the District of Columbia forty-one days following the 
General Election.10 At these fifty-one separate meetings, the 
electors cast their electoral votes in the manner required by 
the Twelfth Amendment, which states:
The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote 
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, 
at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with 
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted 
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for 
as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all 
persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as 
Vice-President and of the number of votes for each, which 
lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the 
seat of the government of the United States, directed to the 
President of the Senate.11
Federal law does not require electors in each state to vote for 
any particular candidate.12 Many states, however, mandate 
by statute that electors vote for candidates to whom they 
have pledged their votes.13 These statutory mandates create a 
potential crisis if a presidential or vice-presidential candidate 
dies between Election Day in November and the meeting of 
the Electoral College in mid-December. In such a case,  
“[t]heoretically, the electors would be free to vote for anyone 
they pleased. But the national party rules for the filling of 
vacancies by the national committees would still be in effect, 
and the electors would probably—but not necessarily— 
respect the decision of their national committee on a new 
nominee.”14 The political parties, relying on the authority 
granted to them in their respective party rules and bylaws, 
likely would recommend a replacement candidate for whom 
the electors should vote. 
After the electoral votes are cast by the electors and certified 
by the appropriate state official, the votes are sealed and 
transmitted to the President of the United States Senate, the 
Vice President.15 The Twelfth Amendment provides that  
“[t]he President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the 
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates 
and the votes shall then be counted.”16 By federal statute, the 
joint session of Congress is required to take place at 1:00 
p.m. on January 6 in the calendar year following the meetings 
of the Electoral College.17 The person receiving the greatest 
number of votes for President becomes President, provided 
he receives a majority of the electoral votes.18 Likewise, 
the person receiving the greatest number of votes for Vice 
President becomes Vice President, provided he receives a 
majority of the electoral votes.19
If no candidate for President receives a majority, the House 
of Representatives is required, pursuant to the Twelfth 
Amendment, to go into session and choose the President 
“from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding 
three on the list of those voted for as President.”20 The state 
delegations cast their votes for President “by states,” with each 
state having one vote; a candidate must receive the votes of an 
absolute majority of state delegations—twenty-six—in order 
to become President-elect.21
Similarly, if no candidate for Vice President receives a 
majority of the electoral votes, then, pursuant to the Twelfth 
Amendment, the Senate is required to go into session and 
choose the Vice President “from the two highest numbers on 
the list.”22 A candidate must receive the vote of the “majority 
of the whole number” of Senators—fifty-one—in order to 
become Vice President-elect.23
Section 4 of the Twentieth Amendment provides that, in the 
event of the death of any of the candidates from whom the 
respective Houses may choose the President or Vice President, 
Congress retains the authority to provide for a possible 
solution: 
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The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of 
any of the persons from whom the House of Representatives 
may choose a President whenever the right of choice shall have 
devolved upon them, and for the case of the death of any of the 
persons from whom the Senate may choose a Vice President 
whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them.24
If the House of Representatives fails to choose a President-
elect in time for the inauguration on January 20,25 then 
Section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment specifies that the 
Vice President-elect becomes Acting President until the 
House chooses a President when the right of choice devolves 
upon it.26 If the Senate has also failed to choose a Vice 
President-elect by Inauguration Day, then, under the 1947 
Act, the next in the line of succession, currently the Speaker of 
the House, becomes Acting President until either the House 
selects a President or the Senate selects a Vice President.27 
If the President-elect dies between the counting of the electoral 
votes by Congress on January 6 and Inauguration Day on 
January 20, then under the Twentieth Amendment the Vice 
President-elect becomes President.28 In the event of the death 
of the Vice President-elect during this period, the President, 
at the beginning of his term of office, must nominate a new 
Vice President for congressional confirmation pursuant to 
Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.29 In the event that 
both the President-elect and Vice President-elect die during 
this same period, the statutory line of succession goes into 
effect on Inauguration Day, placing the Speaker, the President 
pro tempore, and then Cabinet Secretaries, in the order of 
their departments’ creation, in the line for the presidency.30 
The Speaker then becomes the Acting President for the full 
presidential term; but, if neither a Speaker nor a President 
pro tempore is available, the Cabinet member next in line of 
succession would become Acting President until a Speaker or 
President pro tempore becomes available.31 
c. succEssion Prior to thE gEnEral ElEction 
If death or resignation occurs prior to the General Election, 
the political party of the candidate can fill the vacancy in the 
ticket.32 As stated above, Congress can also delay the date of 
the presidential election.33 In the rare instances, in which the 
vice-presidential candidate has died or resigned, the national 
party executive committees, usually in consultation with 
the presidential candidate, convened to select a replacement 
candidate in accordance with the party rules. For example, 
President Taft’s incumbent Vice President, James S. Sherman, 
died on October 30, 1912, just days before the national popular 
election of 1912.34 Vice President Sherman’s name remained on 
the ballot because his death occurred so close to the election.35 
On November 12, 1912, the Republican National Committee 
selected Columbia University President Nicholas Murray 
Butler as Sherman’s replacement.36 Electors for Sherman voted 
for Butler when the Electoral College met.37 
In 1972, Democratic presidential nominee George 
McGovern selected Senator Thomas Eagleton as his vice-
presidential candidate, and the party subsequently nominated 
him at the national party convention.38 Senator Eagleton 
withdrew his name from nomination on July 31, 1972 after 
he disclosed that he had been hospitalized three times for 
the treatment of depression.39 The Democratic National 
Committee nominated McGovern’s replacement choice for 
Vice President—Sargent Shriver—on August 8, 1972, in a 
meeting open to the press.40
The rules of both major political parties delegate a great 
deal of discretion to their executive committees for selecting 
replacement candidates.41 In exercising this discretion, 
the parties should fulfill the electorate’s expectations 
of transparency, process, and certainty by clarifying the 
procedure for selecting replacement candidates in the party 
rules and bylaws. As necessary, these changes should be 
adopted before the national party conventions. 
1. Succession Prior to the National Party 
Convention 
If the death or resignation of a presidential candidate occurs 
prior to the national party convention,iv the party executive 
committee determines the obligation of the pledged 
delegates, if any, won through primary elections.42 Two 
possible amendments to party rules that should be considered 
are releasing the pledged delegates from their obligation to 
vote for certain candidates or awarding the pledged delegates 
won by the absent candidate to another candidate.
iv If the death or resignation of a candidate occurs before any primary elections 
are held, there may still be issues concerning state qualifying periods, names 
printed on ballots, early voting, and absentee voting. These merit attention 
but are outside the scope of this Clinic. 
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2. Succession After the National Party 
Convention 
The death or resignation of a presidential or vice-presidential 
candidate after the national political party convention but 
prior to the General Election poses additional concerns. The 
national party executive committee has the authority to name 
a replacement candidate here as well.43 The primary voters and 
the convention delegates have already fulfilled their duties. 
While not impossible, recalling the thousands of convention 
delegates would present an enormous financial and 
logistical burden and may not prove to be more transparent, 
democratic, or certain than a meeting of the national party 
executive committee. 
3. Recommendations
The national party committees should examine the need for 
criteria and procedures to guide the selection process in the 
event of the death, resignation, or inability of a candidate 
prior to the General Election. For instance, in the case of 
vacancy caused by death or resignation, the party executive 
committee could meet to select a replacement candidate, 
in consultation with members of Congress and Governors 
from the same party,v and together lay out criteria for 
replacement candidates. The criteria should vary to account 
for the many circumstances leading to the succession of a 
presidential candidate and might include national security 
experience, previous exposure to the electorate, or continuity 
of policy positions with the deceased or resigned candidate. 
The national party executive committee could also create 
expedited timelines for recalling convention delegates.
We would expect the presidential candidate to have a 
major role in the process if his running mate has died or 
withdrawn. Conversely, we would expect the vice-presidential 
running mate to receive every appropriate consideration 
as the replacement candidate for a presidential nominee 
who had died or resigned before the General Election. This 
v The national political party conventions are held in the summer, leaving 
anywhere from two to three months between the convention and the 
national popular election on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in 
November. Members of Congress and governors are usually granted 
unpledged delegate status and may vote as they wish for the party nominees 
during the party conventions. Therefore, consultation with these individuals 
will provide the parties with guidance similar to that given by the unpledged 
delegates at the party conventions.  
consideration would have different weight if the succession 
event occurred after the election when the electorate has 
expressed itself.
The value of transparency suggests that the meetings of the 
national party committees when considering replacement 
candidates should be open to the public and the press and 
should be televised. When a national party committee 
takes on the extraordinary role of selecting a replacement 
candidate, the privacy ordinarily afforded to internal party 
decisions should be sacrificed to ensure that the public 
confidence is served by the party’s process and the results of 
its deliberations.vi 
d. succEssion aftEr gEnEral ElEction but 
bEforE thE MEEtings of ElEctoral collEgE 
Replacement of a candidate who has died or resigned during 
the forty-one day period between the General Election on 
the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November and the 
casting of votes by the Electoral College in mid-December 
must respect the fact that the electorate has spoken through a 
national election. Historically, the national party committees 
have instructed the party’s electors how to cast their electoral 
votes in the event of the death of a candidate.44 However, 
whether there is a legal obligation for a presidential elector 
to vote according to party instructions, including a vote for a 
replacement nominee, is a question “that cannot be answered 
with any certainty.”45 
vi The Charter and the Bylaws of the Democratic Party provide that  
“[a]ll meetings of the Democratic National Committee, the Executive 
Committee, and all other official Party committees, commissions and 
bodies shall be open to the public, and votes shall not be taken by secret 
ballot.” Democratic Nat’l Comm., The Charter & The Bylaws of 
the Democratic Party of the United States 7 (2010), available at 
http://www.democrats.org/files/misc/pdf/Charter_and_Bylaws_8_20_10.
php (Article Nine, Section 12). The Rules of the Republican Party provide 
that “[a]ll meetings of the Republic National Committee and all of its 
committees shall be open meetings, except as provided for by Robert’s Rules 
of Order,” and that “[n]o votes (except elections to office when properly 
ordered pursuant to the provisions of Robert’s Rules of Order) shall be taken 
by secret ballot in any open meeting of the Republic National Committee or 
of any committee thereof.” Republican Nat’l Comm., The Rules of 
the Republican Party 6, 7 (2008), available at http://www.gop.com/
images/legal/2008_RULES_Adopted.pdf (amended by the Republican 
National Committee on August 6, 2010).
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Speaking to this contingency, a 1932 House Report 
interpreting Article II, Section 3 and the Twelfth Amendment 
stated that electors are free agents: “[p]residential electors, 
and not the President, are chosen at the November election. 
The electors, under the present Constitution, would be 
free to choose a President, notwithstanding the death of a 
party nominee.”46 Under this interpretation, electors cannot 
be compelled to vote for their party’s nominees.47 Several 
historical instances of “unfaithful” electors have not stopped 
Congress from counting those electors’ votes,48 supporting the 
view that presidential electors are free agents.49 
Yet, history and custom also indicate that Congress can 
invalidate electoral votes cast against party instructions in 
the case of a nominee’s death. Horace Greeley, the 1872 
presidential nominee of the Democratic and Liberal 
Republican parties, died on November 29, 1872, a few weeks 
after the national popular election held on November 5, 
1872. Sixty-three of the sixty-six presidential electors whom 
Greeley won voted for other candidates in accordance with 
party instructions. Congress declined to count the three votes 
from Georgia cast for Greeley against party instructions on 
the ground that electoral votes cast for a dead person50 were 
invalid.51 Congress, however, grouped those three electoral 
votes with all other electoral votes cast for purposes of 
determining the number needed for an electoral majority.52 
According to the law of some states, presidential electors 
are held accountable if they do not vote as instructed by the 
party at the meeting of the Electoral College.vii More than 
half the states and the District of Columbia have adopted 
laws aimed at deterring unfaithful electors.53  In a majority 
of these states, an elector pledges to vote for his party’s 
nominee for President and Vice President when the Electoral 
College meets to cast its votes. In the other states, electors 
are obligated to vote for the winners of the states’ popular 
elections.54 Although the courts have never addressed the 
vii Six states have enacted civil and criminal penalties for faithless electors. See 
Appendix F, Chart 5 for the text of these states’ statutes.
question whether state laws binding electors are enforceable, 
the courts have upheld the constitutionality of these laws. In 
Ray v. Blair, the Supreme Court held that it is constitutional 
for states to allow parties to require pledges from the electors55 
as the electors are actors on behalf of their respective states.56 
Moreover, the Court held that a state has the right to reject 
the appointment of an elector who refuses to take the pledge 
required by his party.57 
The result of a national popular election presumably cements 
in the minds of the voters the expectation that the successor 
to the incoming President will be the newly-elected Vice 
President. Of course, under the Twentieth Amendment, 
this would not occur until Inauguration Day.58 Nevertheless, 
to fulfill voters’ expectations after a presidential election, 
the successful vice-presidential nominee should be assured 
of succession if the successful presidential nominee dies 
or resigns after Election Day, even if the electors have the 
power to cast their votes for someone else in the period 
before Inauguration Day, when the Twentieth Amendment 
would take effect.viii Since voters would expect the electors to 
vote for the winners of each state’s popular vote, in such an 
instance, the party executive committees should exercise their 
discretion to instruct the electors to vote for the successful 
vice-presidential nominee to replace the deceased presidential 
nominee and to recommend, not instruct, a vote by the 
electors for a new vice-presidential nominee. 
viii The nominees for President and Vice President, of course, are not “elected” 
on Election Day. Rather, voters elect electors on Election Day, and the 
electors in turn elect a President and Vice President when they meet in 
December to cast their electoral votes. Even at this point, the nominees for 
President and Vice President are not yet “elected” because Congress must 
validate and count the electoral votes. A presidential nominee becomes the 
President-elect and a vice-presidential nominee becomes the Vice President-
elect upon the count and declaration of electoral votes by Congress. See 
generally Neale, supra note 51, at 3-4. But see H.R. Rep. No. 72-345, at 
4 (1932) (“[V]otes which were cast for a person, who was eligible at the 
time the votes were cast but who has died before the votes are counted by 
Congress . . . . must be counted by Congress.”). 
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1. Recommendations
In the event of the death of a successful presidential nominee 
after the General Election but before the meeting of the 
Electoral College, we urge the parties to adopt rules that 
automatically elevate the vice-presidential nominee to the 
position of presidential nominee.ix In addition, the party 
should issue recommendations to the electors for whom 
they should vote for Vice President.x To the extent that state 
laws binding presidential electors conflict with the above 
recommendation, state legislatures should amend those 
statutes and release electors from an obligation to cast an 
electoral vote for a dead nominee.xi 
E. succEssion aftEr thE ElEctoral collEgE VotE 
but bEforE thE counting and dEclaration of 
ElEctoral VotEs by congrEss
Congress is the ultimate arbiter of electoral votes in the event 
of the death or resignation of a successful presidential or vice-
presidential nominee, or both, during the period between 
the meeting of the Electoral College and January 6, when 
ix The general notion of elevating the candidate for Vice President of 
the same party to the presidential spot has some support in Congress, 
although the means identified for effectuating this are different from the 
recommendation in this Report. See Presidential Succession Act of 2010, 
H.R. 6557, 111th Cong. § 3 (2010) (suggesting the elevation of the vice-
presidential candidate of the same party to the presidential slot and the 
selection of the replacement vice-presidential candidate via predetermined 
contingent choices by presidential electors).
x Because it would be non-binding, this specific recommendation likely would 
play an important role in limiting the political jockeying by electors to put 
the election before Congress. If a sufficient number of electors feel forced 
to vote in a way with which they disagree, they may switch their electoral 
votes for President and thereby deny all of the candidates a majority of the 
electoral votes, throwing the election to the House of Representatives. While 
a non-binding suggestion carries the authoritative weight of the party, the 
ultimate election of the replacement Vice President should be left up to the 
individual electors. See generally Amar, supra note 49, at 219. Of course, in 
the event that the presidential election is thrown into the House or the vice-
presidential election into the Senate, Congress would have the authority to 
disregard party recommendations or instructions. See U.S. Const. amend 
XX, § 4. 
xi Apparently, only Wisconsin’s statute regarding presidential electors explicitly 
releases electors from their statutory obligation upon the death of the 
candidate to whom they are pledged. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 7.75 (LexisNexis 
2011).
Congress counts the Electoral College votes.59 The Twelfth 
Amendment states that “[t]he President of the Senate shall . . . 
open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted.”60 
It is unclear whether Congress can invalidate electoral votes 
cast for a presidential or vice-presidential nominee who dies 
after the meeting of the Electoral College.61 
As in other pre-inaugural periods, the death or resignation 
of a presidential or vice-presidential nominee poses less 
urgent problems than in the case of double death or double 
resignation.62 There are two outcomes if Congress counts the 
votes for a nominee who has won a majority of the electoral 
votes but dies or resigns after the votes have been cast. First, in 
the event of death or resignation of the presidential nominee, 
the vice-presidential nominee would become President upon 
taking the presidential oath of office on Inauguration Day.63 
Second, in the event of the death of the vice-presidential 
nominee, the President, after assuming office, must nominate 
a new Vice President pursuant to Section 2 of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment.64 
If Congress counts the electoral votes for the successful 
presidential and vice-presidential nominees who both had 
died after the meeting of the Electoral College, the next 
person in the line of succession would become Acting 
President upon taking the oath of office on January 20.65 
Thus, if the next in line is a member of a different party from 
that of the deceased President-elect and Vice President-elect, 
the result would be a change in the party of the President-
elect, contrary to the expressed will of the electorate. This 
would present a politically difficult situation for members 
of Congress charged with determining the outcome of a 
presidential election. The alternative—the refusal of Congress 
to count votes cast for nominees living at the time of the 
Electoral College vote—would run afoul of the Twelfth 
Amendment.  
1. Recommendation
Ultimately, in light of the constitutional mandate in the 
Twelfth Amendment to count all electoral votes and the 
statutory provision66 disfavoring objections to electoral votes 
cast for living nominees, we believe that Congress lacks the 
authority to refuse to count electoral votes cast for nominees 
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who were living at the time of the meeting of the Electoral 
College. Congress must count those votes, regardless of 
subsequent death or resignation.xii
f. succEssion aftEr count and dEclaration 
of ElEctoral VotEs by congrEss but bEforE 
inauguration day
As noted previously, the death of either a President-elect or 
Vice President-elect during the fourteen days between the 
congressional count and declaration of the electoral votes on 
January 6 and the inauguration on January 20 is addressed by 
the Twentieth and Twenty-Fifth Amendments, respectively. 
How to address the death or resignation or inability of both 
the President-elect and Vice President-elect during this period 
may present complications if there is no Speaker or President 
pro tempore. The 1947 Act contains the list of officers eligible 
to act as President in these circumstances, which would 
trigger the Cabinet line of succession.67 However, there 
may not have been any Cabinet nominations made by the 
outgoing President for the Senate to confirm at the request 
of a newly-elected President.xiii Thus, the outgoing President’s 
Cabinet members would be in the line of succession to act as 
President if they had not yet resigned.  
Recent practice has been for the President-elect to release the 
names of his Cabinet nominees and for Senate committees 
to hold confirmation hearings for uncontroversial nominees 
xii Furthermore, objections to electoral votes are prohibited by statute if those 
votes were “regularly given by electors whose appointment has been lawfully 
certified.” 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2006). Although the Greeley precedent would 
invalidate electoral votes cast for candidates who died before the meeting 
of the Electoral College, this does not mean that Congress can invalidate 
electoral votes cast for qualified nominees who were alive at the time of the 
Electoral College vote. A “qualified” nominee is one who meets the Article 
II, Section 1 requirements to run for President: “No person except a natural 
born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption 
of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall 
any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age 
of thirty-five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United 
States.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
xiii The Constitution provides that only a President, not a President-elect, “shall 
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate shall 
appoint . . . all other Officers of the United States . . . .” U.S. Const. art. II, § 
2, cl. 2.
before January 20. The term “confirmation hearing” is not 
fully accurate because there is no presidential nominee for 
the Senate committee to confirm prior to January 20. Rather, 
Senate committees hold such hearings to decide whether to 
recommend confirmation of the nominees to the full Senate, 
a vote which can only occur after the newly-inaugurated 
President officially nominates his Cabinet selections.68
1. Recommendations
To ensure an orderly transition in a time of crisis, the Clinic 
recommends adopting the Continuity of Government 
Commission’s recommendation69 for cooperation between 
the outgoing and incoming presidential administrations to 
expedite the confirmation of incoming Cabinet members.xiv 
The outgoing President and Congress have affirmative duties 
in this regard under the Presidential Transition Act of 1963.70 
The Clinic suggests that the outgoing President consider 
promptly nominating Cabinet nominees the President-
elect submits to him prior to Inauguration Day.xv Congress 
should confirm as many of these nominees as possible prior 
to Inauguration Day, consistent with the proper discharge of 
its advice and consent responsibility.71 As is now the practice, 
one or more of these individuals should not attend the 
presidential inauguration and should be located away from 
Washington, D.C. to ensure a line of succession that reflects 
the results of the most recent presidential election.xvi 
xiv The proposed cooperation between outgoing and incoming administrations 
to expedite the confirmation of Cabinet members and secure the continuity 
of government has support in Congress. See Presidential Succession Act of 
2010, H.R. 6557, 111th Cong. § 4 (2010) (supporting the Continuity of 
Government Commission’s seventh recommendation).
xv We believe that such an action by a sitting President would set a positive 
and powerful precedent to be followed by future Presidents. If this 
recommendation is not adopted, however, the current practice of holding 
hearings before Inauguration Day should continue.
xvi We recognize that under a Cabinet line of succession, the death, resignation, 
or failure to qualify of the President- and Vice President-elect before 
Cabinet nominations are submitted to the outgoing President is a gap 
that is not addressed by these recommendations.  Under a legislative line 
of succession, the contingency does not create a gap because the Speaker 
becomes Acting President upon taking the oath of office on January 20. 
See H.R. Rep. No. 72-345, at 2 (1932). Because the Clinic recommends 
the adoption of a Cabinet line of succession, the Cabinet selection process 
should be expedited and should be one of the first items addressed by the 
President-elect and the presidential transition team.
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Presidential and Acting Presidential Inability 
Recommendations: 
 Statutory Action:
1. Acknowledge that the President or Acting President, 
upon declaration of his own inability, can transfer his 
powers voluntarily to the next in the line of succession in 
instances of vice-presidential inability or vacancy.
2. Authorize the person next in the line of succession 
after the Vice President, together with a majority of the 
Cabinet, to declare the inability of the President or Acting 
President in instances of vice-presidential inability or 
vacancy. 
 Executive Contingency Planning:
3. The President or Acting President should prepare a 
prospective executive declaration of inability at the 
beginning of his service, in which he would define the 
situations which in his view would render him unable 
to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency in 
the future and would provide that the declaration of his 
inability goes into effect based upon a review process set 
out by the President or Acting President.
Vice-Presidential Inability Recommendation:
 Executive Contingency Planning:
4. The Vice President should prepare a prospective executive 
declaration of inability at the beginning of his service, in 
which he would define the situations which in his view 
would render him unable to discharge the powers and 
duties of the vice presidency in the future and would 
provide that the declaration of his inability goes into 
effect based upon a review process set out by the Vice 
President.
Line of Succession Recommendations 
 Statutory Action:
5. Establish an executive line of succession that runs 
exclusively through the Cabinet after the President 
and Vice President. In the case of removal, death, or 
resignation of the President, the Cabinet member 
assuming the powers and duties of the presidency should 
be required to resign from the Cabinet. In a case of 
inability, the Cabinet member assuming the powers and 
duties of the presidency should not be required to resign.
6. In the event an executive line of succession is not adopted, 
establish a binary line of succession that first runs through 
Congress, and then the Cabinet, in instances of death, 
resignation, and removal. Successors would be required 
to resign in these circumstances. The line of succession 
would run solely through the Cabinet in instances of 
presidential and vice-presidential inability or failure to 
qualify. Under this proposal, when a Cabinet member 
assumes the powers and duties of the presidency, that 
Cabinet member would not be required to resign.
7. Confirm whether Acting Secretaries are included in the 
line of succession, and, if so, either remove them from 
the line, or alternatively, amend the 1947 Act so that 
Acting Secretaries can assume the powers and duties of 
the presidency, in the order of the departments’ creation, 
only after succession has passed through all of the Cabinet 
Secretaries.
Pre-Inaugural Period Recommendations:
 Political Party Rules:
8. In the event of the death or resignation of a presidential 
candidate before the political party conventions, require 
the parties to hold an open meeting to decide which 
replacement candidate(s) will receive the delegates’ votes.
9. In the event of the death or resignation of a presidential 
nominee between the political party conventions and the 
General Election, require the parties to either hold an 
open meeting to select a replacement candidate or recall 
the convention delegates. 
10. During the period between the General Election and 
the meeting of the Electoral College, provide that 
the vice-presidential candidate replaces a deceased or 
resigned presidential candidate of the same ticket and 
that the candidate’s party issue recommendations to the 
presidential electors as to a new candidate for the office of 
Vice President.
Viii. suMMary of rEcoMMEndations
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 Congressional Rules:
11. In the event of the death or resignation of a presidential 
or vice-presidential candidate between the meeting of the 
Electoral College and the counting and declaration of the 
Electoral College votes by Congress, require Congress to 
count votes cast for a candidate if he was alive at the time 
of the Electoral College vote. 
 Executive Contingency Planning: 
12. During the period between the counting and declaration 
of Electoral College votes by Congress and Inauguration 
Day, the outgoing President should consider promptly 
nominating any Cabinet nominees the President-
elect submits to him, and Congress should confirm as 
many nominees as possible prior to Inauguration Day, 
consistent with the proper discharge of Congress’s advice 
and consent responsibility. One or more newly confirmed 
Cabinet Secretaries should remain at a secure location 
outside of Washington, D.C. on Inauguration Day. This 
recommendation is particularly important in the case of 
an exclusively executive line of succession, as the Clinic 
recommends. 
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a.  constitutional, statutory, and Party rulE 
ProVisionsi
1. Article I, Section 2, Clause 1
The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members 
chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, 
and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications 
requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the 
State Legislature.1
2. Article I, Section 2, Clause 2
No person shall be a Representative who shall not have 
attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven 
Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when 
elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be 
chosen.2
3. Article I, Section 2, Clause 3
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among 
the several States which may be included within this Union, 
according to their respective Numbers, which shall be 
determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, 
including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and 
excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. 
The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after 
the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and 
within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as 
they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall 
not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall 
have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration 
shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled 
to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and 
Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, 
New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland 
six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, 
and Georgia three.3 
4. Article I, Section 2, Clause 4
When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, 
the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election 
to fill such Vacancies.4
i This Appendix contains constitutional provisions without noting whether 
the provision has been subsequently amended.
5. Article I, Section 2, Clause 5
The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker 
and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of 
Impeachment.5
6. Article I, Section 3, Clause 2
Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence 
of the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may 
be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first 
Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, 
of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and 
of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that 
one third may be chosen every second Year; [and if Vacancies 
happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of 
the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make 
temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the 
Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies].6
7. Article I, Section 3, Clause 3
No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained 
to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of 
the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an 
Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.7
8. Article I, Section 3, Clause 4
The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the 
Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.8
9. Article I, Section 3, Clause 5
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a 
President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, 
or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United 
States.9
10. Article I, Section 3, Clause 6
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. 
When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or 
Affirmation. When the President of the United States is 
tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall 
be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the 
Members present.10
aPPEndicEs 
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11. Article I, Section 3, Clause 7
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further 
than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and 
enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United 
States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable 
and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, 
according to Law.11 
12. Article I, Section 5, Clause 1
Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns 
and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority 
of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a 
smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be 
authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in 
such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may 
provide.12
13. Article I, Section 5, Clause 2
Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, 
punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the 
Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.13
14. Article I, Section 5, Clause 3
Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from 
time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in 
their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the 
Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire 
of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.14
15. Article I, Section 5, Clause 4
Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without 
the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, 
nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses 
shall be sitting.15 
16. Article II, Section 1, Clause 1
The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the 
Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, 
chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows:16
17. Article II, Section 1, Clause 2
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature 
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the 
whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which 
the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or 
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit 
under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.17
18. Article II, Section 1, Clause 4
The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the 
Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; 
which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.18
19. Article II, Section 1, Clause 5
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen 
of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this 
Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; 
neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall 
not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been 
fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.19
20. Article II, Section 1, clause 6 
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of 
his Death, Resignation or Inability to discharge the Powers 
and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the 
Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the 
Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the 
President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then 
act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly until the 
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.20
21. Article II, Section 1, Clause 7
The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, 
a Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor 
diminished during the Period for which he shall have been 
elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other 
Emolument from the United States, or any of them.21
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22. Article II, Section 1, Clause 8
Before he enter on the Execution of His Office, he shall take 
the following Oath or Affirmation:--”I do solemnly swear (or 
affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of 
the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, 
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.”22
23. Article II, Section 3
He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information 
of the State of the Union, and recommend to their 
Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and 
expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene 
both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement 
between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, 
he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; 
he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he 
shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall 
Commission all the Officers of the United States.23
24. Article II, Section 4
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the 
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment 
for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes 
and Misdemeanors.24
25. Twelfth Amendment 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote 
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, 
at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with 
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted 
for as President and in distinct ballots the person voted for 
as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all 
persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as 
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which 
lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the 
seat of the government of the United States, directed to the 
President of the Senate;--The President of the Senate shall, 
in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, 
open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;--
The person having the greatest number of votes for President, 
shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the 
whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have 
such majority, then from the persons having the highest 
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for 
as President, the House of Representatives shall choose 
immediately, by ballot, the President, the votes shall be taken 
by states, the representation from each state having one 
vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or 
members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all 
the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of 
Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the 
right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day 
of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as 
President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional 
disability of the President.--The person having the greatest 
number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, 
if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors 
appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the 
two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the 
Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-
thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the 
whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person 
constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be 
eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.25 
26. Twentieth Amendment 
Section 1. The terms of the President and Vice President 
shall end at noon on the 20th day of January, and the terms 
of Senators and Representatives at noon on the 3d day of 
January, of the years in which such terms would have ended 
if this article had not been ratified; and the terms of their 
successors shall then begin.  
Sec. 2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every 
year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of 
January, unless they shall by law appoint a different day. 
Sec. 3. If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of 
the President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice 
President elect shall become President. If a President shall not 
have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of 
his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, 
then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a 
President shall have qualified; and the Congress may by law 
provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a 
Vice President elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall 
then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to 
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act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly 
until a President or Vice President shall have qualified. 
Sec. 4. The Congress may by law provide for the case of 
the death of any of the persons from whom the House of 
Representatives may choose a President whenever the right 
of choice shall have devolved upon them, and for the case of 
the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate may 
choose a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall 
have devolved upon them. 
Sec. 5. Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day of 
October following the ratification of this article. 
Sec. 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have 
been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the 
legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven 
years from the date of its submission.26 
27. Twenty-fifth Amendment 
Section 1. In case of the removal of the President from 
office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall 
become President.
Sec. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice 
President, the President shall nominate a new Vice President 
who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of 
both Houses of Congress.
Sec. 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President 
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to 
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he 
transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such 
powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as 
Acting President.
Sec. 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either 
the principal officers of the executive departments or of such 
other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the 
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives their written declaration that the 
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his 
office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers 
and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter when the President transmits to the President 
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, 
he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the 
Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of 
the executive department or of such other body as Congress 
may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President 
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives their written declaration that the President 
is unable to perform the powers and duties of his office. 
Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within 
forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the 
Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter 
written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within 
twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, 
determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the 
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his 
office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same 
as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the 
powers and duties of his office.27
28. Presidential Succession Act of 1792 
Chapter VIII. An act relative to the Election of a President 
and Vice President of the United States, and declaring the 
Officer who shall act as President in case if Vacancies in the 
offices both of President and Vice President.  
(March 1, 1792) 
Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of 
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress 
assembled, That except in case of an election of a President 
and Vice President of the United States, prior to the ordinary 
period as herein after specified, electors shall be appointed in 
each state for the election of a President and Vice President 
of the United States, within thirty-four days preceding the 
first Wednesday in December, one thousand seven hundred 
and ninety-two, and within thirty-four days preceding the 
first Wednesday in December in every fourth year succeeding 
the last election, which electors shall be equal to the number 
of Senators and Representatives, to which the several states 
may by law be entitled at the time, when the President 
and Vice President, thus to be chosen, should come into 
office: Provided always, That where no apportionment of 
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Representatives shall have been made after any enumeration, 
at the time of choosing electors, then the number of electors 
shall be according to the existing apportionment of Senators 
and Representatives.
Section 2. And be it further enacted, That the electors 
shall meet and give their votes on the said first Wednesday 
in December, at such place in each state as shall be directed, 
by the legislature thereof; and the electors in each state shall 
make and sign three certificates of all the votes by them 
given, and shall seal up the same certifying on each that a list 
of the votes of such state for President and Vice President is 
contained therein, and shall by writing under their hands, or 
under the hands of a majority of them, appoint a person to 
take charge of and deliver to the President of the Senate, at 
the seat of government, before the first Wednesday in January 
then next ensuing, one of the said certificates, and the said 
electors shall forthwith forward by the post-office to the 
President of the Senate, at the seat of government, one other 
of the said certificates, and shall forthwith cause the other of 
the said certificates to be delivered to the judge of that district 
in which the said electors shall assemble.
Section 3. And be it further enacted, That the executive 
authority of each state shall cause three lists of the names of 
the electors of such state to be made and certified and to be 
delivered to the electors on or before the said first Wednesday 
in December, and the said electors shall annex one of the said 
lists to each of the lists of their votes.
Section 4. And be it further enacted, That if a list of votes, 
from any state, shall not have been received at the seat of 
government on the said first Wednesday in January, that 
then the Secretary of State shall send a special messenger to 
the district judge in whose custody such list shall have been 
lodged, who shall forthwith transmit the same to the seat of 
government.
Section 5. And be it further enacted, That Congress shall be 
in session on the second Wednesday in February, one thousand 
seven hundred and ninety-three, and on the second Wednesday 
in February succeeding every meeting of the electors, and the 
said certificates, or so many of them as shall have been received, 
shall then be opened, the votes counted, and the persons who 
shall fill the offices of President and Vice President ascertained 
and declared, agreeably to the constitution.
Section. 6. And be it further enacted, That in case there 
shall be no President of the Senate at the seat of government 
on the arrival of the persons entrusted with the lists of the 
votes of the electors, then such persons shall deliver the lists of 
votes in their custody into the office of the Secretary of State, 
to be safely kept and delivered over as soon as may be, to the 
President of the Senate.
Section 7. And be it further enacted, That the persons 
appointed by the electors to deliver the lists of votes to the 
President of the Senate, shall be allowed on the delivery of 
the said lists twenty-five cents for every mile of the estimated 
distance by the most usual road, from the place of meeting of 
the electors, to the seat of government of the United States. 
Section 8. And be it further enacted, That if any person 
appointed to deliver the votes of the electors to the President 
of the Senate, shall after accepting of his appointment neglect 
to perform the services required of him by this act, he shall 
forfeit the sum of one thousand dollars.
Section 9. And be it further enacted, That in case of 
removal, death, resignation or inability both of the President 
and Vice President of the United States, the President of the 
Senate pro tempore, and in case there shall be no President of 
the Senate, then the Speaker of the House of Representatives, 
for the time being shall act as President of the United States 
until the disability be removed or a President shall be elected. 
Section 10. And be it further enacted, That whenever 
the offices of President and Vice President shall both 
become vacant, the Secretary of State shall forthwith cause a 
notification thereof to be made to the executive of every state, 
and shall also cause the same to be published in at least one of 
the newspapers printed in each state, specifying that electors 
of the President of the United States shall be appointed or 
chosen in the several states within thirty-four days preceding 
the first Wednesday in December then next ensuing: 
Provided, There shall be the space of two months between 
the date of such notification and the said first Wednesday in 
December, but if there shall not be the space of two months 
between the date of such notification and the first Wednesday 
in December; and if the term for which the President and 
Vice President last in office were elected shall not expire on 
the third day of March next ensuing, then the Secretary of 
State shall specify in the notification that the electors shall be 
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appointed or chosen within thirty-four days preceding the 
first Wednesday in December in the year next ensuing, within 
which time the electors shall accordingly be appointed or 
chosen, and the electors shall meet and give their votes on the 
said first Wednesday in December, and the proceedings and 
duties of the said electors and others shall be pursuant to the 
directions prescribed in this act.
Section 11. And be it further enacted, That the only 
evidence of refusal to accept or of a resignations of the Office 
of President and Vice President, shall be an instrument in 
writing declaring the same, and sub-scribed by the person 
refusing to accept or resigning, as the case may be, and 
delivered into the office of the Secretary of State.
Section 12. And be it further enacted, That the term of four 
years for which a President and Vice President shall be elected 
shall in all cases commence on the fourth day of March next 
succeeding the day on which the votes of the electors shall 
have been given.28
Chapter XVII – An Act to authorize the President of the 
United States in certain cases to alter the place for holding 
a session of Congress. (Approved April 3, 1794)
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in congress assembled, That 
whenever the Congress shall be about to convene, and, from 
the prevalence of contagious sickness, or the existence of other 
circumstances, it would in the opinion of the President of 
the United States, be hazardous to the lives or health of the 
members to meet at the place to which the Congress shall 
then stand adjourned, or at which it shall be next by law to 
meet, the President shall be, and he hereby is authorized, by 
proclamation, to convene the Congress at such other place as 
he may judge proper.
29. Presidential Succession Act of 1886
Chapter 4. An act to provide for the performance of the 
duties of the office of President in case of the removal, 
death, resignation, or inability both of the President and 
Vice-President. - Jan 19, 1886.
Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of 
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress 
assembled, That in case of removal, death, resignation, or 
inability of both the President and Vice-President of the 
United States, the Secretary of State, or if there be none, or 
in case of his removal, death, resignation, or inability, then 
the Secretary of Treasury, or if there be none, or in case of his 
removal, death, resignation, or inability, then the Secretary 
of War, or if there be none, or in case of his removal, death, 
resignation, or inability, then the Attorney-General, or if 
there be none, or in case of his removal, death, resignation, 
or inability, then the Postmaster-General, or if there be none, 
or in case of his removal, death, resignation, or inability, then 
the Secretary of the Navy, or if there be none, or in case of his 
removal, death, resignation, or inability, then the Secretary 
of the Interior, shall act as President until the disability of the 
President or Vice-President is removed or a President shall be 
elected: Provided, That whenever the powers and duties of 
the office of President of the United States shall devolve upon 
any of the persons named herein, if Congress be not then in 
session, or if it would not meet in accordance with law within 
twenty days thereafter, it shall be the duty of the person 
upon whom said powers and duties shall devolve to issue a 
proclamation convening Congress ‘in extraordinary session, 
giving twenty days’ notice of the time of meeting. 
Section 2. That the preceding section shall only be held 
to describe and apply to such officers as shall have been 
appointed by the advice and consent of the Senate to 
the offices therein named, and such as are eligible to the 
office of President under the Constitution and not under 
impeachment by the House of Representatives of the United 
States at the time the powers and duties of the office shall 
devolve upon them respectively.
Section 3. That sections one hundred and forty-six, one 
hundred and forty-seven, one hundred and forty-eight, one 
hundred and forty-nine and one hundred and fifty of the 
Revised Statutes are hereby repealed.29
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30. Presidential Succession Act of 1947
Section 19. Vacancy in offices of both President and Vice 
President; officers eligible to act (a)(1) If, by reason of death, 
resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to qualify, 
there is neither a President nor Vice President to discharge the 
powers and duties of the office of President, then the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives shall, upon his resignation as 
Speaker and as Representative in Congress, act as President.
(2) The same rule shall apply in the case of the death, 
resignation, removal from office, or inability of an individual 
acting as President under this subsection.
(b) If, at the time when under subsection (a) of this section a 
Speaker is to begin the discharge of the powers and duties of 
the office of President, there is no Speaker, or the Speaker fails 
to qualify as Acting President, then the President pro tempore 
of the Senate shall, upon his resignation as President pro 
tempore and as Senator, act as President.
(c) An individual acting as President under subsection (a) 
or subsection (b) of this section shall continue to act until 
the expiration of the then current Presidential term, except 
that (1) if his discharge of the powers and duties of the office 
is founded in whole or in part on the failure of both the 
President-elect and the Vice-President-elect to qualify, then 
he shall act only until a President or Vice President qualifies; 
and (2) if his discharge of the powers and duties of the office 
is founded in whole or in part on the inability of the President 
or Vice President, then he shall act only until the removal of 
the disability of one of such individuals. 
(d)(1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from 
office, inability, or failure to qualify, there is no President 
pro tempore to act as President under subsection (b) of this 
section, then the officer of the United States who is highest 
on the following list, and who is not under disability to 
discharge the powers and duties of the office of President shall 
act as President: Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, 
Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of the 
Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, 
Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Secretary of 
Transportation, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Education, 
Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Secretary of Homeland Security. 
(2) An individual acting as President under this subsection 
shall continue so to do until the expiration of the then 
current Presidential term, but not after a qualified and prior 
entitled individual is able to act, except that the removal of 
the disability of an individual higher on the list contained 
in paragraph (1) of this subsection or the ability to qualify 
on the part of an individual higher on such list shall not 
terminate his service.
(3) The taking of the oath of office by an individual specified 
in the list in paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be held 
to constitute his resignation from the office by virtue of the 
holding of which he qualifies to act as President.
(e) Subsections (a), (b), and (d) of this section shall apply only 
to such officers as are eligible to the office of President under 
the Constitution. Subsection (d) of this section shall apply only 
to officers appointed, by and with the advice and consent of 
the Senate, prior to the time of the death, resignation, removal 
from office, inability, or failure to qualify, of the President pro 
tempore, and only to officers not under impeachment by the 
House of Representatives at the time the powers and duties of 
the office of President devolve upon them.
(f ) During the period that any individual acts as President 
under this section, his compensation shall be at the rate then 
provided by law in the case of the President.30
31. Rule Number 9 of the Republican Partyii 
Filling Vacancies in Nominations
(a) The Republican National Committee is hereby authorized 
and empowered to fill any and all vacancies which may 
occur by reason of death, declination, or otherwise of the 
Republican candidate for President of the United States or 
the Republican candidate for Vice President of the United 
States, as nominated by the national convention, or the 
Republican National Committee may reconvene the national 
convention for the purpose of filling any such vacancies.
ii As adopted by the 2008 Republican National Convention, September 1, 
2008, and amended by the Republican National Committee on August 6, 
2010. 
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(b) In voting under this rule, the Republican National 
Committee members representing any state shall be entitled 
to cast the same number of votes as said state was entitled to 
cast at the national convention.
(c) In the event that the members of the Republican National 
Committee from any state shall not be in agreement in 
the casting of votes hereunder, the votes of such state shall 
be divided equally, including fractional votes, among the 
members of the Republican National Committee present or 
voting by proxy.
(d) No candidate shall be chosen to fill any such vacancy 
except upon receiving a majority of the votes entitled to be 
cast in the election.31
32. Selected Sections of the Charter and 
Bylaws of the Democratic Party 
The Charter
Article 3 – Democratic National Committee
Section 1. The Democratic National Committee shall have 
general responsibility for the affairs of the Democratic Party 
between National Conventions, subject to the provisions of 
this Charter and to the Resolutions or other actions of the 
National Convention. This responsibility shall include:
. . . .
(c) filling vacancies in the nominations for the office of 
President and Vice President. . . .
Article 9 – General Provisions
Section 8. To assure that the Democratic nominee for the 
office of President of the United States is selected by a fair and 
equitable process, the Democratic National Committee may 
adopt such statements of policy as it deems appropriate with 
respect to the timing of Presidential nominating processes and 
shall work with state Parties to accomplish the objectives of 
such statements.
Section 12. All meetings of the Democratic National 
Committee, the Executive Committee, and all other official 
Party committees, commissions and bodies shall be open to 
the public, and votes shall not be taken by secret ballot.
The Bylaws
Article 2 – Democratic National Committee
Section 8. Attendance and Quorum and Voting.
. . . 
(g) Proxy voting shall be permitted. Proxies may be either 
general or limited and either instructed or uninstructed. All 
proxies shall be in writing and transferable if so specified. No 
DNC member may at any one time hold or exercise proxies 
for more than one other DNC member; provided, however, 
that proxy voting shall not be permitted in voting to fill a 
vacancy on the National ticket.32 
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b.  ExEcutiVE dEclarations of inability, lEttEr 
agrEEMEnts & sEction 3 lEttEr PrEcEdEnts
1. Past Presidential Letter Agreements 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Vice President Richard 
M. Nixon entered into a letter agreement that provided for 
President Eisenhower or Vice President Nixon to initiate a 
transfer of presidential powers to Vice President Nixon on a 
temporary basis.1 President Eisenhower would retain the right 
to resume those powers upon a simple declaration that he was 
ready to do so.2
Later administrations followed President Eisenhower and Vice 
President Nixon’s precedent by entering into letters providing 
for instances of presidential inability. They existed between: 
President John F. Kennedy and Vice President Lyndon B. 
Johnson;3 and President Johnson and Speaker of the House of 
Representatives John McCormack,4 because President Johnson’s 
ascendancy to the presidency following President Kennedy’s 
assassination left the vice presidency vacant. President Ronald 
Reagan and Vice President George H.W. Bush executed 
declarations of inability pursuant to section three of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment.5 Several of these letters appear below.
a.  Letter Agreement During the Eisenhower 
Administration
Letter from President Eisenhower to then-Vice President 
Nixon, February 5, 1958
As both of us know, there are differences of opinion as to the 
exact meaning of that feature of the Constitution which provides 
that the Vice President will have the powers and the duties of the 
President when the President is unable to discharge them. There 
is uncertainty expressed as to how there could be determined the 
degree of the President’s disability that would justify transferring 
his powers and duties to the Vice President.
An inability to discharge properly the powers and duties of 
the Presidency could come about in several ways. One would 
be disease or accident that would prevent the President from 
making important decisions. Such periods of inability could 
be prolonged but, even if only the length of hours, could 
require action should there be any question of real importance 
and urgency to be decided without delay.
Another form of inability could come about through a failure of 
communications between the President and the Capital at any 
time that he might be absent therefrom. A somewhat similar case 
might be an uncertainty about the whereabouts of the President, 
occasioned by a forced landing of the Presidential airplane. 
Other types of inability could unquestionably arise.
There have been many proposals for clarifying this situation, 
some by law, others by Constitutional Amendment. My own 
opinion is that it would be difficult to write any law or an 
Amendment in such fashion as to take care of every contingency 
that might possibly occur. While the great area of uncertainty 
now existing could and should be drastically reduced, I am not 
sure that even the most carefully devised plan, objectively arrived 
at, could remove doubt in every instance.
However, it seems to me that so far as you and I are concerned 
in the offices we now respectively hold, and particularly in view 
of our mutual confidence and friendship, we could do much to 
eliminate all these uncertainties by agreeing, in advance, as to 
the proper steps to be taken at any time when I might become 
unable to discharge the powers and duties of the President. 
Based upon my studies of the history of the Constitution and 
upon the advice of Constitutional authorities, I am of the 
opinion that this agreement would not in any way contravene 
the clear intention of the Constitution; on the contrary, it is 
rather a statement of our common intention to act completely 
according to the spirit of this portion of the Constitution.
Through such an agreement, we can assure that the best 
interests of the country would not be damaged by the doubts 
and indecisions that have at times existed in similar cases 
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in the past. Moreover with this advance agreement, you 
could without personal or official embarrassment, make any 
decisions that seemed to you proper in cases where my ability 
to discharge my powers and duties may be in serious question.
This note, which I have been planning for some time to write, 
is merely to confirm, in writing, the gist of the agreement that 
you and I have reached between ourselves.
It is simply stated:
In any instance in which I could clearly recognize my own 
inability to discharge the powers and duties of the Presidency I 
would, of course, so inform you and you would act accordingly.
With the exception of this one kind of case, you will be 
the individual explicitly and exclusively responsible for 
determining whether there is any inability of mine that makes 
it necessary for you to discharge the powers and duties of 
the Presidency, and you will decide the exact timing of the 
devolution of this responsibility on you. I would hope that 
you would consult with the Secretary of State, Governor 
Adams and General Heaton, and if feasible, with medical 
experts assembled by him, but the decision will be yours only.
I will be the one to determine if and when it is proper for me 
to resume the powers and duties of the Presidency.
I know, of course, that you would make any decision for 
taking over the presidential powers and duties only when 
you feel it necessary. I have no fear that you, for any fleeting 
or inconsequential purpose, would do so and thereby create 
confusion in the government. Circumstances would have to 
guide you, and if the imminence or occurrence of any world or 
domestic emergency demanded, you would have to act promptly.
There is always the possibility that, as in the cases of Garfield 
and Wilson, I might, without warning, become personally 
incapable of making a decision at the moment when it should 
be made. The existence of this agreement recognizing your 
clear and exclusive responsibility for deciding upon the 
inability of the President to perform his duties and exercise 
his powers will remove any necessity or desire on the part of 
friends and staffs to impede the right and authority of the 
Vice President in reaching his decision on the matter.
There is only one final thought I would like to add. If any 
disability of mine should, in the judgment of any group of 
distinguished medical authorities that you might assemble, finally 
become of a permanent character, I would, of course, accept 
their decision and promptly resign my position. But if I were not 
able to do so, and the same group of consultants would so state, 
then you would take over not only the powers and duties but the 
perquisites of the Presidency, including the White House itself. 
In temporary cases of my “inability,” we agree that you should act 
for the necessary period in your capacity as Vice President and, 
additionally, as “Acting President.”
With warm regard, As ever6
Letter Agreement from President Eisenhower to then-Vice 
President Nixon
The President and the Vice President have agreed that the 
following procedures are in accord with the purposes and 
provisions of Article 2, Section 1, of the Constitution, dealing 
with Presidential inability. They believe that these procedures, 
which are intended to apply to themselves only, are in no sense 
outside or contrary to the Constitution but are consistent with 
its present provisions and implement its clear intent.
(1) In the event of inability the President would—if 
possible—so inform the Vice President, and the Vice 
President would serve as Acting President, exercising the 
powers and duties of the office until the inability had ended.
(2) In the event of an inability which would prevent the 
President from so communicating with the Vice President, 
the Vice President, after such consultation as seems to him 
appropriate under the circumstances, would decide upon the 
devolution of the powers and duties of the Office and would 
serve as Acting President until the inability had ended.
(3) The President, in either event, would determine when the 
inability had ended and at that time would resume the full 
exercise of the powers and duties of the Office.7
b. Letter Agreement During the Kennedy 
Administration
In August 1961 President Kennedy and Vice President 
Johnson agreed to follow the procedures set forth below:
(1) In the event of inability the President would—if 
possible—so inform the Vice President, and the Vice 
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President would serve as Acting President, exercising the 
power and duties of the office until the inability had ended.
(2) In the event of an inability which would prevent the 
President from so communicating with the Vice President, 
the Vice President after such consultation as seems to him 
appropriate under the circumstances, would decide upon the 
devolution of the powers and duties of the office and would 
serve as Acting President until the inability had ended.
(3) The President, in either event would determine when the 
inability had ended and at that time would resume the full 
exercise of the powers and duties of the office.8
c.  Letter Agreement From President Johnson to Speaker 
John W. McCormack 
President Lyndon Johnson sent a signed letter agreement to the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives John W. McCormak on 
December 23, 1963, which Speaker McCormak signed as well. It 
was accompanied by a fifteen-page explanatory memorandum. The 
letter and memorandum were not released publicly. The Clinic 
obtained a copy from the Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library.
December 23, 1963 
Dear Mr. Speaker:
Confirming our oral agreement regarding the procedures to 
be followed in the event of my inability to exercise the powers 
and duties of the Presidency, I am reducing the agreement 
to writing and would appreciate your signing the original 
of this letter and returning it to me for safekeeping in the 
Presidential files. Enclosed for your use is a signed duplicate 
original. The terms of the agreement are as follows:
1. In the event of inability, the President would – if possible 
– so inform the Speaker of the House, and the Speaker of the 
House would serve as Acting President, exercising the powers 
and duties of the Office until the inability had ended.
 2. In the event of an inability which would prevent the 
President from communicating with the Speaker of the House, 
the Speaker of the House, after such consultation as seemed 
to him appropriate under the circumstances, would decide 
upon the devolution of the powers and duties of the Office and 
would serve as Acting President until the inability had ended.
3. The President, in either event, would determine when the 
inability had ended and at that time would resume the full 
exercise of the powers and duties of the Office.
 4. After being informed by the President of his inability or, in 
the event of an inability which would prevent the President 
from communicating with the Speaker of the House, after the 
latter satisfies himself that such inability exists, the Speaker 
of the House will resign as Speaker and as Representative in 
Congress before undertaking to act as President.
Sincerely, 
President Johnson did not enter into a signed letter agreement 
with Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, but instead had an 
oral agreement.9
d.  Letter Declarations During the Reagan 
Administration 
President Ronald Reagan signed a letter to the President 
pro tempore and the Speaker of the House in 1985, which 
transferred presidential power to Vice President Bush, 
pursuant to their longstanding agreement, for the duration of 
his intestinal surgery.
Letter to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the House on the Discharge of the President’s 
Powers and Duties During His Surgery 
July 13, 1985 
Dear Mr. President: (Dear Mr. Speaker:)
I am about to undergo surgery during which time I will 
be briefly and temporarily incapable of discharging the 
Constitutional powers and duties of the Office of the 
President of the United States. 
After consultation with my Counsel and the Attorney 
General, I am mindful of the provisions of Section 3 of 
the 25th Amendment to the Constitution and of the 
uncertainties of its application to such brief and temporary 
periods of incapacity. I do not believe that the drafters of this 
Amendment intended its application to situations such as the 
instant one.
Nevertheless, consistent with my longstanding arrangement 
with Vice President George Bush, and not intending to set a 
precedent binding anyone privileged to hold this Office in the 
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future, I have determined and it is my intention and direction 
that Vice President George Bush shall discharge those powers 
and duties in my stead commencing with the administration 
of anesthesia to me in this instance.
I shall advise you and the Vice President when I determine 
that I am able to resume the discharge of the Constitutional 
powers and duties of this Office.
May God bless this Nation and us all.
Sincerely, 
RONALD REAGAN10
Upon resuming his powers and duties following surgery, 
President Reagan’s letter to the President pro tempore of the 
Senate and the Speaker of the House was as follows:
Letter to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the House on the President’s Resumption of 
His Powers and Duties Following Surgery 
July 13, 1985
Dear Mr. President: (Dear Mr. Speaker:)
Following up on my letter to you of this date, please be advised 
I am able to resume the discharge of the Constitutional powers 
and duties of the Office of the President of the United States. I 
have informed the Vice President of my determination and my 
resumption of those powers and duties.
Sincerely, 
RONALD REAGAN11
2. Letters Pursuant to Section 3 of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment
a. Letters During the George W. Bush Administration 
President George W. Bush sent two letters to the President pro 
tempore and the Speaker of the House temporarily transferring 
his powers to Vice President Richard B. Cheney during his 
presidency, once in 2002 and again in 2007. The text of these 
letters were:
Letter to Congressional Leaders on Temporary Transfer of 
the Powers and Duties of President of the United States
June 29, 2002 
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
As my staff has previously communicated to you, I will undergo 
this morning a routine medical procedure requiring sedation. 
In view of present circumstances, I have determined to transfer 
temporarily my Constitutional powers and duties to the Vice 
President during the brief period of the procedure and recovery.
Accordingly, in accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
this letter shall constitute my written declaration that I am unable 
to discharge the Constitutional powers and duties of the office 
of President of the United States. Pursuant to Section 3, the 
Vice President shall discharge those powers and duties as Acting 
President until I transmit to you a written declaration that I am 
able to resume the discharge of those powers and duties.
Sincerely, 
GEORGE W. BUSH12
Letter to Congressional Leaders on Resuming the Powers 
and Duties of President of the United States
June 29, 2002 
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
In accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, this letter shall 
constitute my written declaration that I am presently able to resume 
the discharge of the Constitutional powers and duties of the office 
of President of the United States. With the transmittal of this letter, 
I am resuming those powers and duties effective immediately.
Sincerely, 
GEORGE W. BUSH13
Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Temporary 
Transfer of the Powers and Duties of the President of the 
United States
July 21, 2007 
Dear Madame Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
This morning I will undergo a routine medical procedure 
requiring sedation. In view of present circumstances, I have 
determined to transfer temporarily my Constitutional powers 
and duties to the Vice President during the brief period of the 
procedure and recovery.
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In accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, this 
letter shall constitute my written declaration that I am 
unable to discharge the Constitutional powers and duties of 
the office of the President of the United States. Pursuant to 
Section 3, the Vice President shall discharge those powers and 
duties as Acting President until I transmit to you a written 
declaration that I am able to resume the discharge of those 
powers and duties.
Sincerely, 
George W. Bush14
Letter to Congressional Leaders on Resuming the Powers 
and Duties of the President of the United States
July 21, 2007 
Dear Madame Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
In accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, this 
letter shall constitute my written declaration that I am 
presently able to resume the discharge of the Constitutional 
powers and duties of the office of the President of the United 
States. With the transmittal of this letter, I am resuming those 
powers and duties effective immediately.
Sincerely, 
GEORGE W. BUSH15
3. Sample Executive Declarations of 
Inability
The Clinic has prepared the following sample declarations 
of inability – a sample presidential executive declaration of 
inability and a sample vice-presidential executive declaration 
of inability. 
a.  Sample Presidential Executive Declaration of 
Inability
To the President Pro Tempore and the Speaker of the House:
As you are aware, there is currently no constitutional or legal 
provision by which my inability can be declared in the event 
of a vice-presidential vacancy or vice-presidential inability. 
Through this document I wish to express situations which, if 
they were to arise, would result in my view in a declaration of 
my inability. This advance declaration, by providing for the 
declaration of my inability in described circumstances, will 
allow for the smooth transfer of presidential power. 
An inability to properly discharge the powers and duties of 
my office could arise in several ways. One would be disease 
or accident that would prevent me from making important 
decisions. Another form of inability could arise through a 
breakdown of communications from me at a time of increased 
urgency, uncertainty as to my whereabouts, or any such similar 
scenarios involving a lapse or breakdown in communication. 
Upon execution, this declaration will trigger the statutory 
line of succession pursuant to Article II of the Constitution, 
permitting the person next in the line of succession to act as 
President until my recovery or the earlier recovery of the Vice 
President, should he be disabled.  
The individuals I authorize to make the determination as to 
my inability declaration are as follows:
[To be determined by the sitting President]
Sincerely, 
President [  ]
b.  Sample Vice-Presidential Executive Declaration of 
Inability
To the President Pro Tempore and the Speaker of the House:
As you are aware, there is no specific constitutional or legal 
provision by which I can declare my own inability to perform 
the powers and duties of the vice presidency. I believe I 
have the right to do so and, indeed, the responsibility in 
circumstances where the President is disabled or a vacancy in 
the presidency has arisen.  
Through this document I wish to express my view of situations, 
if they were to arise, that would constitute a basis for me to 
declare my own inability. An inability to properly discharge 
the powers and duties of my office could arise in several ways. 
One would be disease or accident that would prevent me from 
making important decisions. Another form of inability could 
arise through a breakdown of communications between the 
President and me at a time of increased urgency, uncertainty 
as to my whereabouts, or any such similar scenarios involving a 
lapse or breakdown in communication. 
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This prospective declaration of inability will allow for the 
smooth transition of power to the person next in line of 
succession were the President to become unable to discharge 
the powers and duties of his office, or died, resigned, or was 
removed, all contingencies appearing in Article II, Section 
1, Clause 6 of the Constitution. Obviously, I hope none 
of these occasions occurs during our term in office but 
prudence dictates that I contemplate such possibilities and act 
accordingly.
The individuals I authorize to make the determination as to 
my inability declaration are as follows:
[To be determined by the sitting Vice President]
Sincerely, 
Vice President [  ]
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c.  lEgislatiVE history of thE PrEsidEntial 
succEssion acts
1. The Presidential Succession Act of 1792
On December 20, 1790, the First Congress addressed the 
issue of presidential succession.1 A bill was presented to the 
House of Representatives providing that an “Officer” shall 
act as President when vacancies arise in both the offices 
of President and Vice President.2 This bill was referred to 
the Committee of the Whole on the next day but was not 
considered until January 10, 1791.3 The debates reveal 
considerable controversy surrounding the question as to 
which “Officers” should be included in the line of succession. 
Suggestions ranged from the President pro tempore of the 
Senate to the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme 
Court.4 No consensus was reached.5 
The Second Congress first addressed the matter of 
presidential succession on November 15, 1791.6 On 
November 30, 1791, the Senate passed a bill entitled “An 
act relative to the election of a President and Vice President 
of the United States, and declaring the officer who shall 
act as President in case of vacancies in the offices both of 
President and Vice President” and sent it to the House of 
Representatives for debate.7 The bill placed the President 
pro tempore ahead of the Speaker of the House in the line of 
succession. Representatives initially rejected the placement 
of legislative officers in the line of succession because it might 
lead to “caballing” and “electioneering” in the choice of a 
Speaker.8 Representative Hugh Williamson contended that 
an “extensive construction” of the word “Officer” would allow 
for any individual in the United States to be properly placed 
in the line of succession.9 While Representatives Theodore 
Sedgwick and Elbridge Gerry argued that the Speaker was an 
“Officer,”10 Representative Gerry argued that a legislative line 
of succession might violate separation of powers by blending 
the executive and legislative branches.11
By February 9, 1792, the Committee of the Whole was 
considering placing the Secretary of State in the line of 
succession.12 The House approved the proposal by a vote 
of 32 to 22, with five members of the Constitutional 
Convention voting with the majority13 and one voting 
against the proposal.14 Then-Representative James Madison, 
among others, supported placing the Secretary of State in 
the line of succession during times of a dual vacancy and/
or inability for a number of reasons.15 Madison questioned 
the constitutionality of including the President pro tempore 
and the Speaker in the line of succession because they were 
not “Officers” within the meaning of the Constitution.16 
Moreover, Madison believed that if the Framers had 
contemplated the President pro tempore and Speaker as 
possible successors to the presidency, then “they would 
probably have been there designated . . . instead of being 
left to Legislative selection.”17 Finally, Madison believed the 
inclusion of the President pro tempore and Speaker violated 
the incompatibility clause and separation of powers.18
The Senate subsequently rejected the bill because the 
Federalists successfully lobbied their supporters in order 
to prevent Thomas Jefferson, then Secretary of State, from 
becoming eligible to succeed to the presidency.19 As a result, 
on February 20, 1792, the Senate reinserted the President pro 
tempore and Speaker of the House in place of the Secretary 
of State into the line of succession.20 Additionally, the 
Presidential Succession Act of 1792 (“1792 Act”) provided 
for a special election for President21 in the case of a dual 
vacancy, and called for the Secretary of State, in such an 
instance, to notify the executive of every state that electors for 
the President should be appointed within “thirty-four days 
preceding the first Wednesday in December,” provided that 
there were two months between the notification and the first 
Wednesday in December.22 The Senate then referred the bill 
to the House, and the following day, the House approved the 
amendment by a vote of 31 to 24.23 The 1792 Act included 
a provision for holding a special election, and it appears 
that Congress contemplated a full four-year term for a new 
President and Vice-President selected under this statute.24  
The bill was signed into law on March 1, 1792.
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2. The Presidential Succession Act of 1886
Ninety-four years later, on January 19, 1886, Congress 
superseded the 1792 Act when President Grover Cleveland 
signed the Presidential Succession Act of 1886 (“1886 Act”).25 
Vice President Thomas Hendricks had died in Indianapolis 
in November 1885. President Cleveland’s message to 
Congress on December 8, 1885 regarding the death of the 
new Vice President called for a constitutional amendment 
to clarify the line of succession should both the President 
and Vice President die or become unable to serve. While the 
Presidential Succession Act that was proposed and passed 
shortly afterward was primarily the work of the Congress, 
President Cleveland supported the legislation and signed the 
bill into law.26
The House Select Committee on the Election of President 
and Vice-President (“Select Committee”) submitted a report 
concluding, among other things, that legislators were not 
“Officers” as envisioned by the Framers and that an executive line 
of succession would remove many of the questions arising from 
a legislative line of succession. For instance, an executive line of 
succession would remove the possible violation of separation 
of powers and conflicts of interest in the event of impeachment 
proceedings and trials in the House and Senate.27 
Moreover, the drafters of the 1886 Act made it clear that 
they intended to supersede the special election provision of 
the 1792 Act. The Select Committee believed that in times 
of inability of the President, an Acting President was only to 
act as the “locum tenens,” or placeholder, until the inability 
terminated.28 If the President died, the Acting President 
was to fill the position “for the remainder of the term of 
the removed President, and upon the occurring of the next 
regular quadrennial election for President and Vice-President 
and their inauguration on the succeeding 4th of March the 
term of the officer acting as President should end.”29 Although 
the Select Committee’s Report clearly stated its intent to 
revoke the special election provision, the language of the 
1886 Act is unclear. The 1886 Act contains the language 
“shall act as President until the disability of the President or 
Vice-President is removed or a President shall be elected,” and 
“it shall be the duty of the person upon whom said powers 
and duties shall devolve to issue a proclamation convening 
Congress in extraordinary session, giving twenty days’ 
notice of the time of the meeting.”30 Thus, there is a lack of 
agreement as to whether the 1886 Act did in fact supersede 
the special election provision of the 1792 Act.ii 31
The 1886 Act did not pass without dissent. Many members 
writing for the Minority of the Select Committee believed 
that the 1886 Act did not go far enough to address future 
issues pertaining to presidential succession.32 Specifically, those 
in the Minority identified three distinct periods in which a 
presidential vacancy might arise that remained unaddressed:33  
(1) Where the President-elect dies or becomes 
constitutionally disabled (for “inability” and “disability” are 
used interchangeably) before inauguration.
(2) Where there is a failure of election of both President and 
Vice-President, when the election is thrown in the House . . . .
(3) Where there is a failure to count the vote and declare 
the result “in the presence of the Senate and House of 
Representatives”; as, if one House or the other should fail, 
for any cause, to meet the other, and our recent history more 
than suggests the possibility of this contingency.34
a. Debates Leading Up To the 1886 Act
Members of Congress proposed several changes to the 
1792 Act during the 94 years before Congress ultimately 
amended the Act in 1886.35 The first significant analysis of the 
constitutionality of the 1792 Act took place in 1856.36 On 
June 26, 1856, Senator John Crittenden of Kentucky made 
a motion to investigate what would happen when “both the 
President and Vice President were dead, or unable to act” 
and to address the issue of what happens “when the President 
alone is either dead, removed from office, or from any cause 
is unable to act.”37 On August 5, 1856, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee issued a report (the “Report”) on Senator 
Crittenden’s proposal affirming the view that Sections 9 
i Ultimately, Congress revisited the issue of special elections, and they are no 
longer provided for in the 1947 Act.
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and 10 of the 1792 Act,ii which provide for a legislative line 
of succession and a special election, were constitutional.38 
However, the Judiciary Committee was not convinced 
that the 1792 Act prevented “the mischief of confusion 
and anarchy.”39 Specifically, the Report expressed concern 
regarding the potential absence of a President pro tempore 
and Speaker and the possibility that either the President 
pro tempore or the Speaker might not possess the “requisite 
qualifications, under the Constitution, to be invested with the 
duties and powers of an acting President.”40 
To remedy these potential problems, the Report analyzed a 
number of possible solutions.41 For example, to guard against 
the problem of vacancies in both the positions of President 
pro tempore and Speaker, a suggestion was made to extend the 
line of succession to the Cabinet.42 Although the Judiciary 
Committee believed an extension of the line of succession 
to the Cabinet would solve the problem of a dual vacancy 
in the offices of President pro tempore and the Speaker by 
including more individuals who would be eligible to qualify 
to act as President, the Judiciary Committee quickly found 
cause for rejecting the proposal.43 The Report cites the 
potential issue of Cabinet members being implicated as 
ii Section 9 of the 1792 Act states: 
And be it further enacted, That in case of removal, death, resignation or 
inability both of the President and Vice President of the United States, the 
President of the Senate pro tempore, and in case there shall be no President 
of the Senate, then the Speaker of the House of Representatives, for the 
time being shall act as President of the United States until the disability be 
removed or a President shall be elected.
 Section 10 of the 1792 Act states:  
And be it further enacted, That whenever the offices of President and Vice 
President shall both become vacant, the Secretary of State shall forthwith 
cause a notification thereof to be made to the executive of every state, and 
shall also cause the same to be published in at least one of the newspapers 
printed in each state, specifying that electors of the President of the United 
States shall be appointed or chosen in the several states within thirty-four 
days preceding the first Wednesday in December then next ensuing: 
Provided, There shall be the space of two months between the date of such 
notification and the said first Wednesday in December, but if there shall 
not be the space of two months between the date of such notification and 
the first Wednesday in December; and if the term for which the President 
and Vice President last in office were elected shall not expire on the third 
day of March next ensuing, then the Secretary of State shall specify in the 
notification that the electors shall be appointed or chosen within thirty-four 
days preceding the first Wednesday in December in the year next ensuing, 
within which time the electors shall accordingly be appointed or chosen, 
and the electors shall meet and give their votes on the said first Wednesday 
in December, and the proceedings and duties of the said electors and others 
shall be pursuant to the directions prescribed in this act.
particeps criminis, or participants in a crime, if a President 
faced impeachment and removal.44 Moreover, the Judiciary 
Committee questioned whether Cabinet members were truly 
“Officers” under the Constitution when their positions had 
terminated or were suspended.45 For example, if an Acting 
President found a Cabinet member to be “obnoxious” or to 
be an individual he disagreed with, he might decide to replace 
the Cabinet member.46 Ultimately, the Judiciary Committee 
recommended extending the line of succession to the 
Supreme Court.47 The Report stated: 
[A]nd if there be no President of the Senate, then the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives for the time being shall 
act as President of the United States until the disability be 
removed or a President shall be elected; and if there should 
be no President of the Senate nor Speaker of the House of 
Representatives for the time being, and it be not a case of 
vacancy caused by removal, the chief justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, or if there be no chief justice in 
office, or it be a case of vacancy caused by removal, then the 
associate justices of the said Supreme Court, successively, 
according to seniority of commission, shall act as President 
of the United States until the disability be removed or a 
President shall be elected.48
Finally, the Report concluded that such a “provisional” 
President would only be invested with the executive functions 
until the “disability” was removed or the Electoral College 
chose a new President.49 While the Judiciary Committee did 
a thorough analysis of the 1792 Act, no further legislative 
action was taken on the basis of the Report.
For the next twenty-five years, there was little or no discussion 
on presidential succession, until the assassination of President 
James Garfield,50 which brought to the nation’s attention the 
need for reform. At the time of President Garfield’s death, 
there was neither a President pro tempore nor a Speaker of 
the House.51 Upon President Garfield’s death, Vice President 
Chester A. Arthur took the oath of office in the early morning 
of September 20, 1881 by New York State Supreme Court 
Justice, John R. Brady, and then again on September 22, 1881 
by United States Supreme Court Justice Morrison R. Waite.52 
President Arthur immediately called the Senate into special 
session in order to elect a President pro tempore and to take up 
the matter of presidential succession.53 He wrote to the Senate:
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Questions which concern the very existence of the 
Government and the liberties of the people were suggested by 
the prolonged illness of the late President, and his consequent 
incapacity to perform the functions of his office. It is 
provided by the second article of the Constitution, . . . that 
‘in case of the removal of the President from office, or of his 
death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and 
duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-
President.’ 
What is the intendment of the Constitution in its 
specifications of ‘inability to discharge the powers and duties 
of the said office’ as one of the contingencies which calls the 
Vice-President to the exercise of Presidential functions? 
Is the inability limited in its nature to long-continued 
intellectual incapacity, or has it a broader import? 
What must be its extent and duration? 
How must its existence be established? 
Has the President whose inability is the subject of inquiry 
any voice in determining whether or not it exists, or is 
the decision of that momentous and delicate question 
confided to the Vice-President, or is it contemplated by the 
Constitution that Congress should provide by law precisely 
what should constitute inability, and how and by what 
tribunal or authority it should be ascertained? 
If the inability proves to be temporary in its nature, and 
during its continuance the Vice-President lawfully exercises 
the functions of the Executive, by what tenure does he hold 
his office? 
Does he continue as President for the remainder of the four 
years’ term? 
Or would the elected President, if his inability should cease in 
the interval, be empowered to resume his office? 
And if, having such lawful authority, he should exercise 
it, would the Vice-President be thereupon empowered to 
resume his powers and duties as such?54
On December 6, 1881, Senator James Beck and Senator Samuel 
Maxey sought to answer President Arthur’s questions and proposed 
resolutions to reform the 1792 Act.55 Senator Beck prepared a 
resolution asking that the Committee on the Judiciary examine 
the laws enacted pursuant to Article II, Section 1 concerning 
presidential succession so that “all doubts or defects which may 
exist in our present laws on this subject may be remedied and future 
controversy prevented.”56 Similarly, Senator Maxey prepared a 
resolution stating: 
Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary be, and 
is hereby, instructed to inquire what legislation, if any, 
is necessary to carry into effect the provision of the 
Constitution in case of the removal of the President from 
office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the 
powers and duties of the said office, as well as the provision 
in case of the removal, death, resignation, or inability of both 
the President and Vice-President; and said committee will 
report by bill or otherwise.57 
Two days later, on December 8, 1881, Senator Augustus 
Garland introduced a bill58 “to provide for the performance 
of the duties of the Presidential office in case of the removal, 
death, resignation, or inability of the President and Vice-
President” with no further details.59 
On December 14, 1881, Congress resumed discussion on 
presidential succession and Senator Beck noted numerous 
questions surrounding the 1792 Act, including: in the case 
of special elections the possibility of presidential terms 
beginning and expiring in the middle of congressional terms; 
the expiration of a President pro tempore’s or Speaker’s term 
of office while acting as President; the length of time that the 
Vice President would hold office, whether it would be for 
the remainder of the term or until an inability was removed; 
separation of powers if the President pro tempore or Speaker 
were to take the office; and the meaning of the term “Officer” 
in the Constitution.60
Although all these questions arose in the course of 
Senator Beck’s attempt to revise the 1792 Act, it was the 
constitutionality of the 1792 Act that emerged as the 
principal issue, specifically whether the President pro 
tempore and Speaker of the House are “Officers” under the 
Constitution.61 Senator Beck relied on an 1862 speech by 
Senator James A. Bayard to argue that legislators are not 
“Officers” under the Constitution able to succeed to the 
presidency.62 Senator Bayard had cited the example of Senator 
William Blount,63 who, during his trial after impeachment, 
pled he was not a “civil officer of the United States”64 
and therefore, not liable to impeachment.65 This plea was 
sustained in the Senate and the attempt to impeach Senator 
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Blount was abandoned.66 Senator Bayard believed this 
decision made clear that legislative officers were not “Officers 
of the United States”67 because the decision was made by the 
Senate “organized as a court, sitting under oath, after a public 
argument and hearing by the ablest counsel in the country on 
both sides,”68 and should stand as precedent.69 
Senator Bayard had next looked to the difference in language 
between Article II, Section 1 regarding the presidential 
term of Office,70 and Article I, Sections 271 and 3,72 regarding 
the terms of Representatives and Senators. Senator Bayard 
suggested that if the positions of Representatives or Senators 
were those of “Officers,” the Framers would have used the 
same constitutional language as applied to the President, 
“shall hold his Office.”73 Article I, Section 2, for example, 
could have read, with respect to Representatives: “who shall 
hold their office for the term of six years,”74 rather than the 
language that was adopted, which reads, “The House of 
Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every 
second Year . . . .”75 Additionally, Article I, Section 3, referring 
to Senators, states that “The Seats of the Senators of the 
first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second 
Year . . . .”76 Senator Bayard suggested that if the Framers 
meant for these positions to be those of “Officers,” then the 
Framers would have written “[t]he term of office of Senators 
of the first class shall expire at the expiration of the second 
year.”77 Furthermore, Senator Bayard noted the language of 
the Incompatibility Clause,78 which prevents any Senator 
or Representative, during the time for which he is elected, 
from holding “any civil Office.”79 It does not state that these 
individuals are prevented from holding any “other” civil 
Office, which implies that they do not already hold “civil 
Offices.” Senator Bayard then pointed to Article II, Section 
1, providing for the election of electors80 and the language 
distinguishing between Senators and Representatives 
and persons “holding an Office of Trust or Profit under 
the United States.”81 He concluded that Senators and 
Representatives are not “officers of the United States” nor do 
they hold “office under the United States”; rather they hold 
the position of a “station” or “trust.”82 In support of this view, 
Senator Bayard offered the fact that the people of the United 
States elect neither Senators nor Representatives; rather, 
state legislatures elected Senators and the people from state 
districts elect members of the House of Representatives.83 
Senator Beck agreed with these points and entered into 
the record additional support for addressing the question 
of presidential succession, including his correspondence 
with the Official Reporter, D.F. Murphy, in 1881.84 The 
correspondence took place four days after President Garfield 
was shot and dealt with the history and issues surrounding 
presidential succession.85 In his correspondence, Murphy 
pointed to a number of provisions of the 1792 Act that 
concerned him.86 Specifically, Murphy noted that the 
President pro tempore can change on a daily basis, as provided 
for by a Senate resolution dated January 13, 1876, declaring, 
“[t]hat the office of President pro tempore of the Senate is 
held at the pleasure of the Senate.”87 Under the 1792 Act 
the President pro tempore was not required to resign before 
becoming Acting President, and therefore it was unclear 
whether he would remain Acting President if the Senate 
changed his status as President pro tempore. This is no longer a 
concern because the 1947 Act requires both the Speaker and 
the President pro tempore to resign before taking the oath as 
Acting President.88
Subsequently, Senator Garland of Arkansas introduced a 
bill repealing the legislative line of succession and replacing 
it with an executive line of succession. Senator Garland 
believed the line of succession should go through the Cabinet 
Departments “commencing with the Secretary of State 
and going down in the order in which they are generally 
recognized and named in our proceedings, our laws, and 
our correspondence.”89 Senator Garland recommended the 
executive line of succession in order to maintain separation of 
powers within the government.90 Just as then-Representative 
James Madison believed the extension of the line of succession 
to the judiciary would blur the lines of the separation of 
powers, Senator Garland believed the extension of the 
line of succession to the legislative branch would have the 
same effect.91 Specifically, Madison noted that by including 
the President pro tempore and the Speaker in the line of 
succession, these individuals would retain their legislative 
stations and “their incompatible functions will be blended; 
or the incompatibility will supersede those stations, and then 
those being the substratum of the adventitious functions, 
these must fail also.”92 Furthermore, Senator Garland believed 
that the executive line of succession enabled the President to 
hand over his duties confidently.93 Senator Garland argued 
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that an executive line of succession would appeal to the will of 
the electorate because all Heads of Departments would have 
received the Senate’s endorsement.94 Finally, Senator Garland 
believed an executive line of succession would dispose of the 
“Officer” question.95 In his opinion, the President pro tempore 
and Speaker were only “Officers” of their respective bodies.96 
In support of this argument, he offered Senator Blount’s 
impeachment trial and the case of Senator John Smith from 
Ohio, who was punished by expulsion, not impeachment, 
because he was held not to be an “Officer” within the 
meaning of the Constitution.97 This bolstered Senator 
Garland’s position because if legislators are not impeachable, 
then they are not “Officers of the United States” under the 
Constitution.98
Senator Garland next addressed objections to an executive 
line of succession. Specifically, in response to objections 
regarding presidential qualifications,99 Senator Garland 
suggested a clause stating “each of such officers above named 
shall have the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution 
of the United States for President and Vice-President.”100 
Other objections to the proposed executive line of succession 
were based on the possible implication of a Cabinet officer 
as particeps criminis in the impeachment of the President.101 
Senator Garland suggested this issue could be eliminated by 
a clause providing “that neither of such officers above named 
shall have been implicated, directly or indirectly, in any matter 
for which the President may have been impeached.”102 These 
two suggestions by Senator Garland were included in Section 
2 of the 1886 Act as enacted.103
Senator Hoar proposed an executive line of succession, 
which would last for the duration of the presidential term, 
eliminating any special election.104 Included in this line of 
succession were all Heads of Departments, in the order in 
which the Departments had been created.105 Senator Hoar 
appeared to firmly believe that the Secretary of State should 
be in the line of succession.106 He described the Secretary of 
State as “usually the most conspicuous representative next to 
the President of the United States, of the same opinions and 
policies upon which the people put their stamp of approval 
in the Presidential election.”107 Thus, in his view, the inclusion 
of the Secretary of State and other Cabinet members in 
the line of succession would allow for party continuity and 
the furtherance of the President’s policies. In response to 
challenges concerning the confirmation process of Cabinet 
members, primarily that there is an “unwritten law” that 
causes the Senate to confirm the President’s appointments 
for the Departments,108 Senator Hoar noted that Senators 
will need to take into consideration “this new possibility” 
when advising and consenting as to the qualifications of 
a nominated individual, and thus take more seriously the 
nomination and confirmation process.109 However, Senator 
Hoar did not believe that Acting Secretaries should be in the 
line of succession. He stated, “an officer holding ad interim, 
or an officer holding by Presidential appointment without 
the consent of the Senate, is not entitled under this bill to 
succeed, under any circumstances, to the Presidency.”110
Furthermore, Senator Hoar, like his colleagues, believed 
constitutional questions regarding legislative officers and 
party continuity were decisive reasons to change the line of 
succession.111 Senator Hoar also identified the issue regarding 
possible simultaneous vacancies in both the positions of the 
President pro tempore and the Speaker as important in his 
decision to propose an executive line of succession.112 Senator 
Hoar reintroduced his bill,113 which the Senate passed and 
forwarded to the House,114 but the House again failed to take 
further action.115 
The issue of presidential succession did not reemerge as a 
congressional concern until 1885, with the death of Vice 
President Thomas A. Hendricks and President Grover 
Cleveland’s message to the Forty-Ninth Congress.116 In his 
message, President Cleveland stated: 
The present condition of the law relating to the succession 
to the Presidency . . . is such as to require immediate 
amendment. This subject has repeatedly been considered 
by Congress, but no result has been reached. The recent 
lamentable death of the Vice President and vacancies at 
the same time in all other offices the incumbents of which 
might immediately exercise the functions of the Presidential 
office, have caused public anxiety and a just demand that 
a recurrence of such a condition of affairs should not be 
permitted.117
Thus, with President Cleveland’s urging and on the basis of 
the previous exhaustive debates on the issue of presidential 
succession on the record, Senator Hoar reintroduced a 
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modified bill in the Senate.118 The Senate passed the bill 
on December 17, 1885,119 and upon review the House of 
Representatives also passed the bill.120 The 1886 Act became 
law on January 19, 1886.121
3. The Presidential Succession Act of 1947
After almost sixty years, the issues surrounding presidential 
succession were resurrected following the death of President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and Vice President Harry S. Truman’s 
subsequent ascension to the presidency in April 1945.122 
Members of Congress became concerned at this time because 
of the perceived political inexperience of Secretary of State 
Edward R Stettinius, Jr., who under the 1886 Act was the 
next in the line of succession.123 Postmaster General James A. 
Farley raised the additional concern that under the 1886 Act, 
the President would be able to appoint his own successor by 
naming a new Secretary of State.124 According to Postmaster 
General Farley this was undemocratic and should be 
immediately modified.125 These concerns ultimately prompted 
Congress to reexamine presidential succession.126
On June 19, 1945, President Truman delivered a special 
message to Congress, which echoed Postmaster General 
Farley’s concerns and urged Congress to adopt new legislation 
to address presidential succession.127 President Truman argued 
that his ability to name his own successor was contrary to 
democratic principles and should not be vested with the 
President.128 President Truman believed that the next in the 
line of succession should come as close as possible to being 
nationally elected.129 Thus, he recommended the Speaker 
of the House as next in the line of succession.130 President 
Truman felt the Speaker was the individual who came closest 
to being nationally elected because not only is the Speaker 
elected as his district’s congressional representative, but also 
by the House of Representatives as its Speaker.131 
President Truman recommended that the Speaker be placed 
ahead of the President pro tempore in the line of succession 
because, in his view, the Speaker enjoyed a more democratic 
pedigree, since members of the House of Representatives are 
elected every two years, while Senators are elected every six 
years.132 Therefore, the Speaker is more likely to be reflective 
of the national political mandate at the time of succession. 
President Truman proposed that in times of a dual vacancy 
and/or inability the individual succeeding to the presidency 
should serve only until the next congressional election, at 
which point a President would be elected or until a special 
election to replace the President and Vice President was 
held.133 
In sum, President Truman recommended that Congress 
enact a law providing: that the Speaker of the House should 
be first in the line of succession in the case of removal, death, 
resignation, or inability of the President and Vice President, 
and he should resign from the House before assuming the 
powers and duties of the office of President; that if there is 
no qualified Speaker, the President pro tempore should resign 
from the Senate and act as President only until a qualified 
Speaker is elected; that if there is neither a qualified Speaker 
nor a qualified President pro tempore, the Cabinet member 
next in the line of succession should act as President until 
either a qualified Speaker or a qualified President pro tempore 
is elected; and that if Congress decides to enact a special 
election provision, the election should be held as soon as 
practicable.134 
Initial responses to President Truman’s proposal were 
favorable, but as time passed the terms stipulated in the plan 
were questioned on constitutional grounds.135 On June 25, 
1945, Representative Hatton W. Sumners of Texas introduced 
a bill that reflected all of President Truman’s proposals,136 
and subsequently the Committee on the Judiciary found 
Representative Sumner’s bill to be constitutional.137 Sumner’s 
bill provided that if concurrent presidential and vice-
presidential vacancies occurred more than ninety days before 
the next congressional election, presidential electors would 
be chosen at the coming congressional election and if a 
simultaneous vacancy did not occur within that ninety-day 
period, no special election would take place.138 
The House debated this bill. Those in favor believed it was 
more democratic than the 1886 Act because the Speaker 
reflected the most recent mandate of the national electorate.139 
However, Representatives John Gwynne, Clarence E. 
Hancock, and Raymond Springer criticized the bill and 
argued that the Speaker and President pro tempore were not 
constitutional “Officers.”140 Others argued that the bill would 
inadvertently encourage the impeachment and removal of 
the President, constituting a legislative encroachment on the 
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executive.141 Representative John M. Robsion took particular 
issue with the special election provision, arguing it could lead 
to four different Presidents in one term and was bad policy.142 
The House of Representatives ultimately removed the special 
election provision from the bill.143 The House passed the 
modified Sumners bill on June 29, 1945.144
Once the bill reached the Senate, no further action was 
taken until 1947.145 The fact that the Republicans took 
control of Congress in 1946 did not deter Truman, who still 
advocated for congressional consideration of the legislative 
line of succession.146 The bill, which was introduced by 
Senator Kenneth S. Wherry, did not contain a provision 
for special elections and explicitly required the resignation 
of the Speaker and President pro tempore before either 
could act as President.147 Compulsory resignation received 
much criticism, as many believed this would discourage a 
Speaker or President pro tempore from acting as President 
in the event of presidential inability.148 Further, the issues 
regarding whether these legislative leaders were even 
“Officers” under the Constitution reemerged.149 Senator 
Carl A. Hatch of New Mexico argued that “[t]he officer 
must continue to hold that office in order to continue to 
qualify to act as President.”150 Thus, the person is no longer 
an “Officer” under the Constitution and cannot, having 
resigned his position, act as President.151 As these concerns 
mounted, the Committee on Rules and Administration 
submitted a report on March 24, 1947, which contained the 
“minority view” of various Senators and described the bill 
as “piecemeal legislation” while insisting that the relevant 
issues had not been thoroughly studied.152 
Representative Robsion submitted a report of the Committee 
on the Judiciary on July 9, 1947 recommending that the bill 
be enacted.153 The report included a letter dated June 11, 
1947 from then Attorney General, Douglas W. McGregor, in 
response to a request by the Committee on the Judiciary for 
review of the constitutionality of the bill.154 Attorney General 
McGregor endorsed the bill and opined that members 
of Congress were “Officers” under the Constitution.iii155 
iii Attorney General McGregor cited Lamar v. United States, 241 U.S. 102 
(1916), which stands for the proposition that impersonating a member 
of the House of Representatives involved an “Officer” acting under the 
authority of the United States. However, Officer in this sense is construed 
according to its meaning in the penal code, not the Constitution. Id. at 112-
17. 
McGregor also cited the 1792 Act and the fact that it 
“represents a construction of article II by an early Congress, 
whose views of the Constitution have long been regarded 
as authoritative, and reflects a long-continued acquiescence 
in such a construction.”156 Ultimately, the Senate passed the 
bill on June 27, 1947157 and the House of Representatives 
followed suit on July 10, 1947.158 On July 18, 1947, President 
Truman signed the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 into 
law.159 The 1947 Act, which is still in effect, includes most 
of Truman’s proposals, with the notable exception of his 
recommendation to provide for a special election.160
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d.  Post-9/11/2001 ProPosals and PrEsidEntial 
succEssion initiatiVEs
1. Proposed Post-9/11/2001 Legislation
The majority of legislative proposals following the attacks 
of September 11, 2001 focus on the inclusion of legislative 
leaders in the line of succession, the bumping provision of the 
1947 Act, and mandatory resignation.i
a. Legislators 
Legislative proposals since 9/11 have sought to address the 
two principal issues regarding the inclusion of legislators in 
the line of succession: party continuity1 and constitutionality.2
The potential for a disruption in party continuity is a matter of 
genuine and continuing concern.3 In the ten years since 9/11, 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President 
have been members of opposing political parties for three 
years,ii and the President pro tempore of the Senate has been in 
the President’s opposing party for four years.iii 
Four bills,4 all introduced by Congressman Brad Sherman of 
California, have proposed that the President have the power 
to designate which party leader in each House of Congress 
should be included in the line of succession.iv In the House, the 
President could select among the Speaker, the Majority Leader, 
and the Minority Leader.5 In the Senate, the President could 
choose from among the President pro tempore, the Majority 
Leader, and the Minority Leader.6 The President would 
designate one of these legislators for the House and one for the 
Senate by notifying the Clerk of the House of Representatives 
and the Secretary of the Senate.7 Until the President submits a 
letter designating otherwise, the Speaker and Majority Leader 
of the Senate would be deemed successors.8
Other bills have sought to remove legislators from the line 
of succession. Senator John Cornyn of Texas proposed a 
i This overview is current as of May 2011, when the Clinic concluded its 
work.
ii See Appendix F, Chart 2, for a list of former Speakers of the House of 
Representatives and the Presidents during whose terms they served.
iii See Appendix F, Chart 3, for a list of former Presidents pro tempore of the 
Senate and the Presidents during whose terms they served.
iv The Presidential Succession Act of 2004 also included this provision for the 
President-elect. H.R. 5390, 108th Cong. (2004).
bill removing legislative officers from the line of succession 
altogether.9 In a separate bill, Representative Sherman 
proposed removing legislators from the line of succession 
unless there is neither a President nor a Vice President to take 
office on Inauguration Day.10 In such an instance, the Speaker 
of the House and the Majority Leader of the Senate would 
serve as next in line in that order.11 However, this legislation 
explicitly states that the individual in this scenario acting as 
President “may not nominate any individual to serve as Vice 
President.”v12
Later proposals by Senator Cornyn and Representative 
Sherman did not remove legislators,13 but left the Speaker 
of the House and the President pro tempore in the line of 
succession.14 Senator Cornyn stated that this change was 
made because he hoped that “Congress [would] enact the 
Presidential Succession Act of 2005 quickly, and that the 
more controversial but nevertheless critical constitutional 
issues arising out of current law can be addressed as well 
through separate legislation.”15 
b. Bumping
Legislators have attempted to remove the bumping provision 
in six bills.16 Some of these bills provide that the individual 
who first acts as President pursuant to the line of succession 
may serve for the rest of the presidential term “or until the 
disability of the President or the Vice President is removed.”17 
c. Mandatory Resignation Provision
Under the 1947 Act, any individual who acts as the President 
is required to resign his current post, prohibiting him from 
resuming it later.18 As a result, potential successors may be 
unwilling to assume the powers of the presidency during a 
temporary inability. Only two of the post-9/11 bills would 
have continued the compulsory resignation for executive 
officers.19 In contrast, all but one bill provided for mandatory 
resignation for legislators.20 The most recent proposed 
v The Clinic notes that this proposed restriction raises constitutional concerns 
that are not addressed in this Report. Specifically at issue is whether the 
Acting President has the authority to appoint a Vice President under the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment. See Examination of the First Implementation 
of Section Two of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment Before the Subcomm. on 
Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 
(1975).
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legislation would not require the resignation of either 
executive or legislative leaders.vi21 
d. Acting Secretaries
It is unclear whether the 1947 Act includes Acting 
Secretariesvii in the line of succession.viii One post-9/11 bill 
states that officers can only be in the line of succession if the 
President appointed them to their office.22 Five other post-
9/11 bills state that, to be included in the line of succession, 
officers must have been appointed by the President and 
confirmed with the advice and consent of the Senate to a 
specific office listed. Therefore only Cabinet Secretaries 
confirmed as such would be in the line of succession.23 
e. Speaker of the House Pro Tempore
Representative Sherman has proposed two bills that would 
allow the President to choose among various House leaders in 
selecting a statutory successor, but the bills specifically provide 
that a person acting as Speaker pro tempore is not considered 
the Speaker of the House.24
f. Successors Outside the Washington, D.C. Area
Many commentators suggest that the greatest threat to continuity 
in the presidency in the event of mass catastrophe stems from 
the concentration of individuals in the line of succession present 
within the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.25 
Five bills have proposed adding the Ambassadors to the 
United Nations, Great Britain, Russia, China, and France 
to the end of the line of succession after the Secretary of 
Homeland Security.26 
vi This proposal raises constitutional issues not addressed in this Report, 
specifically whether a member of the legislature would be able to serve 
simultaneously in the executive branch. Currently, legislators must resign 
before becoming Acting President. 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006). The necessity of 
that requirement has been debated throughout the history of the Succession 
Acts.
vii An “Acting Secretary” is an officer who was not appointed as a principal 
officer by the President but who nonetheless holds the powers of a Cabinet 
Secretary. By contrast a Cabinet Secretary is an individual who was 
appointed by the President to be part of his Cabinet and confirmed by the 
Senate. Both an Acting Secretary and a Cabinet Secretary would have been 
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate for the positions 
they were originally appointed to before they could become Acting 
President. See Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 3 U.S.C. § 19. 
viii For a discussion of this issue see supra Part VI.C.
2. Additional Post-9/11/2001 Proposals
a. Introduction
Others besides legislators have made proposals since 9/11. 
The Continuity of Government Commission, a joint effort 
by the American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings 
Institute, has released an evaluation of the current system of 
presidential succession in the event of “a catastrophic attack 
that would kill or incapacitate multiple individuals in the 
line of succession.”27 Other proposals have been advanced by 
various scholars, including Dr. John C. Fortier;28 Professor 
Akhil Reed Amar;29 Professor Howard Wasserman;30 
and Miller Baker, Esq.31 These proposals provide valuable 
perspectives on alternative solutions to the presidential 
succession deficiencies present in the current system. 
b. Recommendations of The Continuity of Government 
Commission
The Continuity of Government Commission provides 
a detailed and thorough discussion culminating in seven 
recommendations addressing presidential succession 
deficiencies in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.32 
Specifically, the Commission recommends: extending the line 
of succession to individuals living outside of the Washington, 
D.C. metropolitan area; removing legislative officers from 
the line of succession; providing for a special election in the 
event of a double vacancy occurring in the first two years of a 
presidential term; reordering the line of succession; removing 
Acting Secretaries from the line of succession; supplementing 
procedures for declaring a President unable to discharge 
the powers and duties of his office; and addressing the 
contingencies which may arise during the inaugural and pre-
inaugural periods.33 
i. Extend the Presidential Line of Succession Outside of 
Washington, D.C.
The first recommendation made by the Commission is to 
extend the presidential line of succession to individuals 
living outside of the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.34 
The reason for this recommendation is the concern that 
all the individuals in the current line of succession could 
be eliminated in a mass catastrophe targeting the nation’s 
Capital.35 During the Cold War, a nuclear missile posed 
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the greatest threat to American security.36 Officials in 
Washington, D.C. assumed they had the capability to retreat 
from the Capital prior to an impending attack.37 With the 
advent of global terrorism and the portability of weapons of 
mass destruction, the potential threats have intensified. 
To accomplish its goal of extending the line of succession to 
individuals living outside Washington, D.C., the Commission 
proposes two solutions. The first proposal would add 
Ambassadors or governors to the line of succession.ix38 
The Commission ultimately recommends that Congress 
establish four or five new federal officer positions, requiring 
appointment by the President and confirmation by the 
Senate, each of which would be in the line of succession.39 The 
Commission contemplates that the individuals nominated to 
these offices would primarily be high government officials,40 
such as former Presidents,x former Cabinet members, or even 
current and former governors.xi41
ii. Remove Legislators From the Line of Succession
The second recommendation is to remove legislators from 
the line of succession.42 Party continuity would thus be 
maintained.43 The question whether legislators are “Officers” 
within the meaning of Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 would 
become moot. The bumping provision contained in 3 U.S.C. 
§ 19(d)(2) would become ineffective and unnecessary.44 
Finally, this would address the concern that during times of 
temporary inability legislative leaders may not wish to resign 
their posts to act as President, as is currently required. 45
Recognizing that it would be difficult to obtain legislative 
ix The inclusion of governors in the line of succession raises some 
constitutional concerns that are not addressed in this Report. Specifically 
at issue is whether governors can be federalized under the Commander-
in-Chief Clause and what federalism implications may arise from such an 
inclusion. See infra note xx.
x Former Presidents who have served two terms are not precluded from 
the line of succession by reason of the Constitution’s limitations on the 
length of service. A president cannot be elected to more than two terms of 
office, U.S. Const. amend. XXII, § 1, but arguably could serve by virtue 
of appointment, ascending to the office through the line of succession. See 
Ensuring the Continuity of the United States Government: The Presidency: 
Joint Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and S. Comm. on Rules 
and Admin., 108th Cong. 59 n.1 (2003) [hereinafter The Presidency: Joint 
Hearing] (testimony of John C. Fortier, Exec. Dir., Continuity of Gov’t 
Comm’n, and Research Assoc., Am. Enter. Inst.).
xi See infra note xx.
support for a bill that removes legislators, the Commission 
makes four additional recommendations in the event that they 
remain in the line of succession. First, to remove the bumping 
provision of 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(2).46 Second, to change the criteria 
for selecting the President pro tempore or replace the President pro 
tempore in the line of succession with the Majority Leader of the 
Senate.47 Third, to allow legislative leaders to act only in the event 
of the death of a President and not during times of presidential 
inability.48 Fourth, to address problems concerning the continuity 
of Congress within the House of Representatives.49 
iii. Provide for a Special Presidential Election
The Commission recommends that special presidential 
elections be held within five months if a double vacancy 
occurs in the first two years of a presidential term.50
iv. Reorder the Line of Succession
The Commission recommends reordering the line of 
succession.51 The Commission argues that, in determining 
the order of succession, Congress should consider not only 
the year in which a Cabinet level position was created, but 
also the likely qualifications of a Secretary who serves a given 
department.52 The line of succession deemed appropriate by 
the Commission is: Secretary of State; Secretary of Defense; 
Attorney General; Secretary of the Treasury; and new officers 
created by Congress who are located outside of Washington, 
D.C. in accordance with the Commission’s first proposal.53 
v. Remove Acting Secretaries
The Commission recommends explicitly removing Acting 
Secretaries from the line of succession,54 as was provided for in 
the 1886 Act.55 
vi. Supplement Inability Procedures
Another of the Commission’s recommendations is to 
supplement the procedures for determining presidential 
inability by officials who are in the line of succession after the 
Vice President.56 The Twenty-Fifth Amendment establishes 
procedures both for filling a vacancy in the office of the Vice 
President as well as for addressing presidential inability, but 
does not address how this might be accomplished in the 
absence of an able Vice President. The Commission suggests 
that Congress create a procedural framework whereby an 
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officer lower in the line of succession can declare the inability 
of an officer higher in the line57 and that Congress could 
provide guidance on how a transfer might take place and how 
Congress is to be notified.58 Additionally, the Commission 
recommends that Congress, using its authority under the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment,59 create an alternative body 
that the Vice President can convene in order to declare a 
presidential inability in the event that a majority of the 
Cabinet cannot convene.60 Such a body could be comprised 
of a majority of governors or some other group of individuals 
from outside of Washington, D.C.61 If no alternative body is 
created and a majority of the Cabinet members is rendered 
unable by reason of a mass attack, then the possibility remains 
that a surviving Vice President will have no constitutional 
means for declaring the President unable to perform the 
duties of his office.xii 
vii. Address Inaugural and Pre-Inaugural Contingencies
The seventh and final recommendation made by the 
Commission is to address inaugural and pre-inaugural 
contingencies. The Commission recommends the adoption of 
three proposals.62 
First, Congress and the political parties would take care to 
secure the line of succession during these times.63 This could 
be accomplished primarily with a change in custom.64 The 
outgoing and incoming administrations could work together 
so that the outgoing President could nominate members of 
the President-elect’s Cabinet.65 Then, before the inauguration, 
the Senate could confirm the new nominees.66 Second, the 
Commission recommends shortening the time between the 
casting and counting of the Electoral College votes in order to 
identify the President-elect as soon as possible.67 Finally, the 
Commission recommends that the political parties plan for 
the possibility of the deaths of both the President-elect and 
Vice President-elect.68
xii A majority of “the principal officers of the executive departments,” as set 
out in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, Section 4, was not thought of as a 
quorum but as a majority of the Cabinet positions. John D. Feerick, 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Its Complete History and 
Applications 202-03 (Fordham U. Press 1976). Acting Secretaries were 
thought to be the members acting for their respective departments and, thus, 
would be among the principal officers to participate in declaring a President 
unable. Id. For a discussion of the departmental lines of succession, see 
Appendix E of this Report.
c. Proposals by Dr. John C. Fortierxiii 
Dr. John C. Fortier has made numerous thoughtful proposals 
concerning presidential succession, some of which overlap 
with the Commission’s proposals.69 Additional proposals 
include creating a binary line of succession and removing 
the bumping provision in 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(2).70 The latter 
suggestions are discussed below.
i. Binary Line of Succession
In his 2003 testimony before the Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary, Dr. Fortier proposed creating two lines 
of succession. First, in cases of presidential inability, 
impeachment and removal, and death and resignation, 
he recommends that presidential powers and duties 
should devolve upon the Cabinet members.71 Second, if a 
President and Vice President both fail to qualify, Dr. Fortier 
recommends that it is both constitutional and practical to 
have the presidential powers devolve upon qualified legislative 
officers.xiv 
According to Dr. Fortier, the powers of the President should 
also flow to the Cabinet in the event of a double vacancy. This 
recommendation addresses the conflicts of interest that may 
arise in cases of impeachment and removal.72 
In the case of death or resignation, Dr. Fortier also proposes 
removing legislative officers from the line of succession.73 This 
section of his proposal, however, does not specifically address 
post-9/11 concerns. This proposal reflects Dr. Fortier’s 
opinion on the question whether legislators qualify as 
xiii Dr. John C. Fortier has been the Executive Director of the Continuity of 
Government Commission since 2002. He has testified before the House of 
Representatives and the Senate concerning the continuity of government. 
Dr. Fortier has held teaching positions at the University of Pennsylvania, 
University of Delaware, Boston College, and Harvard University. 
xiv The Presidency: Joint Hearing, supra note 25, at 10, 52-53 (statement and 
testimony of John C. Fortier, Exec. Dir., Continuity of Gov’t Comm’n, and 
Research Assoc., Am. Enter. Inst.). A legislator is arguably not an “Officer” 
within the meaning of Article II, but a legislative officer is a “person” as used 
in the Twentieth Amendment. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 6; id. amend. XX, 
§ 3. The Twentieth Amendment states in part: “the Congress may by law 
provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President 
elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the 
manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall 
act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified.” Id. 
amend. XX, § 3 (emphasis added). However, concerns about including a 
legislator in the line of succession through the Twentieth Amendment may 
still raise separation of powers concerns.
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number of problems inherent in the current succession laws.80
The primary responsibility of the Assistant Vice President 
would be “to receive regular briefings preparing him to serve 
at a moment’s notice, and to lie low until needed: in the line 
of succession but out of the line of fire . . . .”81 Professor Amar 
intends this office to be highly visible to the American people, 
proposing that the assistant vice-presidential nominee be 
announced well before the November election so that a vote for 
the presidential nominee would also signal an endorsement of 
the Assistant Vice President.82 The office would require Senate 
confirmation.83 In addition, the line of succession following 
the Assistant Vice President would run directly to Cabinet 
members.84 Finally, Professor Amar suggests that if creating a 
new office is not politically viable, Congress could name one of 
the current Cabinet members to be next in line after the Vice 
President in a purely executive line of succession.85
Under this proposal, the bumping provision would become 
unnecessary, mandatory resignations would not be required, 
the Assistant Vice President would certainly be an “Officer” 
within the meaning of Article II, congressional conflicts 
of interest would be avoided, power transfers in times of 
inability would be seamless, party and policy continuity 
would be maintained, and democratic legitimacy would be 
ensured through the Senate confirmation process.86
Professor Amar’s proposal is not without complications. First, 
the office of Assistant Vice President could erode the political 
status of the Vice President. Second, there is no guarantee 
that the assistant vice-presidential candidate, announced prior 
to an election, would assume that office, because the Senate 
could refuse to confirm him or the President could change 
his nominee after the election. Third, having to judge a third 
individual when evaluating a presidential ticket may confuse 
the electorate and complicate the selection of running mates. 
e. Proposals by Professor Howard Wassermanxvii
Professor Howard Wasserman, in addition to making 
proposals that overlap with those discussed above, has 
proposed a unique solution to the problem of presidential 
xvii Professor Wasserman is an Associate Professor of Law at Florida 
International University and has written on presidential succession. See, 
e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, The Trouble With the Shadow Government, 52 
Emory L.J. 281 (2003); Howard M. Wasserman, Structural Principles and 
Presidential Succession, 90 Ky. L.J. 345 (2001).
“Officers” within the meaning of Article II, Section 1, Clause 
6 of the Constitution.xv
According to Dr. Fortier, in the event that a President-elect or 
Vice President-elect fails to qualify, it would be appropriate 
for legislators to be in the line of succession.74 This situation 
would most likely result from an election controversy or a 
terrorist attack resulting in the death of the President-elect 
and Vice President-elect shortly before the inauguration, 
leaving no one to qualify as President and Vice President.75 
Since members of the House of Representatives are elected 
in the same General Election as the President-elect and Vice 
President-elect, the Speaker of the House would arguably 
best reflect the political sentiment of the country as a whole 
as of Inauguration Day and is the best person to assume the 
presidency. If legislators were not included in the line of 
succession before Cabinet members in a failure-to-qualify 
scenario, the powers of the President would flow to the 
previous administration’s Cabinet or even to the previous 
administration’s Acting Secretaries.76 This result would be 
unlikely to reflect the political will of the electorate. 
ii. Remove the Bumping Provision
Dr. Fortier recommends removing the bumping provision 
of 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(2).77 He points out that a bumping 
provision, particularly in the event of a catastrophic attack, 
could create several negative consequences including: 
having multiple Presidents over a short period of time; the 
possession of potentially extortionary power by legislators 
to affect the policy decisions of an Acting President; and the 
election of a new Speaker of the House by a constitutionally 
questionable quorum in the event that a mass catastrophe kills 
or incapacitates a significant number of Representatives.78 
d. Proposal by Professor Akhil Reed Amar: New 
Position of Assistant Vice President xvi
Professor Akhil Reed Amar has proposed creating a new 
Cabinet position of Assistant Vice President.79 According to 
Professor Amar, the creation of this position would solve a 
xv For a discussion of this issue see supra Part VI.B.
xvi Professor Amar is the Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science at Yale 
University and has written extensively on presidential succession. See, e.g., 
Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law 
Constitutional?, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 113 (1995).
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succession in the post-9/11 era that draws from the shadow 
government implemented by President George W. Bush.87 
Professor Wasserman’s proposal lays out a framework defining 
the role and composition of a shadow government.88
i. Reorder the Line of Succession
First, Professor Wasserman advocates reordering the line of 
succession.89 He places Cabinet members immediately after 
the Vice President in the line of succession.90 The Speaker of 
the House and the President pro tempore are not removed 
under this proposal but are placed at the end of the line 
of succession.91 Professor Wasserman would have the line 
run first through the Cabinet because an Acting President 
coming from the Cabinet would have been a top official in 
the executive, a member of the President’s party, and chosen 
by the President to further his policies.92 Including legislative 
leaders at the end of the line of succession is a way to respond 
to possible catastrophic events. According to Professor 
Wasserman, one lesson of 9/11 “is that the line of succession 
should contain everyone who constitutionally may be an 
officer under the Succession Clause and who, as a normative 
policy matter, should be included in the line.”93 As long as 
a House of Congress is functioning, one of these legislative 
leaders can be elected and assume the presidency, should 
everyone else in the line be eliminated.94
ii. Create the Position of First Secretary
Professor Wasserman suggests creating a new Cabinet 
member, the First Secretary, who would be nominated by 
the President and confirmed by the Senate to lead a shadow 
government.95 The First Secretary is different from the 
Assistant Vice President suggested by Professor Amar. The 
First Secretary would play an important role in the daily 
operations of the government. While running the shadow 
government, the First Secretary would “be in contact with the 
President and the administration, as an active member of the 
Cabinet, aware of and involved in the creation and execution 
of public policy.”96 The shadow government would be 
comprised of high-ranking members of each executive agency 
and department, with the First Secretary at its head, and 
would function in a secure location outside of Washington, 
D.C.97 Professor Wasserman’s conception of a shadow 
government would allow for continuity within the executive 
branch after a catastrophic attack.98 
Professor Wasserman identifies several benefits of a shadow 
government. The First Secretary would be intimately involved 
in the administration and in a position to assume power 
seamlessly in the event of a double vacancy or catastrophic 
attack.98 In addition, Professor Wasserman’s proposal for 
a shadow government ensures that the public knows the 
identity of the individual at its head.100
iii. Allow for Change in the Seat of Government
Professor Wasserman proposes a statute that would allow 
the seat of government to function in a location other 
than Washington, D.C.101 The need for such a move could 
arise following a catastrophic attack, which renders the 
government unable to function in Washington, D.C. 
f. Proposals by Miller Bakerxviii
Miller Baker has made several proposals overlapping with 
those discussed above but with modifications. These are: 
to reorder the line of succession; to remove the bumping 
provision; to provide for Cabinet bumping; and to allow the 
President to determine the order of succession for Cabinet 
members after those specifically enumerated in the Act.102
i. Reorder the Line of Succession
Baker proposes reordering the line of succession by removing 
the lower listed Cabinet members, with the exception of 
the Secretary of Homeland Security.103 He also proposes to 
amend the 1947 Act to allow the President, at his discretion, 
to nominate Cabinet members after those specifically 
enumerated in the line of succession.104 Baker also suggests 
that the President should have the power to nominate 
individuals to be in the line of succession who are neither 
Cabinet members nor legislators, such as governors, subject 
to Senate confirmation.xix105 To address questions whether 
this proposal would be constitutional, Baker suggests that 
xviii Mr. Baker is a partner at the law firm of McDermott Will & Emery LLP. 
Mr. Baker appeared before the House of Representatives and the Senate to 
testify about presidential succession after 9/11. 
xix See infra note xx.
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governors be “federalized” pursuant to the Commander-
In-Chief Clause.xx Under this proposal, the line would be 
as follows: Secretary of State; Secretary of the Treasury;xxi 
Secretary of Defense; Attorney General; Secretary of 
Homeland Security; and other individuals as the President 
would nominate and who would be confirmed by the Senate.106
ii. Remove the Bumping Provision
Baker proposes the removal of bumping when legislators 
decline to act as President or when legislators are appointed 
after another officer or individual has assumed the powers of 
the President.107 
iii. Create a Cabinet Bumping Provision
Finally, Baker proposes a Cabinet bumping provision. He 
suggests that a Cabinet member higher in the line of succession 
should have the ability to assume the powers of the President 
from a Cabinet member lower in the line of succession once the 
former recovers from an inability.108 The purpose of a Cabinet 
bumping provision is to have the highest-ranking Cabinet 
member assume the powers of the President.109
xx The Presidency: Joint Hearing, supra note 25, at 41 (testimony of M. 
Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery). The theory is that the 
Commander-In-Chief clause allows the President, as Commander-In-Chief 
of the “Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several 
states, when called into actual Service of the United States,” U.S. Const. art 
II, § 2, cl. 1, to “federalize” a governor who is the Commander–In-Chief of 
his state’s militia, since the President has the authority to call the militia into 
the service of the United States.
xxi Although in House hearings in 2004 Mr. Baker did not include the 
Secretary of Treasury in his proposed line of succession, he had done so 
at the Senate hearing in 2003. Compare The Presidency: Joint Hearing, 
supra note 25, at 41 (testimony of M. Miller Baker, Esq., McDermott Will 
& Emery), with Presidential Succession Act: Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 39 (2004) 
(prepared statement of M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & 
Emery). 
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E.  acting cabinEt sEcrEtariEs and acting 
lEgislatiVE lEadErshiP 
1. Acting Secretaries 
The manner through which staff may rise through a given 
executive department to become an Acting Secretary is not 
consistent within the various departments. Departmental 
lines of succession are established through statutes, executive 
orders, and in some instances at the discretion of the current 
Cabinet Secretary. Major complications of including Acting 
Secretaries in the line of succession arise from the length of 
the line and the differences and inconsistencies in the order of 
the line within agencies and the fact that the order within any 
agency can be changed at any moment.
The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 establishes 
the order in which an individual working in a Cabinet 
department becomes Acting Secretary.1 In addition to 
setting time and other limitations for service of Acting 
Secretaries, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act allows the 
President to direct who shall serve as Acting Secretary for 
most of his Cabinet positions.2 Presidents have done this 
through executive orders, which in some instances operate 
in conjunction with statutes creating the lines of succession.3 
Currently, executive orders and statutes establish the lines of 
succession for all Cabinet positions except the Department 
of Energy and the Department of Education.4 In total, there 
are over 400 positions from which an individual can become 
an Acting Secretary and, by virtue of having been confirmed 
by the Senate, become the Acting President if the 1947 Act is 
interpreted to include Acting Secretaries.5 Most notably, over 
200 officers are eligible to become the Acting Secretary of 
State alone.6 
Since Presidents can easily issue, revoke, or amend executive 
orders, the lines of succession within most departments 
are flexible and can change dramatically in an instant. For 
example, on December 18, 2001, President George W. Bush 
issued seven executive orders changing the internal lines of 
succession for the Departments of State, Treasury, Interior, 
Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, and Veterans Affairs.7 Thus, 
if a catastrophic attack were to occur on the same day as such 
a vast restructuring, uncertainty would surely ensue. With so 
many officers in the line eligible to become Acting Secretaries, 
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it would be difficult to establish just who is properly in the 
line of succession and in what order. The nation may be faced 
with an Acting Secretary, far down a departmental line of 
succession, who becomes Acting President, but who in fact 
was not authorized to do so.i 
Aside from problems in implementing the line of succession, 
an additional consideration is the qualifications of the 
individuals who could become the Acting President by virtue 
of serving as an Acting Secretary. This is not to say that an 
Acting Secretary will never be qualified to become Acting 
President. Certainly, there may be instances in which an 
Acting Secretary, because of the nature of his position or 
individual talents, will be better suited to become Acting 
President than other individuals in the line of succession. 
i Departmental lines of succession vary from one department to the next, 
both in depth and order. First, the number of individuals eligible to become 
an Acting Secretary varies by department. Second, the order of succession 
within the departments is established through various means including an 
enumerated list, the order in which an individual was appointed to office, 
the order in which an individual took his oath of office, or a combination 
of these three systems. Having various methods to determine who becomes 
an Acting Secretary may not typically pose problems. However, in a time of 
national catastrophe, relying on multiple systems to determine who becomes 
an Acting Secretary might lead to confusion. This is especially so when a 
combination of these three systems is used within the same department. 
For example, the Department of State first lists officers to become Acting 
Secretary in the order they are listed, but after succession has passed through 
these officers, it runs through another list of officers, but this time according 
to the order in which they have taken the oath of office. See infra notes 2-4.
2. The Speaker of the House pro tempore and 
The Acting President pro tempore of the 
Senateii
Although it has been posited that Acting Secretaries may 
be in the line of succession, no parallel argument has been 
made that individuals acting as the Speaker (the “Speaker 
pro tempore”)8 or as the President pro tempore (the “Acting 
President pro tempore”)9 might be in the line as well. 
The language of the 1947 Act does not specifically address 
this possibility. The 1947 Act states “[i]f . . . there is neither 
a President nor Vice President to discharge the powers 
and duties of the office of President, then the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives shall, upon his resignation as 
Speaker and as Representative in Congress, act as President.”10 
The 1947 Act also states “[i]f . . . there is no Speaker, or the 
Speaker fails to qualify as Acting President, then the President 
pro tempore of the Senate shall, upon his resignation as 
President pro tempore and as Senator, act as President.”11 
Bills recently introduced by Congressman Sherman have 
explicitly stated that the Speaker of the House pro tempore 
is not included in the line of succession.12 As this is the only 
indication that any authority has considered that the Speaker 
pro tempore might be in the line of succession, the Clinic 
finds no indication that the Speaker pro tempore or the Acting 
President pro tempore is or was ever intended to be in the line 
of succession in any of the Succession Acts. Additionally, the 
Clinic would not support their inclusion on policy grounds. 
ii The Speaker pro tempore is an individual who is named to “act as Speaker pro 
tempore.” Rules of the House of Representatives, 112th Cong., 
R. I(8). The Acting President pro tempore may include the Secretary of the 
Senate, the Assistant Secretary of the Senate, or a Senator appointed by the 
President pro tempore. Each of these individuals can perform the “duties of 
the Chair” according to Rules of the Senate, 112th Cong., R. I(2)–
(3). Apart from the lack of statutory basis for inclusion of the Speaker pro 
tempore and the Acting President pro tempore in the line of succession, public 
policy considerations also militate strongly against their inclusion. Many 
legislators can take these temporary positions—as many as the legislators 
themselves decide—and they might be persuaded to do so in order to allow 
a Speaker or President pro tempore to avoid having to resign his position and 
thereby shield himself from having to serve only briefly as Acting President 
in the case of a temporary presidential inability. The Clinic does not believe 
that such contingent legislative leaders are in the line of succession or should 
be for the policy reasons outlined above.
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9 Rules of the Senate, 112th Cong., R. I(2)–(3).
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f. charts 
1. Post-9/11 Legislative Proposals 
Proposal year order of succession legislators 
in the line of 
succession
Mandatory 
resignation
bumping 
Provision
acting 
secretaries
speaker Pro 
tempore
Miscellaneous
house of representatives
107 H.R. 3816 2002 Speaker/Minority Leader of 
the House then Majority/
Minority Leader of the 
Senate.
Yes Yes Yes Unclear N/A N/A
108 H.R. 2749 2003 Speaker/Minority Leader of 
the House then Majority/
Minority Leader of Senate; 
Secretary of Homeland 
Security moved directly 
after the Attorney General.
Yes Yes No Unclear Explicitly not 
in the line of 
succession. 
Acting President 
nominates Vice 
President upon 
any vacancy in 
the office of Vice 
President.
108 H.R. 5390 2004 Generally the Cabinet then 
Ambassadors to the United 
Nations, Great Britain, 
France, Russia, and China.  
But, if no President or 
Vice President is elected 
prior to the beginning of 
the term, then Speaker 
and Majority Leader of 
Senate, respectively.  But, 
if there is no President or 
Vice President or Cabinet 
member or Ambassador 
named in the succession 
list, then the Speaker or 
Minority Leader of the 
House as designated by 
the President.  And if 
none above (President, 
VP, Cabinent & Speaker 
House/Minority house) then 
Majority or Minority Leader 
of the Senate as designated 
by the President shall act 
as President.
Generally no. 
But, yes if no 
President or Vice 
President has 
been elected or 
failed to qualify, 
or if there is no 
Cabinet member 
or named 
Ambassador to 
act as President.
Yes No No N/A Individual acting 
as President 
because no 
President or Vice 
President has 
been elected 
cannot nominate 
a Vice President; 
determination 
of an individual 
being unable 
to serve as 
President must 
be certified by the 
Supreme Court. 
109 H.R. 1943 2005 Adds the Secretary of 
Homeland Security and the 
Ambassadors to the United 
Nations, Great Britain, 
Russia, China, and France 
at the end of the line of 
succession. 
Yes Only for 
legislators.
No No N/A N/A
110 H.R. 540 2007 Adds the Ambassadors to 
the United Nations, Great 
Britain, Russia, China, and 
France at the end of the 
line of succession. 
Yes Only for 
legislators.
No No N/A N/A
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1. Post-9/11 Legislative Proposals  (continued)
Proposal year order of succession legislators 
in the line of 
succession
Mandatory 
resignation
bumping 
Provision
acting 
secretaries
speaker Pro 
tempore
Miscellaneous
111 H.R. 6557 2010 The Speaker, Majority 
Leader, or Minority Leader 
of the House as designated 
by the President, then the 
Majority Leader, President 
pro tempore, or Minority 
Leader of the Senate 
as designated by the 
President, then the Cabinet, 
then the Ambassadors to 
the United Nations, Great 
Britain, Russia, China, and 
France.
Yes No No No Explicitly not 
in the line of 
succession. 
N/A
Senate
108 S. 2073 2004 Adds the Secretary of 
Homeland Security after the 
Attorney General.
No No No No N/A N/A
109 S. 920 2005 Adds the Secretary of 
Homeland Security and the 
Ambassadors to the United 
Nations, Great Britain, 
Russia, China, and France 
to the end of the line of 
succession.
Yes Only for 
legislators.
No No N/A N/A
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2. List of Speakers of the House of Representatives
speaker* district* congress * date Elected* Party** President*** Presidential 
Party****
Frederick A.C. 
Muhlenberg
Pennsylvania 1st April 1, 1789 Pro-Administration George Washington Federalist
Jonathan Trumbull Connecticut 2nd October 24, 1791 Federalist George Washington Federalist 
Frederick A.C. 
Muhlenberg
Pennsylvania 3rd December 2, 1793 Anti-Administration George Washington Federalist 
Jonathan Dayton New Jersey 4th December 7, 1795 Federalist George Washington Federalist 
Jonathan Dayton New Jersey 5th May 15, 1797 Federalist John Adams Federalist
Theodore Sedgwick Massachusetts 6th December 2, 1799 Federalist John Adams Federalist
Nathaniel Macon North Carolina 7th December 7, 1801 Democratic-Republican Thomas Jefferson Democratic-Republican
Nathaniel Macon North Carolina 8th October 17, 1803 Democratic-Republican Thomas Jefferson Democratic-Republican
Nathaniel Macon North Carolina 9th December 2, 1805 Democratic-Republican Thomas Jefferson Democratic-Republican
Joseph B. Varnum Massachusetts 10th October 26, 1807 Democratic-Republican Thomas Jefferson Democratic-Republican
Joseph B. Varnum Massachusetts 11th May 22, 1809 Democratic-Republican James Madison Democratic-Republican
Henry Clay Kentucky 12th November 4, 1811 Democratic-Republican James Madison Democratic-Republican
Henry Clay Kentucky 13th May 24, 1813 Democratic-Republican James Madison Democratic-Republican
Langdon Cheves South Carolina 13th January 19, 1814 Republican James Madison Democratic-Republican
Henry Clay Kentucky 14th December 4, 1815 Democratic-Republican James Madison Democratic-Republican
Henry Clay Kentucky 15th December 1, 1817 Democratic-Republican James Monroe Democratic-Republican
Henry Clay Kentucky 16th December 6, 1819 Democratic-Republican James Monroe Democratic-Republican
John W. Taylor New York 16th November 15, 1820 Republican James Monroe Democratic-Republican
Philip P. Barbour Virginia 17th December 4, 1821 Republican James Monroe Democratic-Republican
Henry Clay Kentucky 18th December 1, 1823 Democratic-Republican James Monroe Democratic-Republican
John W. Taylor New York 19th December 5, 1825 Republican John Quincy Adams Federalist, Democratic-
Republican, Whig
Andrew Stevenson Virginia 20th December 3, 1827 Jacksonian John Quincy Adams Federalist, Democratic-
Republican, Whig
Andrew Stevenson Virginia 21st December 7, 1829 Jacksonian Andrew Jackson Democratic
Andrew Stevenson Virginia 22nd December 5, 1831 Jacksonian Andrew Jackson Democratic
John Bell Tennessee 23rd June 2, 1834 Democratic Andrew Jackson Democratic
James K. Polk Tennessee 24th December 7, 1835 Jacksonian/Democratic Andrew Jackson Democratic
James K. Polk Tennessee 25th September 4, 1837 Jacksonian/Democratic Martin Van Buren Democratic
Robert M. T. Hunter Virginia 26th December 16, 1839 Democratic Martin Van Buren Democratic
John White Kentucky 27th May 31, 1841 Whig William Henry Harrison/
John Tyler
Whig
*  Denotes information obtained from the Office of the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives Historical Archives. See House History, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE U.S. 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://artandhistory.house.gov/house_history/speakers.aspx (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).      
**  Denotes information obtained from Encyclopedia Britannica online. See Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, ENCYCLOPAEDIA.COM, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/
topic/558470/Speaker-of-the-US-House-of-Representatives .house (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).      
***  Denotes information obtained from the Library of Congress archives. See Chronological List of Presidents, First Ladies, and Vice Presidents of the United States, LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS, http://loc.gov/rr/print/list/057_chron.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).       
****  Denotes information obtained from the University of Virginia’s Miller Center. See American President: A Reference Resource, THE MILLER CENTER, http://millercenter.org/president 
(last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
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John W. Jones Virginia 28th December 4, 1843 Democratic John Tyler Democrat, Whig
John W. Davis Indiana 29th December 1, 1845 Democratic James K. Polk Democratic
Robert C. Winthrop Massachusetts 30th December 6, 1847 Whig James K. Polk Democratic
Howell Cobb Georgia 31st December 22, 1849 Democratic Zachary Taylor/Millard 
Fillmore
Whig
Linn Boyd Kentucky 32nd December 1, 1851 Democratic Millard Fillmore Whig
Linn Boyd Kentucky 33rd December 5, 1853 Democratic Franklin Pierce Democratic
Nathaniel P. Banks Massachusetts 34th February 2, 1856 American Franklin Pierce Democratic
James L. Orr South Carolina 35th December 7, 1857 Democratic James Buchanan Democratic
William Pennington New Jersey 36th February 1, 1860 Republican James Buchanan Democratic
Galusha A. Grow Pennsylvania 37th July 4, 1861 Republican Abraham Lincoln Whig, Republican
Schuyler Colfax Indiana 38th December 7, 1863 Republican Abraham Lincoln Whig, Republican
Schuyler Colfax Indiana 39th December 4, 1865 Republican Andrew Johnson Democratic
Schuyler Colfax Indiana 40th March 4, 1867 Republican Andrew Johnson Democratic
Theodore M. Pomeroy New York 40th March 3, 1869 Republican Ulysses S. Grant Republican
James G. Blaine Maine 41st March 4, 1869 Republican Ulysses S. Grant Republican
James G. Blaine Maine 42nd March 4, 1871 Republican Ulysses S. Grant Republican
James G. Blaine Maine 43rd December 1, 1873 Republican Ulysses S. Grant Republican
Michael C. Kerr Indiana 44th December 6, 1875 Democratic Ulysses S. Grant Republican
Samuel J. Randall Pennsylvania 44th December 4, 1876 Democratic Ulysses S. Grant Republican
Samuel J. Randall Pennsylvania 45th December 4, 1876 Democratic Rutherford B. Hayes Republican
Samuel J. Randall Pennsylvania 46th March 18, 1879 Democratic Rutherford B. Hayes Republican
J. Warren Keifer Ohio 47th December 5, 1881 Republican James A. Garfield/
Chester A. Arthur
Republican
John G. Carlisle Kentucky 48th December 3, 1883 Democratic Chester A. Arthur Republican
John G. Carlisle Kentucky 49th December 7, 1885 Democratic Grover Cleveland Democratic
John G. Carlisle Kentucky 50th December 5, 1887 Democratic Grover Cleveland Democratic
Thomas B. Reed Maine 51st December 2, 1889 Republican Benjamin Harrison Republican
Charles F. Crisp Georgia 52nd December 8, 1891 Democratic Benjamin Harrison Republican
Charles F. Crisp Georgia 53rd August 7, 1893 Democratic Grover Cleveland Democratic
Thomas B. Reed Maine 54th December 2, 1895 Republican Grover Cleveland Democratic
Thomas B. Reed Maine 55th March 15, 1897 Republican William McKinley Republican
David B. Henderson Iowa 56th December 4, 1899 Republican William McKinley Republican
David B. Henderson Iowa 57th December 2, 1901 Republican Theodore Roosevelt Republican
Joseph G. Cannon Illinois 58th November 9, 1903 Republican Theodore Roosevelt Republican
Joseph G. Cannon Illinois 59th December 4, 1905 Republican Theodore Roosevelt Republican
Joseph G. Cannon Illinois 60th December 2, 1907 Republican Theodore Roosevelt Republican
Joseph G. Cannon Illinois 61st March 15, 1909 Republican William H. Taft Republican
James Beauchamp 
Clark
Missouri 62nd April 4, 1911 Democratic William H. Taft Republican
speaker district congress date Elected Party President Presidential Party
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James Beauchamp 
Clark
Missouri 63rd April 7, 1913 Democratic Woodrow Wilson Democratic
James Beauchamp 
Clark
Missouri 64th December 6, 1915 Democratic Woodrow Wilson Democratic
James Beauchamp 
Clark
Missouri 65th April 2, 1917 Democratic Woodrow Wilson Democratic
Frederick H. Gillett Massachusetts 66th May 19, 1919 Republican Woodrow Wilson Democratic
Frederick H. Gillett Massachusetts 67th April 11, 1921 Republican Warren G. Harding Republican
Frederick H. Gillett Massachusetts 68th December 3, 1923 Republican Calvin Coolidge Republican
Nicholas Longworth Ohio 69th December 7, 1925 Republican Calvin Coolidge Republican
Nicholas Longworth Ohio 70th December 5, 1927 Republican Calvin Coolidge Republican
Nicholas Longworth Ohio 71st April 15, 1929 Republican Herbert Hoover Republican
John N. Garner Texas 72nd December 7, 1931 Democratic Herbert Hoover Republican
Henry T. Rainey Illinois 73rd March 9, 1933 Democratic Franklin D. Roosevelt Democratic
Joseph Wellington Byrns Tennessee 74th January 3, 1935 Democratic Franklin D. Roosevelt Democratic
William B. Bankhead Alabama 74th June 4, 1936 Democratic Franklin D. Roosevelt Democratic
William B. Bankhead Alabama 75th January 5, 1937 Democratic Franklin D. Roosevelt Democratic
William B. Bankhead Alabama 76th January 3, 1939 Democratic Franklin D. Roosevelt Democratic
Sam Rayburn Texas 76th September 16, 1940 Democratic Franklin D. Roosevelt Democratic
Sam Rayburn Texas 77th January 3, 1941 Democratic Franklin D. Roosevelt Democratic
Sam Rayburn Texas 78th January 6, 1943 Democratic Franklin D. Roosevelt Democratic
Sam Rayburn Texas 79th January 3, 1945 Democratic Franklin D. Roosevelt/
Harry Truman
Democratic
Joseph W. Martin, Jr. Massachusetts 80th January 3, 1947 Republican Harry S. Truman Democratic
Sam Rayburn Texas 81st January 3, 1949 Democratic Harry S. Truman Democratic
Sam Rayburn Texas 82nd January 3, 1951 Democratic Harry S. Truman Democratic
Joseph W. Martin, Jr. Massachusetts 83rd January 3, 1953 Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower Republican
Sam Rayburn Texas 84th January 5, 1955 Democratic Dwight D. Eisenhower Republican
Sam Rayburn Texas 85th January 3, 1957 Democratic Dwight D. Eisenhower Republican
Sam Rayburn Texas 86th January 7, 1959 Democratic Dwight D. Eisenhower Republican
Sam Rayburn Texas 87th January 3, 1961 Democratic John F. Kennedy Democratic
John W. McCormack Massachusetts 87th January 10, 1962 Democratic John F. Kennedy Democratic
John W. McCormack Massachusetts 88th January 9, 1963 Democratic John F. Kennedy/Lyndon 
B. Johnson
Democratic
John W. McCormack Massachusetts 89th January 4, 1965 Democratic Lyndon B. Johnson Democratic
John W. McCormack Massachusetts 90th January 10, 1967 Democratic Lyndon B. Johnson Democratic
John W. McCormack Massachusetts 91st January 3, 1969 Democratic Richard M. Nixon Republican
Carl B. Albert Oklahoma 92nd January 21, 1971 Democratic Richard M. Nixon Republican
Carl B. Albert Oklahoma 93rd January 3, 1973 Democratic Richard M. Nixon/Gerald 
Ford
Republican
Carl B. Albert Oklahoma 94th January 14, 1975 Democratic Gerald Ford Republican
speaker district congress date Elected Party President Presidential Party
Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr. Massachusetts 95th January 4, 1977 Democratic Jimmy Carter Democratic
Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr. Massachusetts 96th January 15, 1979 Democratic Jimmy Carter Democratic
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Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr. Massachusetts 97th January 5, 1981 Democratic Ronald Reagan Republican
Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr. Massachusetts 98th January 3, 1983 Democratic Ronald Reagan Republican
Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr. Massachusetts 99th January 3, 1985 Democratic Ronald Reagan Republican
James C. Wright, Jr. Texas 100th January 6, 1987 Democratic Ronald Reagan Republican
James C. Wright, Jr. Texas 101st January 3, 1989 Democratic George H.W. Bush Republican
Thomas S. Foley Washington 101st June 6, 1989 Democratic George H.W. Bush Republican
Thomas S. Foley Washington 102nd January 3, 1991 Democratic George H.W. Bush Republican
Thomas S. Foley Washington 103rd January 5, 1993 Democratic Bill Clinton Democratic
Newt Gingrich Georgia 104th January 4, 1995 Republican Bill Clinton Democratic
Newt Gingrich Georgia 105th January 7, 1997 Republican Bill Clinton Democratic
J. Dennis Hastert Illinois 106th January 6, 1999 Republican Bill Clinton Democratic
J. Dennis Hastert Illinois 107th January 3, 2001 Republican George W. Bush Republican
J. Dennis Hastert Illinois 108th January 7, 2003 Republican George W. Bush Republican
J. Dennis Hastert Illinois 109th January 4, 2005 Republican George W. Bush Republican
Nancy Pelosi California 110th January 4, 2007 Democratic George W. Bush Republican
Nancy Pelosi California 111th January 6, 2009 Democratic Barack Obama Democratic
John Boehner Ohio 112th January 5, 2011 Republican Barack Obama Democratic
3. List of Presidents Pro Tempore of the Senate
President Pro 
Tempore*
state congress tenure Party** President*** Presidential Party****
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John Langdon New Hampshire 1st Apr. 6, 1789 - Apr. 21, 
1789;  
Aug. 7, 1789 - Aug. 9, 1789
Democratic-Republican George Washington Federalist
Richard Henry Lee Virginia 2nd Apr. 18, 1792 - Oct. 8, 1792 Anti-Administration George Washington Federalist 
John Langdon New Hampshire 2nd Nov. 5, 1792 – Dec. 4, 
1792; Mar. 1, 1793 – Mar. 
3, 1793
Democratic-Republican George Washington Federalist
John Langdon New Hampshire 3rd Mar. 4, 1793 - Dec. 2, 1793 Democratic-Republican George Washington Federalist 
Ralph Izard South Carolina 3rd May 31, 1794 - Nov. 9, 
1794
Pro-Administration George Washington Federalist 
Henry Tazewell Virginia 3rd Feb. 20, 1795 - Jun. 7, 
1795
Democratic-Republican George Washington Federalist 
Henry Tazewell Virginia 4th Dec. 7, 1795 - Dec. 8, 1795 Democratic-Republican George Washington Federalist 
Samuel Livermore New Hampshire 4th May 6, 1796 - Dec. 4, 1796 Federalist George Washington Federalist 
William Bingham Pennsylvania 4th Feb. 16, 1797 - Mar. 3, 
1797
Federalist George Washington Federalist 
William Bradford Rhode Island 5th Jul. 6, 1797 - Oct. 1797 Federalist George Washington Federalist 
Jacob Read South Carolina 5th Nov. 22, 1797 - Dec. 12, 
1797
Federalist George Washington Federalist 
Theodore Sedgwick Massachusetts 5th Jun. 27, 1798 - Dec. 5, 
1798
Federalist George Washington Federalist 
John Laurence New York 5th Dec. 6, 1798 - Dec. 27, 
1798
Federalist George Washington Federalist 
James Ross Pennsylvania 5th Mar. 1, 1799 - Dec. 1, 1799 Federalist John Adams Federalist
Samuel Livermore New Hampshire 6th Dec. 2, 1799 - Dec. 29, 
1799
Federalist John Adams Federalist
Uriah Tracy Connecticut 6th May 14, 1800 - Nov. 16, 
1800
Federalist John Adams Federalist
John E. Howard Maryland 6th Nov. 21, 1800 - Nov. 27, 
1800
Federalist John Adams Federalist
James Hillhouse Connecticut 6th Feb. 28, 1801 - Mar. 3, 
1801
Federalist John Adams Federalist
Abraham Baldwin Georgia 7th Dec. 7, 1801 - Jan. 14, 
1802;  
Apr. 17, 1802 - Dec. 13, 
1802
Democratic-Republican John Adams Federalist
President Pro 
Tempore
state congress tenure Party President Presidential Party
*  Information regarding the President’s name, home state, Congress and tenure was obtained from the United States Senate website. See President Pro Tempore, United StateS Senate, http://
www.Senate.gov/artandhiStory/hiStory/common/briefing/preSident_pro_tempore.htm#5 (laSt viSited dec. 3, 2011).
**  Information from this column was obtained from Biographical Directory of the United States Congress. See Biographical directory of the United StateS congreSS: 1774 – preSent, http://biogUide.
congreSS.gov/bioSearch/bioSearch.aSp (laSt viSited dec. 10, 2011).
***  Information from this column was obtained from the Library of Congress archives. See Chronological List of Presidents, First Ladies, and Vice Presidents of the United States, Library of 
congreSS, http://loc.gov/rr/print/liSt/057_chron.html (laSt viSited Sept. 16, 2011). 
****  Information from this column was obtained from the University of Virginia’s Miller Center. See American President: A Reference Resource, The miller center, http://millercenter.org/
preSident (laSt viSited Sept. 16, 2011). 
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Stephen R. Bradley Vermont 7th Dec. 14, 1802 - Jan. 18, 
1803;  
Feb. 25, 1803 - Feb. 25, 
1803;  
Mar. 2, 1803 - Oct. 16, 
1803
Democratic-Republican Thomas Jefferson Democratic-Republican
John Brown Kentucky 8th Oct. 17, 1803 - Dec. 6, 
1803;  
Jan. 23, 1804 - Feb. 26, 
1804
Democratic-Republican Thomas Jefferson Democratic-Republican
Jesse Franklin North Carolina 8th Mar. 10, 1804 - Nov. 4, 
1804
Democratic-Republican Thomas Jefferson Democratic-Republican
Joseph Anderson Tennessee 8th Jan. 15, 1805 - Feb. 3, 
1805; 
Feb. 28, 1805 - Mar. 2, 
1805;  
Mar. 2, 1805 - Dec. 1, 1805
Democratic-Republican Thomas Jefferson Democratic-Republican
Samuel Smith Maryland 9th Dec. 2, 1805 - Dec. 15, 
1805;  
Mar. 18, 1806 - Nov. 30, 
1806;  
Mar. 2, 1807 - Oct. 25, 
1807
Democratic-Republican Thomas Jefferson Democratic-Republican
Samuel Smith Maryland 10th Apr. 16, 1808 - Nov. 6, 
1808
Democratic-Republican Thomas Jefferson Democratic-Republican
Stephen R. Bradley Vermont 10th Dec. 28, 1808 - Jan. 8, 
1809
Democratic-Republican Thomas Jefferson Democratic-Republican
John Milledge Georgia 10th Jan. 30, 1809 - Mar. 3, 
1809
Democratic-Republican Thomas Jefferson Democratic-Republican
John Milledge Georgia 11th Mar. 4, 1809 - May 21, 
1809
Democratic-Republican James Madison Democratic-Republican
Andrew Gregg Pennsylvania 11th Jun. 26, 1809 - Dec. 18, 
1809
Democratic-Republican James Madison Democratic-Republican
John Gaillard South Carolina 11th Feb. 28, 1810 - Mar. 2, 
1810; 
Apr. 17, 1810 - Dec. 11, 
1810
Democratic-Republican James Madison Democratic-Republican
John Pope Kentucky 11th Feb. 23, 1811 - Nov. 3, 
1811
Democratic-Republican James Madison Democratic-Republican
William Crawford Georgia 12th Mar. 24, 1812 - Mar. 23, 
1813
Democratic-Republican James Madison Democratic-Republican
Joseph B. Varnum Massachusetts 13th Dec. 6, 1813 - Feb. 3, 1814 Democratic-Republican James Madison Democratic-Republican
John Gaillard South Carolina 13th Apr. 18, 1814 - Nov. 25, 
1814; 
Nov. 25, 1814 - Dec. 3, 
1815
Democratic-Republican James Madison Democratic-Republican
John Gaillard South Carolina 14th Dec. 4, 1815 - Mar. 3, 1817 Democratic-Republican James Madison Democratic-Republican
President Pro 
Tempore
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John Gaillard South Carolina 15th Mar. 4, 1817 - Mar. 4, 
1817; 
Mar. 6, 1817 - Feb. 18, 
1818; 
Mar. 31, 1818 - Jan. 5, 
1819
Democratic-Republican James Monroe Democratic-Republican
James Barbour Virginia 15th Feb. 15, 1819 - Dec. 5, 
1819
Anti-Democratic James Monroe Democratic-Republican
James Barbour Virginia 16th Dec. 6, 1819 - Dec. 26, 
1819
Anti-Democratic James Monroe Democratic-Republican
John Gaillard South Carolina 16th Jan. 25, 1820 - Dec. 2, 
1821
Democratic-Republican James Monroe Democratic-Republican
John Gaillard South Carolina 17th Dec. 3, 1821 - Dec. 27, 
1821; 
Feb. 1, 1822 - Dec. 2, 1822; 
Feb. 19, 1823 - Nov. 30, 
1823
Democratic-Republican James Monroe Democratic-Republican
John Gaillard South Carolina 18th Dec. 1, 1823 - Jan. 20, 
1824; 
May 21, 1824 - Mar. 3, 
1825
Crawford Republican James Monroe Democratic-Republican
John Gaillard South Carolina 19th Mar. 9, 1825 - Dec. 4, 1825 Jacksonian John Quincy Adams Democratic-Republican
Nathaniel Macon North Carolina 19th May 20, 1826 - Dec. 3, 
1826; 
Jan. 2, 1827 - Feb. 13, 
1827; 
Mar. 2, 1827 - Dec. 2, 1827
Jacksonian John Quincy Adams Democratic-Republican
Samuel Smith Maryland 20th May 15, 1828 - Dec. 18, 
1828
Jacksonian John Quincy Adams Democratic-Republican
Samuel Smith Maryland 21st Mar. 13, 1829 - Dec. 10, 
1829; 
May 29, 1830 - Dec. 31, 
1830; 
Mar. 1, 1831 - Dec. 4, 1831
Jacksonian Andrew Jackson Democratic
Samuel Smith Maryland 22nd Dec. 5, 1831 - Dec. 11, 
1831
Jacksonian Andrew Jackson Democratic
Littleton Tazewell Virginia 22nd Jul. 9, 1832 - Jul. 16, 1832 Jackson Republican Andrew Jackson Democratic
Hugh L. White Tennessee 22nd Dec. 3, 1832 - Dec. 1, 1833 Jacksonian Andrew Jackson Democratic
Hugh L. White Tennessee 23rd Dec. 2, 1833 - Dec. 15, 
1833
Jacksonian Andrew Jackson Democratic
George Poindexter Mississippi 23rd Jun. 28, 1834 - Nov. 30, 
1834
Anti-Jacksonian Andrew Jackson Democratic
John Tyler Virginia 23rd Mar. 3, 1835 - Dec. 6, 1835 Anti-Jacksonian Andrew Jackson Democratic
William R. King Alabama 24th Jul. 1, 1836 - Dec. 4, 1836; 
Jan. 28, 1837 - Mar. 3, 
1837
Jacksonian Andrew Jackson Democratic
William R. King Alabama 25th Mar. 7, 1837 - Sep 3, 1837; 
Oct. 13, 1837 - Dec. 3, 
1837; 
Jul. 2, 1838 - Dec. 18, 
1838; 
Feb. 25, 1839 - Dec. 1, 
1839
Democratic Martin Van Buren Democratic
President Pro 
Tempore
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William R. King Alabama 26th Dec. 2, 1839 - Dec. 26, 
1839; 
Jul. 3, 1840 - Dec. 15, 
1840; 
Mar. 3, 1841 - Mar. 3, 1841
Democratic Martin Van Buren Democratic
William R. King Alabama 27th Mar. 4, 1841 - Mar. 4, 1841 Democratic William Henry Harrison/
John Tyler
Whig
Samuel Southard New Jersey 27th Mar. 11, 1841 - May 31, 
1842
Whig William Henry Harrison/
John Tyler
Whig
Willie P. Mangum North Carolina 27th May 31, 1842 - Dec. 3, 
1843
Whig William Henry Harrison/
John Tyler
Whig
Willie P. Mangum North Carolina 28th Dec. 4, 1843 - Mar. 3, 1845 Whig John Tyler Democratic, Whig
Willie P. Mangum North Carolina 29th Mar. 4, 1845 - Mar. 4, 1845 Whig James K. Polk Democratic
Ambrose H. Sevier Arkansas 29th Dec. 27, 1845 - Dec. 27, 
1845
Democratic James K. Polk Democratic
David R. Atchison Missouri 29th Aug. 8, 1846 - Dec. 6, 
1846; 
Jan. 11, 1847 - Jan. 13, 
1847; 
Mar. 3, 1847 - Dec. 5, 1847
Democratic James K. Polk Democratic
David R. Atchison Missouri 30th Feb. 2, 1848 - Feb. 8, 1848; 
Jun. 1, 1848 - Jun. 14, 
1848; 
Jun. 26, 1848 - Jun. 29, 
1848; 
Jul. 29, 1848 - Dec. 4, 
1848; 
Dec. 26, 1848 - Jan. 1, 
1849; 
Mar. 2, 1840 - Mar. 4, 1849
Democratic James K. Polk Democratic
David R. Atchison Missouri 31st Mar. 5, 1849 - Mar. 5, 
1849; 
Mar. 16, 1849 - Dec. 2, 
1849
Democratic Zachary Taylor/Millard 
Fillmore
Whig
William R. King Alabama 31st May 6, 1850 - May 19, 
1850; 
Jul. 11, 1850 - Mar. 3, 1851
Democratic Zachary Taylor/Millard 
Fillmore
Whig
William R. King Alabama 32nd Mar. 4, 1851 - Dec. 20, 
1852
Democratic Millard Fillmore Whig
David R. Atchison Missouri 32nd Dec. 20, 1852 - Mar. 3, 
1853
Democratic Millard Fillmore Whig
David R. Atchison Missouri 33rd Mar. 4, 1853 - Dec. 4, 1854 Democratic Franklin Pierce Democratic
Lewis Cass Michigan 33rd Dec. 4, 1854 - Dec. 4, 1854 Democratic Franklin Pierce Democratic
Jesse D. Bright Indiana 33rd Dec. 5, 1854 - Dec. 2, 1855 Democratic Franklin Pierce Democratic
Jesse D. Bright Indiana 34th Dec. 3, 1855 - Jun. 9, 1856 Democratic Franklin Pierce Democratic
Charles E. Stuart Michigan 34th Jun. 9, 1856 - Jun. 10, 
1856
Democratic Franklin Pierce Democratic
Jesse D. Bright Indiana 34th Jun. 11, 1856 - Jan. 6, 
1857
Democratic Franklin Pierce Democratic
James M. Mason Virginia 34th Jan. 6, 1857 - Mar. 3, 1857 Democratic Franklin Pierce Democratic
President Pro 
Tempore
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Thomas J. Rusk Texas 35th Mar. 14, 1857 - Jul. 29, 
1857
Democratic James Buchanan Democratic
Benjamin Fitzpatrick Alabama 35th Dec. 7, 1857 - Dec. 20, 
1857; 
Mar. 29, 1858 - May 2, 
1858; 
Jun. 14, 1858 - Dec. 5, 
1858; 
Jan. 19, 1859 - Jan. 19, 
1859; 
Jan. 25, 1859 - Feb. 9, 
1859
Democratic James Buchanan Democratic
Benjamin Fitzpatrick Alabama 36th Mar. 9, 1859 - Dec. 4, 
1859; 
Dec. 19, 1859 - Jan. 15, 
1860; 
Feb. 20, 1860 - Feb. 26, 
1860
Democratic James Buchanan Democratic
Jesse D. Bright Indiana 36th Jun. 12, 1860 - Jun. 13, 
1860
Democratic James Buchanan Democratic
Benjamin Fitzpatrick Alabama 36th Jun. 26, 1860 - Dec. 2, 
1860
Democratic James Buchanan Democratic
Solomon Foot Vermont 36th Feb. 16, 1861 - Feb. 17, 
1861
Republican James Buchanan Democratic
Solomon Foot Vermont 37th Mar. 23, 1861 - Jul. 3, 
1861; 
Jul. 18, 1861 - Dec. 1, 
1861; 
Jan. 15, 1862 - Jan. 15, 
1862; 
Mar. 31, 1862 - May 21, 
1862; 
Jun. 19, 1862 - Dec. 12, 
1862; 
Feb. 18, 1863 - Mar. 3, 
1863
Republican Abraham Lincoln Republican
Solomon Foot Vermont 38th Mar. 4, 1863 - Dec. 6, 
1863; 
Dec. 18, 1863 - Dec. 20, 
1863; 
Feb. 23, 1864 - Feb. 23, 
1864; 
Mar. 11, 1864 - Mar. 13, 
1864; 
Apr. 11, 1864 - Apr. 13, 
1864
Republican Abraham Lincoln Republican
Daniel Clark New Hampshire 38th Apr. 26, 1864 - Jan. 4, 
1865; 
Feb. 9, 1865 - Feb. 19, 
1865
Republican Abraham Lincoln Republican
Lafayette S. Foster Connecticut 39th Mar. 7, 1865 - Mar. 2, 1867 Opposition Andrew Johnson Democratic
Benjamin F. Wade Ohio 39th Mar. 2, 1867 - Mar. 3, 1867 Republican Andrew Johnson Democratic
Benjamin F. Wade Ohio 40th Mar. 4, 1867 - Mar. 3, 1869 Republican Andrew Johnson Democratic
President Pro 
Tempore
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Henry B. Anthony Rhode Island 41st Mar. 23, 1869 - Mar. 28, 
1869; 
Apr. 9, 1869 - Dec. 5, 1869; 
May 28, 1870 - Jun. 2, 
1870; 
Jul. 1, 1870 - July 5, 1870; 
Jul. 14, 1870 - Dec. 4, 1870
Republican Ulysses S. Grant Republican
Henry B. Anthony Rhode Island 42nd Mar. 10, 1871 - Mar. 12, 
1871; 
Apr. 17, 1871 - May 9, 
1871; 
May 23, 1871 - Dec. 3, 
1871; 
Dec. 21, 1871 - Jan. 7, 
1872; 
Feb. 23, 1872 - Feb. 25, 
1872; 
Jun. 8, 1872 - Dec. 1, 1872; 
Dec. 4, 1872 - Dec. 8, 
1872; 
Dec. 13, 1872 - Dec. 15, 
1872; 
Dec. 20, 1872 - Jan. 5, 
1873; 
Jan. 24, 1873 - Jan. 24, 
1873
Republican Ulysses S. Grant Republican
Matthew H. Carpenter Wisconsin 43rd Mar. 12, 1873 - Mar. 13, 
1873; 
Mar. 26, 1873 - Nov. 30, 
1873; 
Dec. 11, 1873 - Dec. 6, 
1874; 
Dec. 23, 1874 - Jan. 4, 
1875
Republican Ulysses S. Grant Republican
Henry B. Anthony Rhode Island 43rd Jan. 25, 1875 - Jan. 31, 
1875; 
Feb. 15, 1875 - Feb. 17, 
1875
Republican Ulysses S. Grant Republican
Thomas W. Ferry Michigan 44th Mar. 9, 1875 - Mar. 10, 
1875; 
Mar. 19, 1875 - Dec. 20, 
1875; 
Dec. 20, 1875 - Mar. 4, 
1877
Republican Ulysses S. Grant Republican
Thomas W. Ferry Michigan 45th Mar. 5, 1877 - Mar. 5, 
1877; 
Feb. 26, 1878 - Mar. 3, 
1878; 
Apr. 17, 1878 - Dec. 1, 
1878; 
Mar. 3, 1879 - Mar. 17, 
1879
Republican Rutherford B. Hayes Republican
Allen G. Thurman Ohio 46th Apr. 15, 1879 - Nov. 30, 
1879; 
Apr. 7, 1880 - Apr. 14, 
1880; 
May 6, 1880 - Dec. 5, 1880
Democratic Rutherford B. Hayes Republican
Thomas F. Bayard Delaware 47th Oct. 10, 1881 - Oct. 13, 
1881
Democratic James A. Garfield/Chester 
A. Arthur
Republican
President Pro 
Tempore
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David Davis Illinois 47th Oct. 13, 1881 - Mar. 3, 
1883
Independent James A. Garfield/Chester 
A. Arthur
Republican
George F. Edmunds Vermont 47th Mar. 3, 1883 - Dec. 2, 1883 Republican James A. Garfield/Chester 
A. Arthur
Republican
George F. Edmunds Vermont 48th Dec. 3, 1883 - Jan. 14, 
1884; 
Jan. 14, 1884 - Mar. 3, 
1885
Republican Chester A. Arthur Republican
John Sherman Ohio 49th Dec. 7, 1885 - Feb. 26, 
1887
Republican Grover Cleveland Democratic
John J. Ingalls Kansas 49th Feb. 26, 1887 - Dec. 4, 
1887
Republican Grover Cleveland Democratic
John J. Ingalls Kansas 50th Dec. 5, 1887 - Mar. 3, 1889 Republican Grover Cleveland Democratic
John J. Ingalls Kansas 51st Mar. 7, 1889 - Mar. 17, 
1889; 
Apr. 2, 1889 - Dec. 1, 1889; 
Dec. 5, 1889 - Dec. 10, 
1889; 
Feb. 28, 1890 - Mar. 18, 
1890; 
Apr. 3, 1890 - Mar. 2, 1891
Republican Benjamin Harrison Republican
Charles F. Manderson Nebraska 51st Mar. 2, 1891 - Dec. 6, 1891 Republican Benjamin Harrison Republican
Charles F. Manderson Nebraska 52nd Dec. 7, 1891 - Mar. 3, 1893 Republican Benjamin Harrison Republican
Charles F. Manderson Nebraska 53rd Mar. 4, 1893 - Mar. 22, 
1893
Republican Grover Cleveland Democratic
Isham G. Harris Tennessee 53rd Mar. 22, 1893 - Jan. 7, 
1895
Democratic Grover Cleveland Democratic
Matt W. Ransom North Carolina 53rd Jan. 7, 1895 - Jan. 10, 
1895
Democratic Grover Cleveland Democratic
Isham G. Harris Tennessee 53rd Jan. 10, 1895 - Mar. 3, 
1895
Democratic Grover Cleveland Democratic
William P. Frye Maine 54th Feb. 7, 1896 - Mar. 3, 1897 Republican Grover Cleveland Democratic
William P. Frye Maine 55th Mar. 4, 1897 - Dec. 3, 1899 Republican William McKinley Republican
William P. Frye Maine 56th Dec. 4, 1899 - Mar. 3, 1901 Republican William McKinley Republican
William P. Frye Maine 57th Mar. 7, 1901 - Mar. 4, 1903 Republican Theodore Roosevelt Republican
William P. Frye Maine 58th Mar. 5, 1903 - Mar. 3, 1905 Republican Theodore Roosevelt Republican
William P. Frye Maine 59th Mar. 4, 1905 - Mar. 3, 1907 Republican Theodore Roosevelt Republican
William P. Frye Maine 60th Dec. 5, 1907 - Mar. 3, 1909 Republican Theodore Roosevelt Republican
William P. Frye Maine 61st Mar. 4, 1909 - Apr. 3, 1911 Republican William H. Taft Republican
William P. Frye Maine 62nd Apr. 4, 1911 - Apr. 27, 1911 Republican William H. Taft Republican
Augustus O. Bacon Georgia 62nd Aug. 14, 1911 - Aug. 14, 
1911
Democratic William H. Taft Republican
Charles Curtis Kansas 62nd Dec. 4, 1911 - Dec. 12, 
1911
Republican William H. Taft Republican
Augustus O. Bacon Georgia 62nd Jan. 15, 1912 - Jan. 17, 
1912
Democratic William H. Taft Republican
Jacob H. Gallinger New Hampshire 62nd Feb. 12, 1912 - Feb. 14, 
1912
Republican William H. Taft Republican
President Pro 
Tempore
state congress tenure Party President Presidential Party
Augustus O. Bacon Georgia 62nd Mar. 11, 1912 - Mar. 12, 
1912
Democratic William H. Taft Republican
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Frank B. Brandegee Connecticut 62nd Mar. 25, 1912 - Mar. 26, 
1912
Republican William H. Taft Republican
Augustus O. Bacon Georgia 62nd Apr. 8, 1912 - Apr. 8, 1912 Democratic William H. Taft Republican
Jacob H. Gallinger New Hampshire 62nd Apr. 26, 1912 - Apr. 27, 
1912; 
May 7, 1912 - May 7, 1912
Republican William H. Taft Republican
Augustus O. Bacon Georgia 62nd May 10, 1912 - May 10, 
1912
Democratic William H. Taft Republican
Henry Cabot Lodge Massachusetts 62nd May 25, 1912 - May 25, 
1912
Republican William H. Taft Republican
Augustus O. Bacon Georgia 62nd May 30, 1912 - Jun. 3, 
1912; 
Jun. 13, 1912 - Jul. 5, 1912
Democratic William H. Taft Republican
Jacob H. Gallinger New Hampshire 62nd Jul. 6, 1912 - Jul. 31, 1912 Republican William H. Taft Republican
Augustus O. Bacon Georgia 62nd Aug. 1, 1912 - Aug. 10, 
1912
Democratic William H. Taft Republican
Jacob H. Gallinger New Hampshire 62nd Aug. 12, 1912 - Aug. 26, 
1912
Republican William H. Taft Republican
Augustus O. Bacon Georgia 62nd Aug. 27, 1912 - Dec. 15, 
1912
Democratic William H. Taft Republican
Jacob H. Gallinger New Hampshire 62nd Dec. 16, 1912 - Jan. 4, 
1913
Republican William H. Taft Republican
Augustus O. Bacon Georgia 62nd Jan. 5, 1913 - Jan. 18, 
1913
Democratic William H. Taft Republican
Jacob H. Gallinger New Hampshire 62nd Jan. 19, 1913 - Feb. 1, 
1913
Republican William H. Taft Republican
Augustus O. Bacon Georgia 62nd Feb. 2, 1913 - Feb. 15, 
1913
Democratic William H. Taft Republican
Jacob H. Gallinger New Hampshire 62nd Feb. 16, 1913 - Mar. 3, 
1913
Republican William H. Taft Republican
James P. Clarke Arkansas 63rd Mar. 13, 1913 - Mar. 3, 
1915
Democratic Woodrow Wilson Democratic
James P. Clarke Arkansas 64th Dec. 6, 1915 - Oct. 1, 1916 Democratic Woodrow Wilson Democratic
Willard Saulsbury Delaware 64th Dec. 14, 1916 - Mar. 4, 
1917
Democratic Woodrow Wilson Democratic
Willard Saulsbury Delaware 65th Mar. 5, 1917 - Mar. 3, 1919 Democratic Woodrow Wilson Democratic
Albert B. Cummings Iowa 66th May 19, 1919 - Mar. 3, 
1921
Republican Woodrow Wilson Democratic
Albert B. Cummings Iowa 67th Mar. 7, 1921 - Dec. 2, 1923 Republican Warren G. Harding Republican
Albert B. Cummings Iowa 68th Dec. 3, 1923 - Mar. 3, 1925 Republican Calvin Coolidge Republican
Albert B. Cummings Iowa 69th Mar. 4, 1925 - Mar. 6, 1925 Republican Calvin Coolidge Republican
George H. Moses New Hampshire 69th Mar. 6, 1925 - Mar. 4, 1927 Republican Calvin Coolidge Republican
George H. Moses New Hampshire 70th Dec. 15, 1927 - Mar. 3, 
1929
Republican Calvin Coolidge Republican
George H. Moses New Hampshire 71st Mar. 4, 1929 - Dec. 6, 1931 Republican Herbert Hoover Republican
President Pro 
Tempore
state congress tenure Party President Presidential Party
George H. Moses New Hampshire 72nd Dec. 7, 1931 - Mar. 3, 1933 Republican Herbert Hoover Republican
Key Pittman Nevada 73rd Mar. 9, 1933 - Jan. 2, 1935 Democratic Franklin D. Roosevelt Democratic
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Key Pittman Nevada 74th Jan. 7, 1935 - Jan. 4, 1937 Democratic Franklin D. Roosevelt Democratic
Key Pittman Nevada 75th Jan. 5, 1937 - Jan. 2, 1939 Democratic Franklin D. Roosevelt Democratic
Key Pittman Nevada 76th Jan. 3, 1939 - Nov. 10, 
1940
Democratic Franklin D. Roosevelt Democratic
William H. King Utah 76th Nov. 19, 1940 - Jan. 3, 
1941
Democratic Franklin D. Roosevelt Democratic
Pat Harrison Mississippi 77th Jan. 5, 1937 - Jan. 2, 1939 Democratic Franklin D. Roosevelt Democratic
Carter Glass Virginia 77th Jul. 10, 1941 - Jan. 5, 1943 Democratic Franklin D. Roosevelt Democratic
Carter Glass Virginia 78th Jan. 14, 1943 - Jan. 2, 
1945
Democratic Franklin D. Roosevelt Democratic
Kenneth McKellar Tennessee 79th Democratic Franklin D. Roosevelt/Harry 
Truman
Democratic
Arthur H. Vandenberg Michigan 80th Jan. 4, 1947 - Jan. 2, 1949 Republican Harry Truman Democratic
Kenneth McKellar Tennessee 81st Jan. 3, 1949 - Jan. 2, 1951 Democratic Harry Truman Democratic
Kenneth McKellar Tennessee 82nd Jan. 3, 1951 - Jan. 2, 1953 Democratic Harry Truman Democratic
Styles Bridges New Hampshire 83rd Jan. 3, 1953 - Jan. 4, 1955 Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower Republican
Walter F. George Georgia 84th Jan. 5, 1955 - Jan. 2, 1957 Democratic Dwight D. Eisenhower Republican
Carl T. Hayden Arizona 85th Jan. 3, 1957 - Jan. 6, 1959 Democratic Dwight D. Eisenhower Republican
Carl T. Hayden Arizona 86th Jan. 7, 1959 - Jan. 2, 1961 Democratic Dwight D. Eisenhower Republican
Carl T. Hayden Arizona 87th Jan. 3, 1961 - Jan. 8, 1963 Democratic John F. Kennedy Democratic
Carl T. Hayden Arizona 88th Jan. 9, 1963 - Jan. 3, 1965 Democratic John F. Kennedy/Lyndon B. 
Johnson
Democratic
Carl T. Hayden Arizona 89th Jan. 4, 1965 - Jan. 9, 1967 Democratic Lyndon B. Johnson Democratic
Carl T. Hayden Arizona 90th Jan. 10, 1967 - Jan. 2, 
1969
Democratic Lyndon B. Johnson Democratic
Richard B. Russell Georgia 91st Jan. 3, 1969 - Jan. 20, 
1971
Democratic Richard Nixon Republican
Richard B. Russell Georgia 92nd Jan. 21, 1971 - Jan. 21, 
1971
Democratic Richard Nixon Republican
Allen J. Ellender Louisiana 92nd Jan. 22, 1971 - Jul. 27, 
1972
Democratic Richard Nixon Republican
James O. Eastland Mississippi 92nd Jul. 28, 1972 - Jan. 2, 1973 Democratic Richard Nixon Republican
James O. Eastland Mississippi 93rd Jan. 3, 1973 - Jan. 13, 
1975
Democratic Richard Nixon/Gerald Ford Republican
James O. Eastland Mississippi 94th Jan. 14, 1975 - Jan. 3, 
1977
Democratic Gerald Ford Republican
James O. Eastland Mississippi 95th Jan. 4, 1977 - Dec. 27, 
1978
Democratic Jimmy Carter Democratic
Warren G. Magnuson Washington 96th Jan. 15, 1979 - Dec. 4, 
1980
Democratic Jimmy Carter Democratic
Milton R. Young North Dakota 96th Dec. 5, 1980 - Dec. 5, 1980 Republican Jimmy Carter Democratic
Warren G. Magnuson Washington 96th Dec. 6, 1980 - Jan. 4, 1981 Democratic Jimmy Carter Democratic
President Pro 
Tempore
state congress tenure Party President Presidential Party
Strom Thurmond South Carolina 97th Jan. 5, 1981 - Jan. 2, 1983 Republican Ronald Reagan Republican
Strom Thurmond South Carolina 98th Jan. 3, 1983 - Jan. 2, 1985 Republican Ronald Reagan Republican
Strom Thurmond South Carolina 99th Jan. 3, 1985 - Jan. 5, 1987 Republican Ronald Reagan Republican
John C. Stennis Mississippi 100th Jan. 6, 1987 - Jan. 2, 1989 Democratic Ronald Reagan Republican
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Robert C. Byrd West Virginia 101st Jan. 3, 1989 - Jan. 2, 1991 Democratic George H.W. Bush Republican
Robert C. Byrd West Virginia 102nd Jan. 3, 1991 - Jan. 4, 1993 Democratic George H.W. Bush Republican
Robert C. Byrd West Virginia 103rd Jan. 5, 1993 - Jan. 3, 1995 Democratic Bill Clinton Democratic
Strom Thurmond South Carolina 104th Jan. 4, 1995 - Jan. 6, 1997 Republican Bill Clinton Democratic
Strom Thurmond South Carolina 105th Jan. 7, 1997 - Jan. 6, 1999 Republican Bill Clinton Democratic
Strom Thurmond South Carolina 106th Jan. 7, 1999 - Jan. 3, 2001 Republican Bill Clinton Democratic
Robert C. Byrd West Virginia 107th Jan. 3, 2001 - Jan. 20, 
2001
Democratic George W. Bush Republican
Strom Thurmond South Carolina 107th Jan. 20, 2001 - Jun. 6, 
2001
Republican George W. Bush Republican
Robert C. Byrd West Virginia 107th Jun. 6, 2001 - Jan. 3, 2003 Democratic George W. Bush Republican
Theodore (Ted) Stevens Alaska 108th Jan. 3, 2003 - Jan. 3, 2005 Republican George W. Bush Republican
Theodore (Ted) Stevens Alaska 109th Jan. 4, 2005 - Jan. 4, 2007 Republican George W. Bush Republican
Robert C. Byrd West Virginia 110th Jan. 4, 2007 - Jan. 3, 2009 Democratic George W. Bush Republican
Robert C. Byrd West Virginia 111th Jan. 3, 2009-Jun. 28, 2010 Democratic Barack Obama Democratic
Daniel K. Inouye Hawaii 111th Jun. 28, 2010-Jan. 5, 2011 Democratic Barack Obama Democratic
Daniel K. Inouye Hawaii 112th Jan. 5, 2011- Democratic Barack Obama Democratic
3. List of Presidents Pro Tempore of the Senate (continued)
Report of the Fordham University School of Law Clinic on Presidential Succession 97
  
ADVANCE DRAFT- Cite as: 81 Fordham L. Rev. (forthcoming Oct. 2012)
4. Pre-Inauguration Day Contingencies
time Period contingency constitutional/statutory/Party rule 
governing contingency
Primary Season through  
National Party Conventions
Death of a Presidential Candidate h.r. rEP. no. 72-345 (1932): “A constitutional amendment is not necessary 
to provide for the case of the death of a party nominee before the November 
elections. Presidential electors, and not the President, are chosen at the 
November election. The electors, under the present Constitution, would be free to 
choose a President, notwithstanding the death of a party nominee.”
National Party Conventions through  
November General Election
Death of a Presidential Candidate
Death of a Vice-Presidential Candidate
Death of both Presidential and Vice-Presidential 
Candidates
Republican Party 
republican nat’l comm., the rules of the republican Party (2008), rule 
no. 9: “(a) The Republican National Committee is hereby authorized and 
empowered to fill any and all vacancies which may occur by reason of death, 
declination, or otherwise of the Republican candidate for President of the United 
States or the Republican candidate for Vice President of the United States, as 
nominated by the national convention, or the Republican National Committee 
may reconvene the national convention for the purpose of filling any such 
vacancies. (b) In voting under this rule, the Republican National Committee 
members representing any state shall be entitled to cast the same number of 
votes as said state was entitled to cast at the national convention. (c) In the 
event that the members of the Republican National Committee from any state 
shall not be in agreement in the casting of votes hereunder, the votes of such 
state shall be divided equally, including fractional votes, among the members of 
the Republican National Committee present or voting by proxy. (d) No candidate 
shall be chosen to fill any such vacancy except upon receiving a majority of the 
votes entitled to be cast in the election.”
National Party Conventions through 
November General Election
Death of a Presidential Candidate
Death of a Vice-Presidential Candidate
Death of both Presidential and 
Vice-Presidential Candidates
Democratic Party
democratic nat’l comm., the charter & bylaws of the democratic Party of 
the united states (2010) article three, section 1: “The Democratic National 
Committee shall have general responsibility for the affairs of the Democratic 
Party between National Conventions, subject to the provisions of this Charter 
and to the resolutions or other actions of the National Convention. This 
responsibility shall include: . . . (c) filling vacancies in the nominations for the 
office of President and Vice President;”
democratic nat’l comm., call for the 2012 democratic national convention 
(2011) section Viii(g): “Filling a Vacancy on the National Ticket: In the event 
of the death, resignation or disability of a nominee of the Party for President 
or Vice President after the adjournment of the National Convention, the 
National Chairperson of the Democratic National Committee shall confer with 
the Democratic leadership of the United States Congress and the Democratic 
Governors Association and shall report to the Democratic National Committee, 
which is authorized to fill the vacancy or vacancies.”
Post-November General Election through the 
Meeting of the  Electoral College on the First 
Monday After the Second Wednesday in December
Death of a Presidential Candidate
Death of a Vice-Presidential Candidate
Death of both Presidential and Vice-Presidential 
Candidates
h.r. rEP. no. 72-345 (1932): “Inasmuch as the electors would be free to choose 
a President, a constitutional amendment is not necessary to provide for the 
case of the death of a party nominee after the November elections and before 
the electors vote. The problem in such a case would be a political one, for if 
the political party did not in some manner designate a person, the electors 
representing that political party would probably so scatter their votes that the 
election would be thrown into the House.”
Post-November General Election through the 
Meeting of the  Electoral College on the First 
Monday After the Second Wednesday in December
Death of a Presidential Candidate
Death of a Vice-Presidential Candidate
Death of both Presidential and Vice-Presidential 
Candidates
On Presidential Candidate and President-Elect Death, Disability, or 
Resignation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d cong. (1994) (statement of Prof. lawrence 
d. longley): “Theoretically, the electors would be free to vote for anyone they 
pleased. But the national party rules for the filling of vacancies by the national 
committees would still be in effect, and the electors would probably respect the 
decision of their national committee on a new nominee. Again, the elevation of 
the vice presidential candidate to the presidential slot would be likely but not 
certain.”
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time Period contingency constitutional/statutory/Party rule 
governing contingency
Post-Meeting of the Electoral College on the First 
Monday After the Second Wednesday in December 
through the January 6th Counting of Electoral 
College Votes in Congress
Death of the President-elect
(Presidential Candidate that Garnered Majority 
of Electoral Votes )1
On Presidential Candidate and President-Elect Death, Disability, or 
Resignation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. (1994) (statement of Prof. Lawrence D. 
Longley): “There would likely be a debate about whether the votes cast for a 
dead man could be counted, but most constitutional experts believe that the 
language of the 12th Amendment gives Congress no choice but to count all 
the electoral votes cast, providing the ‘person’ voted for was alive when the 
ballots were cast. (The 1873 precedent, in which Congress refused to count the 
Greeley votes, would not be binding, because Greeley was already dead when the 
electors cast their votes.)”
Post-Meeting of the Electoral College on the First 
Monday After the Second Wednesday in December 
through the January 6th Counting of Electoral 
College Votes in Congress
Death of both the President-elect and the Vice 
President-elect and Resulting Failure to Qualify 
(Presidential Candidate and Vice-Presidential 
Candidate that Garnered Majority of Electoral 
Votes)
According to the House Committee report for the 20th Amendment, Congress 
would have “no discretion” in the matter and “would declare that the deceased 
candidate had received a majority of the votes.”2
“The operative law would then be section 3 of the 20th Amendment, which 
states: ‘If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, 
the President-elect shall have died, the Vice President-elect shall become 
President.’  And when the Vice President-elect took office as President, he would 
be authorized under the 25th Amendment to nominate a new Vice President.  
Similarly, if the Vice President-elect should die before the count in Congress, 
he would still be declared the winner, and the new President would be able to 
nominate a replacement.”
h.r. rEP. no. 72-345 (1932): “There is no immediate emergency presented if 
a candidate for Vice President, or if the Vice President elect, should die, if the 
President elect qualifies upon the day fixed for the beginning of his term.”
h.r. rEP. no. 72-345 (1932): “Section 3 of the [20th A]mendment . . . gives to 
Congress the power to provide for the case.” Section 3 of the 20th Amendment 
states in relevant part: “the Congress may by law provide for the case wherein 
neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualified, 
declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to 
act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a President or 
Vice President shall have qualified.”3
4. Pre-Inauguration Day Contingencies (continued)
1  H.R. REP. NO. 72-345 (1932) (“It will be noted that the committee uses the term ‘President elect’ in its generally accepted sense, as meaning the person who has received the majority of 
the electoral votes, or the person who has been chosen by the House of Representatives in the event that the election is thrown into the House. It is immaterial whether or not the votes 
have been counted, for the person becomes the President elect as soon as the votes are cast.”).
 2 H.R. REP. NO. 72-345 (1932).
 3 U.S. Const. Amend. XX, § 3.
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time Period contingency constitutional/statutory/Party rule 
governing contingency
Post-Meeting of the Electoral College on the First 
Monday After the Second Wednesday in December 
through the January 6th Counting of Electoral 
College Votes in Congress
Death of one or more of the three highest vote 
getters where the election for President is thrown 
into the House
Death of one or more of the two highest vote 
getters where the election for Vice President is 
thrown into the Senate
h.r. rEP. no. 72-345 (1932): “If the election of the President is thrown into the 
House, the House, under the twelfth amendment, must proceed immediately 
to choose a President ‘from the persons having the highest numbers not 
exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President.’ If one of these 
persons had died, the political party which he represents would be practically 
disenfranchised. It seems certain that votes cast for a [man who was dead 
prior to the casting of the Electoral College votes] could not legally be counted 
. . . . Section 4 of the [20th A]mendment . . . specifically gives Congress the 
power to provide for this case. . . . Under some circumstances, for example, it 
might be advisable to provide for a substitution of a name for the name of the 
deceased candidate and to permit the election by the House to proceed as it 
otherwise would; under other circumstances it might be advisable to provide for 
a reconvening of the Electoral College; again it might be necessary to provide 
that a designated officer shall act temporarily as President until a President can 
be chosen in the manner prescribed by the law; and other methods might be 
selected by the Congress.”
h.r. rEP. no. 72-345 (1932): “If the election of the Vice President is thrown into 
the Senate, the Senate, under the twelfth amendment, must proceed to choose 
the Vice President ‘from the two highest numbers on the list.’ If one of these 
persons has died, a situation is presented similar to that discussed . . . in the 
case of the death of one of the three highest where the election is thrown into 
the House. Section 4 of the [20th A]mendment . . . also gives Congress power to 
provide for this case.”
Post-January 6th Counting of Electoral College 
Votes in Congress through January 20th 
Inauguration Day
Death of the President-elect
Death of the Vice President-elect
Death of both the President-elect and Vice 
President-elect
On Presidential Candidate and President-Elect Death, Disability, or 
Resignation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d cong. (1994) (statement of Prof. lawrence d. 
longley): A contingency “may be caused by the death of either the President- 
or Vice President-elect between the day the votes are counted in Congress 
and Inauguration Day. If the President-elect died, . . . [Section 3] of the 20th 
Amendment would elevate the Vice President-elect to the presidency. In the 
event of the death of the Vice President-elect, the 25th Amendment would 
similarly authorize the new President to nominate a Vice President, subject 
to the approval of Congress . . . . In the event that neither a President nor a 
Vice President qualified on Inauguration Day, January 20, then the Automatic 
Succession Act of 1947 would go into effect, placing the Speaker of the House, 
the President Pro-Tempore of the Senate, and then the various Cabinet officials 
in line for the presidency.”
4. Pre-Inauguration Day Contingencies (continued)
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5. State Statutes Binding Electors1  
state statute relevant Provision 
Alabama ala. code 1975 § 17-14-31(c) (LexisNexis 
2011)
“Each certificate of nomination and nominating petition must be accompanied by a list of the names and addresses of 
persons, who shall be qualified voters of this state, equal in number to the number of presidential electors to be chosen. 
Each person so listed shall execute the following statement which shall be attached to the certificate or petition when 
the same is filed with the Secretary of State: “I do hereby consent and do hereby agree to serve as elector for President 
and Vice President of the United States, if elected to that position, and do hereby agree that, if so elected, I shall cast my 
ballot as such elector for _______ for President and _______ for Vice President of the United States” (inserting in the 
blank spaces the respective names of the persons named as nominees for the respective offices in the certificate to which 
this statement is attached).”
Alaska alaSka Stat. § 15.30.040 (LexisNexis 
2012)
“The party shall require from each candidate for elector a pledge that as an elector the person will vote for the candidates 
nominated by the party of which the person is a candidate.”
California cal. elec. code § 6906 (LexisNexis 2012) “ The electors, when convened, if both candidates are alive, shall vote by ballot for that person for President and that 
person for Vice President of the United States, who are, respectively, the candidates of the political party which they 
represent, one of whom, at least, is not an inhabitant of this state.”
Colorado colo. rev. Stat. ann. § 1-4-304(5) 
(LexisNexis 2011)
“Each presidential elector shall vote for the presidential candidate and, by separate ballot, vice-presidential candidate 
who received the highest number of votes at the preceding general election in this state.”
Connecticut conn. gen. Stat. ann. § 9-176 (LexisNexis 
2012)
“Each such elector shall cast his ballots for the candidates under whose names he ran on the official election ballot . . . .”
District of 
Columbia
d.c. code ann. § 1-1001.08(g)(2) 
(LexisNexis 2012)
“Each person elected as elector of President and Vice President shall, in the presence of the Board, take an oath or 
solemnly affirm that he or she will vote for the candidates of the party he or she has been nominated to represent, and it 
shall be his or her duty to vote in such manner in the electoral college.”
Florida fla. Stat. ann. § 103.021(1) (LexisNexis 
2012)
“Each such elector shall be a qualified elector of the party he or she represents who has taken an oath that he or she will 
vote for the candidates of the party that he or she is nominated to represent.”
Hawaii haw. rev. Stat. § 14-28 (LexisNexis 2011) “ The electors, when convened, if both candidates are alive, shall vote by ballot for that person for president and that 
person for vice president of the United States, who are, respectively, the candidates of the political party or group which 
they represent, one of whom, at least, is not an inhabitant of this State.”
Maine me. rev. Stat. ann. tit. 21-A, § 805(2) 
(LexisNexis 2011)
“The presidential electors at large shall cast their ballots for the presidential and vice-presidential candidates who 
received the largest number of votes in the State. The presidential electors of each congressional district shall cast their 
ballots for the presidential and vice-presidential candidates who received the largest number of votes in each respective 
congressional district.”
Maryland md. code ann., elec. law § 8-505(c) 
(LexisNexis 2012)
“After taking the oath prescribed by Article I, § 9 of the Maryland Constitution before the Clerk of the Court of Appeals or, 
in the Clerk’s absence, before one of the Clerk’s deputies, the presidential electors shall cast their votes for the candidates 
for President and Vice President who received a plurality of the votes cast in the State of Maryland.”
Massachusetts maSS. gen. lawS. ann. ch. 53, § 8 
(LexisNexis 2011)
“Such surnames and a list of the persons nominated for presidential electors, together with an acceptance in writing 
signed by each candidate for presidential elector on a form to be provided by the state secretary, shall be filed by the state 
chairmen of the respective political parties not later than the second Tuesday of September. Said acceptance form shall 
include a pledge by the presidential elector to vote for the candidate named in the filing.”
Michigan mich. comp. lawS ann. § 168.47 (LexisNexis 
2012)
“At any time before receipt of the certificate of the governor or within 48 hours thereafter, an elector may resign by 
submitting his written and verified resignation to the governor. Failure to so resign signifies consent to serve and to cast 
his vote for the candidates for president and vice-president appearing on the Michigan ballot of the political party which 
nominated him. Refusal or failure to vote for the candidates for president and vice-president appearing on the Michigan 
ballot of the political party which nominated the elector constitutes a resignation from the office of elector, his  vote shall 
not be recorded and the remaining electors shall forthwith fill the vacancy.”
Mississippi Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-785(3) 
(LexisNexis 2012)
“Each person so listed shall execute the following statement which shall be attached to the certificate or petition when it 
is filed with the State Board of Election Commissioners: ‘I do hereby consent and do hereby agree to serve as elector  
for                                             President and                                             Vice President of the United States, if elected to 
that position, and do hereby agree that, if so elected, I shall cast my ballot as such for President and for Vice President 
of the United States’ (inserting in said blank spaces the respective names of the persons named as nominees for said 
respective offices in the certificate to which this statement is attached).”
1  Statutes in twenty-six states and the District of Columbia bind presidential electors to cast Electoral College Votes for the nominees of the political party which nominated them or the 
winner of the statewide popular vote.  “Party pledge” statutes, so called because eight jurisdictions proscribe a pledge to be recited by the elector, bind the elector to cast his electoral 
vote for his respective party’s presidential and vice- presidential nominees.  Nineteen jurisdictions have adopted statutes instructing electors to cast their electoral votes for candidates 
who garnered the most votes in the state’s popular election.  Of the combined twenty-seven jurisdictions that regulate the vote of presidential electors, a mere six states provide penalties 
for violating the statute.  Only one jurisdiction, Wisconsin, releases electors from their statutory obligation in the event the candidate to whom they are bound is deceased at the time of 
the meeting of the Electoral College. 
Report of the Fordham University School of Law Clinic on Presidential Succession 101
  
ADVANCE DRAFT- Cite as: 81 Fordham L. Rev. (forthcoming Oct. 2012)
state statute relevant Provision 
Montana Mont. Code Ann. § 13-25-304 
(LexisNexis 2011)
 
Mont. Code Ann. § 13-25-307(3) 
(LexisNexis 2011)
“Each elector nominated by a political party under 13-25-101 or by an unaffiliated presidential candidate shall execute 
the following pledge: “If selected for the position of elector, I agree to serve and to mark my ballots for president and vice 
president for the nominees of the political party that nominated me.”
“Except as otherwise provided by law, the secretary of state may not accept and may not count either an elector’s 
presidential or vice presidential ballot if the elector has not marked both ballots or has marked a ballot in violation of the 
elector’s pledge.”
Nebraska Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-714  
(LexisNexis 2012)
“Each at-large presidential elector shall cast his or her ballot for the presidential and vice-presidential candidates 
who received the highest number of votes in the state. Each congressional district presidential elector shall cast his or 
her ballot for the presidential and vice-presidential candidates who received the highest number of votes in his or her 
congressional district.”
Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. § 298.050 (LexisNexis 
2011)
“The presidential electors shall vote only for the nominees for President and Vice President of the party or the independent 
candidates that prevailed in this State in the preceding general election.
New Mexico N.M. Stat. Ann. § 1-15-9(A)-(B) 
(LexisNexis 2012)
“A. All presidential electors shall cast their ballots in the electoral college for the candidates of the political party which 
nominated them as presidential electors. B. Any presidential elector who casts his ballot in violation of the provisions 
contained in Subsection A of this section is guilty of a fourth degree felony.”
North Carolina N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 163-212 
(LexisNexis 2012)
“Any presidential elector having previously signified his consent to serve as such, who fails to attend and vote for the 
candidate of the political party which nominated such elector, for President and Vice-President of the United States at the 
time and place directed in G.S. 163-210 (except in case of sickness or other unavoidable accident) shall forfeit and pay to 
the State five hundred dollars ($500.00), to be recovered by the Attorney General in the Superior Court of Wake County. In 
addition to such forfeiture, refusal or failure to vote for the candidates of the political party which nominated such elector 
shall constitute a resignation from the office of elector, his vote shall not be recorded, and the remaining electors shall 
forthwith fill such vacancy as hereinbefore provided.”
Ohio Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3505.40 
(LexisNexis 2012)
“A presidential elector elected at a general election or appointed pursuant to section 3505.39 of the Revised Code shall, 
when discharging the duties enjoined upon him by the constitution or laws of the United States, cast his electoral vote 
for the nominees for president and vice-president of the political party which certified him to the secretary of state as a 
presidential elector pursuant to law.”
Oklahoma Okla. Stat. tit. 26, § 10-102  
(LexisNexis 2012)
 
 
Okla. Stat. tit. 26, § 10-109  
(LexisNexis 2012)
“Every party nominee for Presidential Elector shall subscribe to an oath, stating that said nominee, if elected, will cast 
his ballot for the persons nominated for the offices of President and Vice President by the national convention of his party. 
. . .  Failure of any party nominee to take and file said oath by said date shall automatically vacate his nomination and a 
substitute nominee shall be selected by the state central committee of the appropriate political party.”
“Any Presidential Elector who violates his oath as a Presidential Elector shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon 
conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not more than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00).”
Oregon Or. Rev. Stat. § 248.355(2)  
(LexisNexis 2009)
“A candidate for elector when selected shall sign a pledge that, if elected, the candidate will vote in the electoral college 
for the candidates of the party for President and Vice President. The Secretary of State shall prescribe the form of the 
pledge.”
South Carolina S.C. Code Ann. § 7-19-80  
(LexisNexis 2011)
“Each candidate for presidential and vice-presidential elector shall declare which candidate for president and vice-
president he will vote for if elected. Those elected shall vote for the president and vice-president candidates for whom 
they declared. Any person selected to fill a vacancy in the electoral college shall vote for the candidates the elector whose 
place he is taking had declared for. The declaration shall be made to the Secretary of State on such form as he may 
require not later than sixty days prior to the general election for electors. No candidate for president and vice-president 
elector shall have his name placed on the ballot who fails to make such declaration by the prescribed time. Any elector 
who votes contrary to the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of violating the election laws of this State and 
upon conviction shall be punished according to law. Any registered elector shall have the right to institute proper action to 
require compliance with the provisions of this section. The Attorney General shall institute criminal action for any violation 
of the provision of this section. Provided, the executive committee of the party from which an elector of the electoral 
college was elected may relieve the elector from the obligation to vote for a specific candidate when, in its judgment, 
circumstances shall have arisen which, in the opinion of the committee, it would not be in the best interest of the State for 
the elector to cast his ballot for such a candidate.”
Vermont vt. Stat. ann. tit. 17, § 2732  
(LexisNexis 2012)
“The electors must vote for the candidates for president and vice-president who received the greatest number of votes at 
the general election.”
Virginia va. code ann. § 24.2-203  
(LexisNexis 2012)
“Electors selected by the state convention of any political party as defined in § 24.2-101 shall be required to vote for 
the nominees of the national convention to which the state convention elects delegates. Electors named in any petition 
of qualified voters as provided in § 24.2-543 shall be required to vote for the persons named for President and for Vice 
President in the petition.”
Washington waSh. rev. code ann. § 29A.56.320 
(LexisNexis 2012)
waSh. rev. code ann. § 29A.56.340 
(LexisNexis 2012)
“Each presidential elector shall execute and file with the secretary of state a pledge that, as an elector, he or she will vote 
for the candidates nominated by that party.”
“ Any elector who votes for a person or persons not nominated by the party of which he or she is an elector is subject to a 
civil penalty of up to one thousand dollars.”
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state statute relevant Provision 
Wisconsin wiS. Stat. ann. § 7.75(2) (LexisNexis 2011) “The presidential electors, when convened, shall vote by ballot for that person for president and that person for vice 
president who are, respectively, the candidates of the political party which nominated them under s. 8.18, the candidates 
whose names appeared on the nomination papers filed under s. 8.20, or the candidate or candidates who filed their 
names under s. 8.185(2), except that at least one of the persons for whom the electors vote may not be an inhabitant of 
this state. A presidential elector is not required to vote for a candidate who is deceased at the time of the meeting.”
Wyoming wyo. Stat. ann. § 22-19-108 (LexisNexis 
2012)
“All Wyoming electors shall vote for the candidates for the office of president and vice-president receiving the highest 
number of votes in the Wyoming general election.”
  
  
  
  
5. State Statutes Binding Electors1 (continued)
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g. studEnt ProfilEs
Carina Bergal
Carina Bergal graduated from Fordham University School 
of Law in 2011 and has a bachelor of arts in philosophy and 
legal studies from Brandeis University.  During her time as an 
undergraduate, she worked in the Civil Rights Division of the 
Massachusetts Attorney General’s office.  Upon graduation, she 
worked as a litigation legal assistant for Sullivan & Cromwell 
LLP.  During law school, Carina served as a legal intern in the 
Office of General Counsel of the Office of Administration 
in the Executive Office of the President of the United States, 
where she worked closely with White House Counsel and OA 
General Counsels on diverse government legal issues.  Carina 
served as the Managing Editor of the Fordham Environmental 
Law Review and published a Note on the proper classification 
of the Mexican drug war as a non-international armed conflict. 
(See Carina Bergal, Note, The Mexican Drug War: The Case 
for a Non-International Armed Conflict Classification, 34 
Fordham Int’l L.J. 1042 (2011).)  Most recently, an abridged 
essay of Carina’s Note was featured in the National Security 
Law Report, a publication of the American Bar Association’s 
Standing Committee on Law and National Security. (See 
Carina Bergal, The Mexican Drug War: The Case for a Non-
International Armed Conflict Classification, 32(3) ABA Nat’l 
Security Law Rep. 15 (2012)).
Rosana Escobar Brown
Rosana Escobar Brown graduated from Fordham University 
School of Law in 2012 and visited The George Washington 
University School of Law for the 2011-2012 academic year. 
She entered law school after obtaining a bachelor of arts magna 
cum laude in political science from American University, where 
she concentrated her studies in lobbying and constitutional 
law. Rosana’s experience includes a long career in management 
where, as a licensed optician she operated several high-volume 
optical retail locations before deciding to pursue a college 
degree and later, a second career in the law.  While at American 
University, Rosana was an executive board member for the pre-
law chapter of Phi Alpha Delta, Law Fraternity International, 
and she studied abroad in Dublin, Ireland, working with Fine 
Gael, the former minority political party in Irish Parliament 
which gained a majority in the 2011 elections.  After her first 
year in law school, Rosana interned in prosecution with the 
Special Victims Unit at the Albany County District Attorney’s 
Office. Later Rosana gained exposure to national security law 
and information privacy as an intern with National Security 
Counselors, a non-profit group based in Arlington, Virginia. 
She also worked as a law clerk for solo practitioner Mirriam 
Seddiq in Maryland criminal defense and immigration law, and 
for the last year has been employed with Price Benowitz, LLP, 
a Washington, D.C. based criminal defense and personal injury 
law firm who maintains attorneys throughout the tri-state area.
Christopher Fell
Christopher Fell graduated from Fordham University School 
of Law in 2012.  Christopher grew up in Brooklyn, New 
York.  While studying history at Boston College, he worked 
for several political campaigns and interned at the 2004 
Republican National Convention.  After college, he joined 
Teach for America and taught in the South Bronx.  In the 
summer of 2011 Chris interned at the Manhattan District 
Attorney’s office.   
Francisco Pardo
Francisco A. Pardo graduated from Fordham University 
School of Law in 2012.  Francisco has a bachelor of arts 
summa cum laude in political science with a minor in applied 
ethics from George Washington University.  He was a GW 
scholar at the University of Oxford in the fields of politics, 
law, and history.  Francisco’s experience includes a New York 
County Lawyer’s Association summer fellowship with the 
Honorable Robert Patterson, Jr., Senior Judge of the Southern 
District of New York and a half-year legal internship with 
the ACLU Racial Justice Project.  Additionally, as a former 
Executive Board member of the Miami-Dade Election 
Reform Coalition, a non-partisan elections watchdog 
and voting rights organization, his knowledge of election 
administration and best practices enabled him to offer in-
depth analysis and practical solutions to the contingencies 
surrounding presidential succession during the pre-inaugural 
period.  Francisco is also a member of the Board of Directors 
of Equal Justice Works, a national organization dedicated to 
mobilizing the next generation of public interest lawyers.  He 
will begin a career in public service with the New York City 
Campaign Finance Board as a Special Compliance Analyst, 
working to safeguard public matching funds and to ensure the 
compliance of outside corporate and organizational political 
expenditures in campaigns for city office.
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Erin Sullivan
Erin M. Sullivan graduated from Fordham University School 
of Law in 2011 and received a bachelor of science in industrial 
and labor relations from Cornell University in 2007.  Her 
past work experience includes an internship at Fox News, 
where she worked closely with Judge Andrew Napolitano in 
researching and drafting the substantive content for his book 
It Is Dangerous to Be Right When the Government Is Wrong: 
The Case for Personal Freedom, which analyzes the evolution 
of select U.S. constitutional rights.  Additionally, as a second-
year law student she wrote an independent study paper on the 
constitutionality of the Patriot Act, as seen through the eyes 
of the authors of the Federalist Papers, and took a class on the 
language of the Constitution.  Erin joined Cahill Gordon & 
Reindel llp as an associate in the fall of 2011.
Patrick Sweeney
Patrick Sweeney graduated from Fordham University School 
of Law in 2012 and graduated cum laude from Villanova 
University in 2007 with a bachelor of science in mechanical 
engineering and a business minor.  After graduation, Patrick 
worked for the Department of Defense as an artillery 
engineer at the Armament Research and Development 
Engineering Center at Picatinny Arsenal.  While there he 
primarily worked on the M119, M198, and M102 weapon 
systems.  Patrick currently works at a financial firm in New 
York City.  During the summer of 2011 he interned at Fox 
News working for Judge Andrew Napolitano in researching 
and drafting the substantive content of an upcoming book.  
Patrick will be joining the Army as part of the Army JAG 
Corps.
Jennie R. Tricomi
Jennie R. Tricomi graduated from Fordham University 
School of Law in 2011.  She graduated from the University 
of Virginia with a bachelor of arts in history in 2006.  During 
her last year at UVA, Jennie wrote her thesis on the efforts of 
Virginian women in support of ratification of the Nineteenth 
Amendment.  During her second year at Fordham, Jennie 
studied the Constitution, its framers, and origins in a course 
taught by Professor John D. Feerick. Jennie joined Milbank, 
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy as an associate in the fall of 2011.
Daniel Tyrrell
Daniel J. Tyrrell graduated from Fordham University School 
of Law in 2011. After graduating from the University of 
Pennsylvania in 2005 with a bachelor of arts degree in 
philosophy, politics & economics, Daniel served as Deputy 
Director of Absentee Ballot and Early Voting for the Republican 
National Committee during the 2006 election cycle.  From 2007 
to 2008, he served as Deputy Regional Political Director for the 
Rudy Giuliani Presidential Committee, where he was responsible 
for developing and implementing campaign strategy in fifteen 
states and five U.S. territories.  His past work experience includes 
judicial internships with the Honorable John W. Bissell, then-
Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the District 
of New Jersey, the Honorable Samuel A. Alito, then-Judge 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 
Justice James R. Zazzali, then-Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the State of New Jersey, and the Honorable Susan D. Wigenton, 
Judge of the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey.  Daniel served as a Notes & Article Editor for the 
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, President of the 
Fordham Law Republicans, and Vice President of the Fordham 
University School of Law Chapter of the Federalist Society.  He 
currently works in Washington, D.C. for the House Energy and 
Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. 
Elnaz Zarrini
Elnaz Zarrini graduated from Fordham University School of 
Law in 2011 and has a bachelor of arts from Brandeis University 
in both political science and international globalization 
studies.  As a second-year law student she wrote a Note on 
the Commercial Activity exception to the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity Act for Nazi art expropriation claims for the Fordham 
Journal of Corporate and Financial Law, on which she served as 
Associate Editor. Her past work experience includes internships 
at the United States Court of International Trade with the 
Honorable Donald Pogue, where she drafted opinions for 
district court cases heard by designation, including tobacco 
litigation and constitutional law issues, the New York City Bar 
Ethics Clearinghouse Subcommittee, and the Prisoners’ Rights 
Project, where she drafted letters to New York State prisoners on 
constitutional law issues.  She took a course on the Language of 
the Constitution taught by Professor John D. Feerick and joined 
Brown Rudnick LLP as a litigation and restructuring associate 
in the fall of 2011.
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